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1
2 INTRODUCTION
Cadre et principaux re´sultats.
Nous pre´sentons dans cette introduction quelques-uns des nombreux re´sultats existants por-
tant sur le comportement asymptotique des jeux re´pe´te´s a` information incomple`te d’un coˆte´
introduits par Aumann et Maschler [3]. Dans un premier temps, nous nous concentrons sur le
comportement asymptotique de la valeur et notamment sur le classique the´ore`me “Cav(u)” en
pre´sentant plusieurs preuves existantes ainsi que des re´sultats concernant la vitesse de conver-
gence. On de´finira aussi le jeu dual introduit par De Meyer [23], et on mentionnera certains
re´sultats asymptotiques obtenus en utilisant ce jeu ([32], [40]).
Le deuxie`me aspect important concerne la vitesse de convergence dans le the´ore`me “Cav(u)”
ou de manie`re e´quivalente l’e´tude asymptotique du terme d’erreur dans les jeux re´pe´te´s a` in-
formation incomple`te d’un coˆte´. On pre´sentera les re´sultats dus a` Mertens et Zamir ([42], [44])
ainsi qu’a` De Meyer ([23], [22]) et les travaux proprement lie´s aux proble`mes de variation maxi-
male de martingales qui apparaissent dans ces e´tudes asymptotiques ([43], [24]). Ces re´sultats
faisant intervenir un deuxie`me terme dans le de´veloppement asymptotique de la fonction valeur
d’un jeu re´pe´te´ seront regroupe´s abusivement sous le terme de de´veloppement du second ordre
par opposition au the´ore`me “Cav(u)” qui sera pour nous un re´sultat du premier ordre. On
mentionne dans la famille des re´sultats du second ordre les jeux financiers introduits par De
Meyer [25], qui ge´ne´ralisent les pre´ce´dents re´sultats de Mertens-Zamir [43] dans un cadre ou`
les ensembles d’actions et l’ensemble d’e´tats sont infinis. Ces jeux seront e´tudie´s en de´tail dans
le chapitre 3.
Nous citerons ensuite certains re´sultats obtenus en the´orie des jeux diffe´rentiels avec infor-
mation incomple`te d’un coˆte´ par Cardaliaguet et Rainer [17]. Nous ne rentrerons pas dans les
de´tails de la de´finition de la valeur ou des strate´gies pour ces jeux que nous ne re´utiliserons
plus par la suite dans cette the`se. Nous pre´senterons simplement quelques caracte´risations, en
termes de solutions de viscosite´ d’e´quations aux de´rive´es partielles, des fonctions valeurs de jeux
diffe´rentiels ainsi que leur repre´sentation probabiliste en termes de proble`me d’optimisation sur
un espace de martingales.
On pre´sentera enfin rapidement les diffe´rents chapitres de cette the`se, les principaux re´sultats
obtenus et comment ils s’inscrivent dans le cadre pre´ce´demment de´crit.
1. Jeux re´pe´te´s a` information incomple`te d’un coˆte´.
Nous pre´sentons dans cette section le mode`le classique de jeux re´pe´te´s a` information in-
comple`te d’un coˆte´ introduit dans Aumann-Maschler [3] dans le cas fini (plus pre´cise´ment avec
espaces d’actions et espace d’e´tat finis). Nous nous concentrons principalement sur le re´sultat
asymptotique connu sous le nom de the´ore`me “Cav(u)” et sur l’apparition d’une fonctionnelle
appele´e L1-variation d’une martingale. Nous pre´sentons aussi la notion de jeu dual introduite
par De Meyer dans [23], ainsi que les formules de re´currence associe´es au jeu initial (appele´ jeu
primal) et au jeu dual mettant en e´vidence leur structure re´cursive.
1.1. Le mode`le classique. Un jeu re´pe´te´ a` somme nulle a` information incomple`te d’un
coˆte´ note´ Gn est de´fini par (I, J,K,A) ou` I, J,K sont trois ensemble finis et A est une famille
de matrices a` coefficients re´els Ak = (Aki,j)(i,j)∈I×J indexe´es par k ∈ K. On conside`re deux
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joueurs appele´s joueur 1 (J1) et joueur 2 (J2). I et J repre´sentent respectivement les ensembles
d’actions de J1 et de J2. K repre´sente l’espace d’e´tat du jeu. Ak repre´sente la fonction de
paiement de J1 du jeu dans l’e´tat k.
Dans toute la suite, le cardinal d’un ensemble fini K sera aussi note´ K. L’ensemble des
probabilite´s sur un ensemble fini K sera note´ ∆(K) et sera identifie´ au simplexe canonique
dans RK . On notera {e1, .., eK} la base canonique de RK .
Pour tout p ∈ ∆(K), on de´finit un jeu de la manie`re suivante :
– Etape 0 : L’e´tat k ∈ K est tire´ au sort suivant la probabilite´ p ∈ ∆(K). Le joueur 1
seulement est informe´ de k.
– Etape 1 : Les deux joueurs choisissent simultane´ment et inde´pendamment une action
i1 ∈ I et j1 ∈ J . La paire d’actions choisie (i1, j1) est annonce´e publiquement.
– Etape q (q = 2, .., n) : En fonction de leurs observations (i1, j1, .., iq−1, jq−1) (appele´e
encore histoire passe´e du jeu), les joueurs choisissent simultane´ment et inde´pendamment
une action iq ∈ I et jq ∈ J . La paire d’actions choisie (iq, jq) est annonce´e publiquement.
– Etape n+ 1 : Le joueur 1 rec¸oit un paiement e´gal a`
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq .
Le jeu e´tant a` somme-nulle, J2 rec¸oit l’oppose´ de ce paiement.
La description du jeu et en particulier la probabilite´ initiale sur l’e´tat p est suppose´e connais-
sance commune des deux joueurs. En particulier, J2 sait que J1 a e´te´ informe´ de la valeur de
la variable d’e´tat k, ne connaˆıt pas cette valeur mais connaˆıt la probabilite´ initiale sur l’e´tat p
qui a e´te´ utilise´e.
La description ci-dessus correspond au jeu en strate´gies pures, conside´rons maintenant le jeu
en strate´gies de comportement ou` a` chaque e´tape q = 1, .., n, les joueurs peuvent utiliser une
loterie (ou loi de probabilite´) pour se´lectionner leur action. Ce jeu e´tendu sera note´ Gn(p). Une
strate´gie de comportement pour J1 est une suite σ = (σ1, .., σn), ou` pour tout q = 1, .., n, σq est
une probabilite´ de transition de K × Iq−1 × Jq−1 dans I. σq(k, i1, j1, .., iq−1, jq−1)[iq] repre´sente
la loterie utilise´e par J1 pour se´lectionner son action iq si la variable d’e´tat est k et si l’histoire
passe´e du jeu est (i1, j1, .., iq−1, jq−1). On notera Σn l’ensemble des strate´gies de comportement
de J1. De manie`re similaire, a` la diffe´rence pre`s que J2 ne connaˆıt pas la valeur de la variable
d’e´tat du jeu, une strate´gie de comportement de J2 est une suite τ = (τ1, .., τn), ou` pour tout
q = 1, .., n, τq est une probabilite´ de transition de Iq−1× Jq−1 dans J . On notera Tn l’ensemble
des strate´gies de comportement de J2. La donne´e du triplet (p, σ, τ) induit de manie`re unique
une probabilite´ Π(p, σ, τ) sur l’ensemble K × In × Jn en utilisant le the´ore`me de Tulcea (voir
[46]). Le paiement de J1 dans le jeu Gn(p) est alors
EΠ(p,σ,τ)[
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq ] =
∑
k∈K
pk
 n∑
q=1
σq(k, i1, j1, .., iq−1, jq−1)[iq]τq(i1, j1, .., iq−1, jq−1)[jq]Akiq ,jq
 .
Notez que l’on prend pour convention que k,iq,jq sont les application projections coordonne´es
sur l’ensemble produit K × In × Jn et donc conside´re´es comme des variables ale´atoires dans
l’espe´rance ci-dessus. Ce jeu est un jeu fini et admet donc une fonction valeur de´finie sur ∆(K)
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et note´e Vn(p) qui ve´rifie
Vn(p) = max
σ∈Σn
min
τ∈Tn
EΠ(p,σ,τ)[
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq ]
= min
τ∈Tn
max
σ∈Σn
EΠ(p,σ,τ)[
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq ].
1.2. La martingale des a posteriori. Conside´rons la probabilite´ Π(p, σ, τ) associe´e a`
une paire de strate´gies fixe´e. Notons (Hq)q=1,..,n la filtration sur K × In× Jn de´finie 1 par Hq =
σ(i1, j1, ..iq−1, jq−1, iq) (H0 e´tant donc la tribu grossie`re). On peut alors de´finir une martingale
(pq)q=0,..,n de la manie`re suivante :
(1.1) ∀q = 0, .., n, pq = EΠ(p,σ,τ)[ek | Hq],
ou` comme plus haut k est vue comme une variable ale´atoire a` valeurs dans K et ou` ek ∈
∆(K) repre´sente la masse de Dirac en k. L’espe´rance est alors de´finie en utilisant la structure
euclidienne de ∆(K) vu comme le simplexe canonique dans RK . Notez que p0 = p et que si
l’on de´finit pn+1 = ek, alors le processus prolonge´ (p0, .., pn+1) est encore une Hq martingale en
posant Hn+1 = σ(Hn, k) ayant pour loi finale une loi supporte´e par les sommets du simplexe.
Notez aussi que l’on peut rajouter la variable jq dans la de´finition de la tribu Hq sans modifier
le re´sultat car les variables jq et k sont par construction conditionnellement inde´pendantes
sachant Hq.
Cette martingale repre´sente les croyances du joueur 2 sur la variable d’e´tat. Cette in-
terpre´tation suppose que le joueur 2 connaˆıt la strate´gie du joueur 1 et re´vise ses croyances sur
l’e´tat en fonction de ses observations en utilisant la re`gle de Bayes. En effet, une identification
simple montre que pq est la loi conditionnelle de la variable d’e´tat sachant Hq. Introduisons
maintenant une fonctionnelle qui sera l’un des objets d’e´tude principaux de cette the`se. On
de´finit la L1-variation de la martingale (pq)q=0,..,n par
VL1n ((pq)q=0,..,n) = E[
n∑
q=1
‖pq − pq−1‖1].
Cette fonctionnelle ve´rifie l’ine´galite´ suivante
Lemme 1.1:
VL1n ((pq)q=0,..,n) ≤
∑
k∈K
√
npk0(1− pk0).
1.3. Le jeu dual. Etant donne´ un jeu Gn(p) comme de´fini plus haut, nous de´finissons
maintenant le jeu dual G∗n(x) de´pendant d’un parame`tre x ∈ RK . Ce jeu a` somme nulle entre
deux joueurs J1 et J2 est de´fini de la manie`re suivante.
– Etape 0 : J1 choisit de manie`re prive´e la variable d’e´tat du jeu en utilisant une loterie
p ∈ ∆(K).
1. Nous utilisons la notation courante σ(.) pour “tribu engendre´e par” en espe´rant qu’aucune ambigu¨ıte´ ne
naˆıtra de ce doublon qui reviendra tout au long de cette the`se, la lettre σ e´tant tout aussi classique pour de´signer
une strate´gie du joueur 1.
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– Etape 1 : Les deux joueurs jouent “comme” dans le jeu Gn(.). Cela revient a` un jeu en une
e´tape ou` les deux joueurs choisissent simultane´ment et inde´pendamment des strate´gies de
comportement σ ∈ Σn et τ ∈ Tn.
– Etape 2 : J1 rec¸oit un paiement
E(p,σ,τ)[
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq − xk].
Ce jeu est un jeu fini et admet une fonction valeur note´e Wn(x) de´finie sur RK ve´rifiant :
Wn(x) = max
p∈∆(K), σ∈Σn
min
τ∈Tn
EΠ(p,σ,τ)[
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq − xk]
= min
τ∈Tn
max
p∈∆(K), σ∈Σn
EΠ(p,σ,τ)[
n∑
q=1
Akiq ,jq − xk].
Les principaux re´sultats concernant le jeu dual sont re´sume´s dans la proposition suivante.
L’utilisation de la dualite´ convexe et de la transformation de Fenchel (note´e f ∗) justifient
l’utilisation du terme dual 2.
Proposition 1.1: Pour tous x ∈ RK et p ∈ ∆(K),
Wn(x) = (−Vn)∗(−x) et Vn(p) = −W ∗n(−p),
ou` la fonction Vn est prolonge´e sur RK par la valeur −∞.
De plus, une strate´gie optimale de J2 dans G∗n(x) avec −x ∈ ∂(−Vn)(p) est optimale dans
Gn(p).
La dernie`re proprie´te´ se ge´ne´ralise aux deux joueurs et relie les strate´gies optimales (et aussi
ε-optimales) du jeu primal et du jeu dual a` travers la relation de dualite´ liant les fonctions
valeurs des jeux correspondants.
La notion de jeu dual a e´te´ ge´ne´ralise´e a` des ensembles d’actions infinis (voir Sorin [54]) et
un jeu dual dans le cadre d’actions infinis avec une variable d’e´tat re´elle a e´te´ introduit dans
Moussa-Saley [30]. Un jeu dual similaire a` celui introduit dans [30] avec ensembles d’actions
infinis et variable d’e´tat dans un espace euclidien sera introduit dans le chapitre 1. Ce jeu dual
sera utilise´ dans l’analyse des jeux line´aires et dans le mode`le de jeux d’e´changes financiers
au chapitre 3, on introduira aussi une ge´ne´ralisation du meˆme type dans un mode`le de jeu a`
somme non-nulle dans le dernier chapitre de cette the`se.
1.4. Formule de re´currence : Primal et Dual. On entend ici par formule de re´currence
une formule reliant la valeur d’un jeu re´pe´te´ de longueur n + 1 a` la valeur du meˆme jeu de
longueur n. Ces formules sont base´es sur la structure re´cursive de ces jeux, qui permet de les
de´composer a` l’aide d’une nouvelle variable d’e´tat, ici la croyance a posteriori du joueur 2 (pour
le jeu primal), en un jeu dont le paiement fait intervenir un paiement d’e´tape de´pendant des
actions et de la variable d’e´tat initiale et un paiement de continuation de´pendant de la variable
d’e´tat actualise´e, ici la valeur d’un jeu re´pe´te´ de longueur n.
2. Dans tous les jeux a` somme nulle que nous conside´rerons, le joueur 1 maximise, de manie`re a` conserver
la pre´sentation classique. Par ailleurs on utilisera syste´matiquement la transformation de Fenchel dans le sens
convexe.
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Proposition 1.2: Pour tout p ∈ ∆(K),
Vn+1(p) = max
σ∈Σ1
min
τ∈T1
EΠ(p,σ,τ)[Aki1,j1 + Vn−1(p1)],
ou` p1 est de´fini par (1.1).
Ajoutons que les minimum et maximum commutent dans cette formule. Cette formule
permet de construire par induction une strate´gie optimale pour J1 qui a` l’e´tape q ne de´pend
que de q et pq−1. La valeur du jeu dual ve´rifie elle aussi une formule de re´currence
Proposition 1.3: Pour tout x ∈ RK,
Wn+1(x) = min
τ∈T1
max
i∈I
Wn(x− Ai,τ ),
ou` Ai,τ ∈ RK est le vecteur de coordonne´es (∑j∈J τ [j]Aki,j)k∈K .
De la meˆme manie`re que dans le jeu primal, cette formule permet de construire par induction
une strate´gie optimale du joueur 2 dans G∗n(x) qui ne de´pend a` l’e´tape q que de q et d’une
variable auxiliaire xq = x−∑q−1l=1 Ail,τl . En combinant ce re´sultat avec la relation existant entre
les strate´gies optimales de J2 dans Gn et G∗n, on obtient un moyen de construire par induction
des strate´gies optimales de J2 dans Gn. Cette technique sera utilise´e dans le chapitre 3 dans le
cadre de jeux financiers ainsi que dans le chapitre 4 dans un mode`le a` somme non-nulle ou` la
structure re´cursive des e´quilibres du jeu dual sera par certains aspects similaire.
1.5. Comportement asymptotique : Premier ordre (the´ore`me “Cav(u)”).
Introduisons maintenant le jeu non-re´ve´lateur, qui est une modification du jeu G1(p) ou`
le joueur 1 n’a aucune information sur la variable d’e´tat k. Son ensemble de strate´gies de
comportement est alors un ensemble re´duit forme´ des strate´gies σ qui ne de´pendent pas de k
dans Σ1, qu’on identifie a` ∆(I). On note Π(σ, τ) la loi induite sur I × J . La valeur note´e u(p)
de ce jeu fini existe et ve´rifie :
u(p) = max
σ∈∆(I)
min
τ∈∆(J)
EΠ(σ,τ)[
∑
k∈K
Aki1,j1 ].
On de´finit la fonction Cav(u) comme e´tant l’envelope concave de u sur ∆(K) (la plus petite
fonction concave supe´rieure a` u). Le the´ore`me “Cav(u)” s’e´nonce alors de la manie`re suivante
The´oreme 1.1 (The´ore`me Cav(u)):
Cav(u)(p) ≤ 1
n
Vn(p) ≤ Cav(u)(p) + C
∑
k∈K
√
pk(1− pk)√
n
.
En particulier, 1
n
Vn(p) converge vers Cav(u)(p) quand n tend vers +∞.
1.6. Approches duales du the´ore`me “Cav(u)”. Mentionnons enfin brie`vement deux
preuves diffe´rentes du the´ore`me “Cav(u)” obtenues par De Meyer et Rosenberg [32] et Laraki
[40] et toutes deux base´es sur l’e´tude du jeu dual. La premie`re repose sur une e´tude appro-
fondie de la formule de re´currence du jeu dual et sur les proprie´te´s fonctionnelles de la famille
d’ope´rateurs associe´e (qui transforme Vn−1 en Vn) et fait notamment apparaˆıtre une e´quation
aux de´rive´es partielles elliptique du type Hamilton-Jacobi. La preuve de Laraki donne un sens
pre´cis a` cette e´quation en montrant qu’elle est e´quivalente a` une e´quation parabolique associe´e
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a` un jeu diffe´rentiel dont la valeur est l’unique solution de viscosite´. L’auteur montre alors que le
jeu dual est une discre´tisation de ce jeu diffe´rentiel et en de´duit le comportement asymptotique
de la valeur du jeu dual. Dans les deux cas, on retrouve le re´sultat asymptotique e´nonce´ dans le
the´ore`me “Cav(u)” grace a` la relation de dualite´ existant entre les fonctions valeurs Vn et Wn.
Les re´sultats obtenus par Laraki seront ge´ne´ralise´s dans la classe des jeux line´aires au
chapitre 1.
2. Comportement asymptotique : Deuxie`me ordre.
Nous pre´sentons dans cette section les re´sultats de Mertens et Zamir [42] et [43] pour
dans une classe particulie`re de jeux finis ainsi que le proble`me de L1-variation maximale de
martingales. Ensuite nous pre´sentons les ge´ne´ralisation obtenues par De Meyer dans [22], [23]
et [24].
2.1. La classes de jeux ∆σ0. Un jeu Gn appartient a` la classe ∆σ0 si I = J et si pour tout
p ∈ ∆(K), J1 a une unique strate´gie optimale comple`tement mixte σ0 dans le jeu non-re´ve´lateur
qui ne de´pend pas de p. Autrement dit :
∀p ∈ ∆(K), min
j∈J
∑
(i,k)∈I×K
pkAki,jσ0[i] ≥ u(p).
Dans tout jeu de la classe ∆σ0 , la fonction u est line´aire (voir [22]). En particulier u = Cav(u), ce
qui s’interpre`te en disant que le joueur 1 ne peut pas guarantir de paiement strictement supe´rieur
a` u a` une e´tape du jeu sans utiliser (et potentiellement re´ve´ler) en partie son information.
2.2. Le re´sultat de Mertens et Zamir. Dans le cas particulier ou` I = J = K = 2,
Mertens et Zamir ([42] ont montre´ dans un jeu particulier de la classe ∆σ0 que le terme d’erreur
dans le the´ore`me “Cav(u)” e´tait d’ordre 1√
n
. Pre´cise´ment, on a le re´sultat suivant pour ce jeu.
The´oreme 2.1: Notons En(p) = ( 1nVn(p)− Cav(u)(p)), alors pour tout p ∈ [0, 1],√
nEn → Cψ(p),
ou` C est une constante et ψ(x) est la densite´ de la loi normale centre´e re´duite e´value´e a` son
x-quantile.
La preuve est base´e sur le re´sultat ge´ne´ral suivant, de´montre´ par des techniques d’e´quations
diffe´rentielles dans [43]. Notons Mn(p) l’ensemble des martingales (p0, .., pn) a` valeurs dans
[0, 1] et telles que p0 = p ∈ [0, 1].
The´oreme 2.2: Pour tout p ∈ [0, 1]
1√
n
sup
(p0,..,pn)∈Mn(p)
VL1n ((p0, .., pn)) = ψ(p).
Ces re´sultats sont ge´ne´ralise´s a` toute la classe ∆σ0 avec I = J = K = 2 dans l’article [44]
ou` en particulier il est montre´ qu’en dehors de cette classe de jeux, la vitesse de convergence
du terme d’erreur vers 0 est au moins d’ordre n−2/3, donc plus rapide.
De plus, une martingale optimale dans ce proble`me de maximisation a` n fixe´ permet de
construire une strate´gie optimale de J1 dans le jeu Gn(p). Ce phe´nome`ne est en fait tre`s ge´ne´ral
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et valable dans tous les jeux finis et dans la classe plus large des jeux line´aires introduite dans
le chapitre 1.
2.3. Les re´sultats de De Meyer. L’apparition de la loi normale fut explique´e par De
Meyer dans [22] en utilisant le the´ore`me central limite dans une sous-classe de ∆σ0 pour des
ensemble I, J,K finis de cardinal quelconque.
Signalons aussi que ces travaux ont conduit paralle`lement a une ge´ne´ralisation du re´sultat
sur la variation L1-maximale de martingales dans [24].
L’extension de ces re´sultats a` la toute la classe ∆σ0 expose´e dans De Meyer [22] proce`de
diffe´remment. La technique employe´e est en fait a` rapprocher de celle apparaissant dans [32]
ou dans [40]. La preuve donne´e par De Meyer e´tudie les proprie´te´s d’ope´rateurs associe´s a`
la formule de re´currence du jeu dual et utilise une e´quation aux de´rive´es partielles du second
ordre appele´e e´quation heuristique. Le re´sultat obtenu est alors un re´sultat du type “the´ore`me
de ve´rification”. Il s’e´nonce en disant que si l’e´quation heuristique admet une solution lisse alors
n−
1
2Wn(
√
nx) converge uniforme´ment vers cette solution. Une interpre´tation probabiliste des
solutions lie´e a` la loi normale est donne´e pour une sous-classe de jeux.
2.4. Mode`les de jeux financiers. Les re´sultats du second ordre pre´sente´s ci-dessus
trouvent une ge´ne´ralisation naturelle dans le cadre des jeux d’e´changes financiers introduits
dans De Meyer et Moussa-Saley [31] et de´veloppe´s dans De Meyer et Moussa-Saley [30], De
Meyer et Marino ([27] et [28]) et plus re´cemment dans De Meyer [25]. Le principal re´sultat
de ce dernier article est l’apparition d’une classe robuste de dynamiques de prix limite, ap-
pele´e CMMV. En effet, il est montre´ que ces dynamiques sont les limites des processus de
prix a` l’e´quilibre dans une tre`s grande famille de jeux financiers. Les techniques utilise´es seront
ge´ne´ralise´es dans le chapitre 2. D’autre part, ces mode`les appartiennent a` la classe des jeux
line´aires que nous introduirons dans le chapitre 1 et seront e´tudie´s en de´tails dans le chapitre
3.
3. Quelques re´sultats concernant les jeux diffe´rentiels
Nous pre´sentons ici certains re´sultats obtenus par Cardaliaguet et Rainer dans [17]. Ces
re´sultats font partie d’une litte´rature plus large sur les jeux diffe´rentiels a` information in-
comple`te dont diffe´rents aspect sont similaires a` ceux apparaissant dans l’e´tude du compor-
tement asymptotique des jeux re´pe´te´s a` information incomple`te. Nous renvoyons notamment
le lecteur a` [15] et [18] pour des de´finitions pre´cises des jeux en question, et de la notion de
strate´gie associe´e.
3.1. Un jeu diffe´rentiel a` information incomple`te. Les auteurs de´finissent un jeu
diffe´rentiel a` somme-nulle a` information incomple`te d’un coˆte´ qui apparaˆıt comme la
ge´ne´ralisation en temps continu du mode`le d’Aumann-Maschler, a` la nuance importante pre`s
que le proble`me n’est plus ne´ce´ssairement homoge`ne en temps. Ce jeu peut se de´crire ainsi.
Comme pre´ce´demment, le joueur 1 est informe´ d’une variable d’e´tat k ∈ K (K fini) tire´e au
sort selon une loi p ∈ ∆(K). Les joueurs ont respectivement des espaces d’actions U, V (com-
pacts de dimension finie). Le jeu se de´roule en temps continu dans [0, 1]. De manie`re a` faire
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varier la longueur du jeu, on indexe ce jeu par sa date de de´but t0 ∈ [0, 1]. Une strate´gie open-
loop pour J1 est une famille de fonctions mesurables uk(s) de [t0, 1] dans U (resp. une fonction
v(s) de [t0, 1] dans V pour J2). On peut alors de´finir un paiement
J(t0, p, (uk(.))k∈K , v(.)) =
∑
k∈K
pk
∫ 1
t0
lk(s, uk(s), v(s))ds
de´pendant d’une famille de fonctions lk continues sur [0, 1] × U × V . La notion qui remplace
les strate´gies de comportement dans ce cadre est la notion de strate´gie mixte non-anticipative
avec de´lai. Notons Σ(t0) (resp. T (t0)) l’ensemble de telles strate´gies pour J1 (resp. J2) dans le
jeu commencant en t0. Un couple (α, β) ∈ Σ(t0) × T (t0) de´finit une loi de probabilite´ Π(α, β)
sur les couples de fonctions mesurables (u, v) de [t0, 1] dans U × V . On peut alors de´finir un
jeu sous forme normale ou` J1 a pour strate´gie (αk)k∈K ∈ Σ(t0)K et J2 β ∈ T (t0), et dont le
paiement est
J(t0, p, αk(.), β(.)) =
∑
pkEΠ(αk,β)[
∫ 1
t0
lk(s, uk(s), v(s))ds].
Sous la condition dite d’Isaacs suivante,
H(t, p) = max
u∈U
min
v∈V
∑
k∈K
pklk(u, v) = min
v∈V
max
u∈U
∑
k∈K
pklk(u, v),
ce jeu a une valeur note´e V (t, p) qui est caracte´rise´e de plusieurs manie`res.
3.2. Repre´sentation probabiliste de la solution et e´quation associe´e. Commencons
par une repre´sentation faisant intervenir un proble`me d’optimisation sur un espace de lois de
martingales. La fonction valeur V de´finie plus haut admet la repre´sentation suivante (the´ore`me
3.1 dans [17]).
Proposition 3.1:
(3.1) V (t0, p) = sup
(Xt)t∈[t0,1]∈M(p)
E[
∫ 1
t0
H(s,Xs)ds],
ou` M(p) est l’ensemble des martingales a` trajectoires ca`dla`g sur [t0, 1], a` valeur dans ∆(K) et
dont la loi finale X1 ve´rifie P(X1 = ek) = pk.
Notons que cet ensemble de martingales est la ge´ne´ralisation naturelle en temps continu des
martingales de croyances a posteriori introduites plus haut.
Une deuxie`me repre´sentation de cette fonction est donne´e, en terme d’e´quation aux de´rive´es
partielles avec obstacle. Pre´cise´ment (proposition 2.5 dans [17])
Proposition 3.2: V est l’unique solution Lipschitz au sens viscosite´ de l’e´quation
max{ ∂φ
∂t
+H(t, p), λmax(
∂2φ
∂2p
)} = 0
sur (0, 1) ×∆(K) avec la condition au bord V (1, p) = 0. En particulier, la fonction V (t, .) est
concave par rapport a` p.
Cette notion de solution admet aussi une formulation duale equivalente, faisant intervenir
la transforme´e de Fenchel de V par rapport a` p (voir [16]). Pour ce jeu pre´cis, on a le re´sultat
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suivant. La fonction (t, x) 7→ (−V (t, .))∗(−x) de´finie sur RK est l’unique solution de viscosite´
de (proposition 3.1. dans [17])
(3.2)

∂φ
∂t
−H(t, ∂φ
∂p
) = 0
φ(1, x) = sup
k∈K
(xk) .
Dans le cas particulier ou` les fonctions lk ne de´pendent pas de t, on retrouve alors une ca-
racte´risation similaire a` celle apparaissant dans les jeux re´pe´te´s, faisant intervenir l’ope´rateur
de concavification (voir exemple 4.1 dans [17]) et la repre´sentation duale donne´e dans Laraki
[40].
L’un des enjeux du chapitre 1 est de de´montrer que dans une large classe de jeux contenant
les jeux finis, le the´ore`me “Cav(u)”, la repre´sentation duale (3.2) ainsi que la repre´sentation
probabiliste (3.1) restent valables. On verra ensuite dans le chapitre 2 que la situation est si-
milaire pour les re´sultats asymptotiques du deuxie`me ordre dans une sous-classe de jeu ou` u =
Cav(u) = 0. En effet, on donnera une repre´sentation duale de la fonction valeur d’un proble`me
asymptotique, faisant intervenir des e´quations du deuxie`me ordre et une repre´sentation proba-
biliste de cette fonction valeur comme proble`me d’optimisation sur un espace de martingales
faisant intervenir un terme de second ordre sous la forme de la variance infinite´simale de ces
martingales.
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4. Re´sultats
Nous pre´sentons ici les principaux re´sultats de cette the`se, en lien avec les re´sultats ge´ne´raux
en the´orie des jeux re´pe´te´s a` information incomple`te e´nonce´s pre´ce´demment.
4.1. Jeux line´aires. Le premier chapitre de cette the`se concerne une classe de jeux re´pe´te´s
a` information comple`te appele´s “Jeux line´aires”. Cette classe contient les jeux finis via une iden-
tification tre`s simple, ainsi que leur extension appele´e jeu partiellement-re´ve´lateur introduite
dans [29] et utilise´e dans [26] pour de´crire les fonctions valeur d’information. Elle contient
aussi la classe des jeux d’e´changes financiers introduite dans [25] et permet de ge´ne´raliser ces
jeux d’e´changes a` un cadre multi-actif, ce qui sera traite´ dans le chapitre 3. Un jeu line´aire est
un jeu a` information incomple`te d’un coˆte´ ou` l’espace d’e´tat est euclidien et ou` la fonction de
paiement du jeu est line´aire par rapport a` la variable d’e´tat. Ce premier chapitre a vocation a`
unifier les diffe´rents re´sultats pre´ce´demment pre´sente´s en se basant sur la formule de variation
de martingale introduite dans [25], et sur une ge´ne´ralisation du jeu dual.
On prouve de manie`re ge´ne´rale que le maxmin d’un jeu line´aire est donne´ par un proble`me
d’optimisation appartenant a` la famille des proble`mes de variation de martingales. La norme
L1 qui apparaˆıt dans la notion de L1-variation est alors remplace´e par la fonction valeur du
jeu en 1 coup. Ce re´sultat permet par exemple de ge´ne´raliser le the´ore`me “Cav(u)” a` toute la
classe des jeux line´aires de manie`re directe. On introduit ensuite un jeu dual, et on montre que
les re´sultats de Laraki s’e´tendent a` cette classe de jeu, obtenant ainsi une repre´sentation duale
diffe´rentielle de Cav(u) sur un simplexe de dimension infinie. On identifie les jeux finis comme
une classe particulie`re de jeux line´aires, et on s’inte´resse a` leur extension en jeux partiellement
re´ve´lateurs. Cette extension consiste simplement a` conside´rer le jeu ou` J1 rec¸oit seulement un
signal ale´atoire sur la variable d’e´tat k. Enfin, on prouve que la fonction Cav(u) admet une
repre´sentation probabiliste comme la fonction valeur d’un proble`me d’optimisation sur un es-
paces de martingales en temps continu. Ce dernier re´sultat apporte peu d’information sur le
comportement asymptotique du jeu, en ce sens que l’ensemble de ses solutions est essentielle-
ment de´ge´ne´re´, mais il souligne une analogie forte, dans la mesure ou` les meˆmes repre´sentations
probabilistes ainsi que les re´pre´sentations duales lie´es a` un proble`me d’e´quations aux de´rive´es
partielles apparaissent dans dans le chapitre 2 concernant des de´veloppements du second-ordre
de fonctions valeurs de jeux line´aires.
4.2. Le proble`me de variation maximale de martingales. Le but de ce chapitre est
de pre´senter une ge´ne´ralisation des re´sultats de Mertens-Zamir [43] et De Meyer [25] sur une
famille de proble`mes de variation maximale de martingales. Ces proble`mes apparaissent de
manie`re tre`s ge´ne´rale dans l’e´tude des jeux line´aires e´tudie´s au chapitre 1. On s’inte´resse ici
aux proble`mes lie´s a` une classe de jeux posse´dant une proprie´te´ d’invariance spe´cifique, qui
permet de re´e´crire le proble`me de variation de martingale associe´ sous une forme proche de
la formulation initiale de la L1-variation. L’e´tude de ce proble`me est intimement lie´e a` l’e´tude
des jeux d’e´changes multi-actifs e´tudie´e au chapitre suivant (voir aussi chapitre 1 section 4),
mode`le dans lequel il apparaˆıt de manie`re naturelle. Notre e´tude va ne´anmoins plus loin et
s’applique a` une classe de jeux line´aires plus grande que les jeux d’e´changes qui seront e´tudie´s
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au chapitre 3. Les premiers re´sultats sont la de´finition d’un proble`me limite d’optimisation sur
un ensemble de lois de martingales en temps continu et la repre´sentation duale de la fonction
valeur de ce proble`me en terme de solutions de viscosite´ d’une e´quation aux de´rive´es partielles
du second ordre. Ces deux repre´sentations sont exactement de meˆme nature (mais au deuxie`me
ordre) que les re´sultats existants pour le premier ordre, dans le cas homoge`ne en temps dans
[17] et dans Laraki [40].
On s’inte´resse aussi en de´tail au comportement asymptotique des lois de martingales de
longueur n qui maximisent le proble`me en temps discret. On montre que les lois limites sont
optimales pour le proble`me limite et on propose une caracte´risation de ces lois limites base´e sur
des re´sultats de transport optimal et sur les solutions d’un proble`me de controˆle stochastique lie´
a` l’e´quation duale. On prouve un the´ore`me de type “ve´rification” associe´ a` cette caracte´risation.
On retrouve en particulier les re´sultats asymptotiques obtenus dans [25].
4.3. Applications aux jeux d’e´change financiers et aux mode`les de prix. Ce cha-
pitre e´tudie une ge´ne´ralisation multi-actifs du mode`le de jeu d’e´change introduit dans De Meyer
et Moussa-Saley [31] puis de manie`re plus large une sous-classe des jeux line´aires qui ge´ne´ralise
les jeux d’e´changes introduits dans [25]. On e´tudie une version a` deux actifs du jeu introduit
dans [31] et on prouve l’existence de la valeur de ce jeu et de strate´gies optimales pour les
deux joueurs. On obtient alors une caracte´risation du comportement asymptotique de la valeur
du jeu et des processus de prix a` l’e´quilibre en utilisant les re´sultats du chapitre pre´ce´dent.
On re´sout alors le proble`me limite dans plusieurs cas particuliers. Dans un premier temps, on
conside`re un mode`le a` deux actifs ou` le deuxie`me actif est un produit de´rive´ dont la valeur varie
de manie`re monotone en fonction de l’actif sous-jacent (le premier actif), comme par exemple
une option europe´enne. On montre que dans ce cas, les dynamiques de prix introduites dans
[25] sont conserve´es, de´montrant ainsi la robustesse de ces dynamiques de prix appele´es CMMV
face a` l’introduction de produits de´rive´s dans le mode`le. On traite aussi un cas particulier ou`
l’hypothe`se de monotonie n’est plus respecte´e, et on construit explicitement une solution du
proble`me limite qui n’est plus dans la classe CMMV, mais est une martingale faisant intervenir
le temps local d’un mouvement Brownien.
4.4. Etude asymptotique d’un jeu d’e´change a` somme non-nulle. Ce chapitre
pre´sente l’e´tude asymptotique d’une classe d’e´quilibres de Nash dans un mode`le de jeu d’e´change
a` somme non-nulle. Ce chapitre est base´ sur un travail effectue´ en collaboration avec Bernard
De Meyer.
Le mode`le a` somme non-nulle exclut la possibilite´ d’utiliser les techniques de variations de
martingales e´tudie´es dans les chapitres pre´ce´dents.
On aborde le proble`me en introduisant un jeu dual. On montre que ce jeu dual conserve
certaines des proprie´te´s propres au jeu dual dans le cadre a` somme nulle. En particulier, on
montre l’existence d’une famille particulie`re d’e´quilibres ayant une structure re´cursive. Grace
a` cette structure, on parvient a` obtenir des re´sultats asymptotiques sur ces e´quilibres dans le
jeu dual. En utilisant la dualite´, ces re´sultats entrainent a` leur tour une caracte´risation du
comportement d’une suite d’e´quilibres dans le jeu initial. Ne´anmoins, cette caracte´risation est
moins directe que la cadre des jeux a` somme nulle, car elle est valable dans une suite de jeux
4. RE´SULTATS 13
ou` la loi de la variable d’e´tat est remplace´e par une approximation. Ceci est duˆ au fait que la
relation existant entre les e´quilibres du jeu initial et les e´quilibres du jeu dual est plus complexe
que dans le cadre des jeux a` somme nulle. Il n’y a plus de fonction valeur, et donc plus de lien
entre les variables duales et primales a` travers le sous-diffe´rentiel de ces fonctions valeurs. Il
existe bien un lien de dualite´, mais il apparaˆıt de manie`re implicite, et la principale difficulte´
dans l’e´tude de ce mode`le tient justement a` relier les e´quilibres du jeu initial a` ceux du jeu
dual. On prouve dans cette optique un re´sultat d’existence d’e´quilibre dans le jeu initial pour
une classe de lois re´gulie`res, ce qui correspondrait dans le language des jeux a` somme-nulle a`
prouver l’existence d’un e´le´ment dans le sous-diffe´rentiel de la fonction valeur du jeu primal.

CHAPITRE 1
Jeux line´aires
Ce premier chapitre introduit une classe de jeux re´pe´te´s a` information comple`te appele´s
“Jeux line´aires”. On e´tablit dans la premie`re section des re´sultats ge´ne´raux et notamment l’ex-
tension du the´ore`me “Cav(u)”. Le re´sultat principal est la formulation de la valeur en tant que
proble`me d’optimisation appele´ variation maximale de martingales, re´sultat que l’on re´utilisera
au chapitre 3.
Dans la section 2, on de´finit et on e´tudie les proprie´te´s du jeu dual, ce qui permet d’e´tendre
les re´sultats de Laraki [40].
On s’inte´resse dans la section 3 aux jeux finis et on montre que le proble`me de variation
maximale converge vers un proble`me limite en temps continu.
Enfin dans la section 4, on identifie la classe des jeux d’e´changes financiers comme une
sous-classe des jeux line´aires, et on introduit une classe spe´cifique de jeux motivant le proble`me
e´tudie´ dans le chapitre 2.
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1. Linear game model
We introduce in this section a general class of repeated games with incomplete information
on one side a` la Aumann-Maschler [3] called linear games. The main result is that the maxmin
(or lower value) of these games is equal to the value function of an optimization problem
over discrete-time martingale distributions called problem of maximal variation of martingales.
This generalizes therefore the former result of De Meyer [25] in a multi-dimensional context.
Using this representation, we extend the classical “Cav(u)” theorem of Aumann-Maschler for
the maxmin functions. The limiting function given by this theorem is then shown to be the
value function of an optimization problem over continuous-time martingale distributions and
we prove that the limit of any convergent sequence of maximizers for the maximal variation
problem is a maximizer of the limit problem.
1.1. The model. We describe now a general two players (P1 and P2) zero-sum game with
incomplete information on one side.The state variable is a vector L = (L1, .., Ld) ∈ Rd and is
drawn by Nature at the beginning of the game using some probability µ in the set ∆1(Rd) of
probabilities with finite first order moment. P1 is informed of the realization of the random
variable L while P2 knows only its probability distribution µ. The two players have polish
(complete separable metric) action spaces I,J endowed with their Borel σ-fields I,J . A pure
strategy for P1 in the one-shot game is a Borel mapping s ∈ L0(Rd, I) from Rd to I, and for
P2 some point j ∈ J . T is a bounded Borel mapping from I × J to Rd. The payoff function in
pure strategies for this game is then defined on ∆1(Rd)× L0(Rd, I)× J by
g(µ, s, j) = Eµ[〈L, T (s(L), j)〉] =
∫
Rd
〈x, T (s(x), j)〉dµ(x)
Let us denote Γn(µ) the associated n-times repeated game in behavioral strategies. At round
k (k = 1, .., n), P1 and P2 select simultaneously and independently an action ik ∈ I for P1 and
jk ∈ J for P2 using some lottery depending on their information and past observations. Actions
are announced publicly after each round. Formally, a behavioral strategy σ for P1 is a sequence
(σ1, ..., σn) of transition probabilities depending on his information and past observations
σk : Rd × (I × J)(k−1) → ∆(I)
where σk(L, i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1) denotes the lottery used to select the action ik played at round
k by P1 when the state variable is L and the past history of the game is (i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1).
Let Σn be the set of behavioral strategies for P1. Similarly, a strategy τ for P2 is a sequence
(τ1, ..., τn) depending only of his past observations
τk : (I × J)(k−1) → ∆(J)
Let Tn denote the set of behavioral strategies for P2. A triplet (µ, σ, τ) induces by Tulcea’s
theorem (see [46]) a unique probability Π(µ,σ,τ) ∈ ∆(Rd × In × Jn). The payoff function in
Γn(µ) is given by
gn(µ, σ, τ) = EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[〈L,
n∑
k=1
T (ik, jk)〉]
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Note that the function inside the above expectation is a linear function of the state variable L
which justifies the name of linear games for this class.
1.2. The martingale of expected beliefs. As usual, if P2 knows that P1 is using some
strategy σ, he will update his beliefs on the state variable L given his observations using
Bayes’ rules. In a more general context, beliefs of P2 should be represented by the conditional
distribution of the state variable over Rd given his information. In our case, due to the linearity
of the payoffs, we shall only consider the process of expected beliefs of P2. Precisely, let us define
the expected belief of P2 as the expected value of L given his information. Available information
after round k is represented by the σ-field Fk = σ(i1, j1, ..., ik, jk) of past observations. Formally,
the process of expected beliefs is the martingale
(1.1) Lk = EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[L | Fk]
and the law of this martingale depends on the pair of strategies (σ, τ). This martingale has
length n and its final value Ln is by construction Blackwell dominated 1 by µ. The initial value
is by convention L0 = Eµ[L] and we will sometimes consider the variable Ln+1 , L as the
terminal value of the martingale 2, which follows the law µ.
1.3. The maxmin and minmax functions. Let us define the maxmin and minmax of
the game Γn(µ), respectively the maximal and minimal payoffs P1 and P2 can guarantee:
V n(µ) = sup
σ∈Σn
inf
τ∈Tn
EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [〈L,
n∑
k=1
T (ik, jk)〉]
V n(µ) = inf
τ∈Tn
sup
σ∈Σn
EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [〈L,
n∑
k=1
T (ik, jk)〉]
Notation 1: In the sequel, |.| refers to the usual euclidian norm on Rd and |.|1,|.|∞ to the
classical norm of order 1 and uniform norm.
The following result is classical in zero-sum games.
Proposition 1.1: The functions V n and V n are concave on ∆1(Rd), nondecreasing for the
Blackwell order, Lipschitz continuous with respect to the Wasserstein distance of order 1 (de-
noted dW1) and positively 1-homogenous in the following sense
(1.2) ∀λ > 0, V n([λY ]) = λV n([Y ])
where Y is some integrable random variable and [Y ] denotes the law of Y .
Proof. Let us prove the nondecreasing property. Suppose that µ1  µ2, and let (Y1, Y2) be
a martingale such that Yi ∼ µi for i = 1, 2. Let σ be a strategy in Γ1(µ1). Define the variable
i1 such that its conditional law given (Y1, Y2) is σ(Y1). The law of (Y2, i1) defines a strategy for
1. Recall that µ1 is Blackwell-dominated by µ2 (µ1  µ2) if there exists a two-steps martingale X1, X2 such
that Xi is µi distributed for i = 1, 2.
2. Note that it is always possible to add an additional variable having law µ to a martingale whose final
distribution is Blackwell dominated by µ
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P1 in Γ1(µ2). Using the martingale property, the induced payoff in Γ1(µ2) against any strategy
τ is
E[〈Y2, T (i1, j1)〉] = E[〈Y1, T (i1, j1)〉] = g(µ1, σ, τ)
implying that P1 can guarantee at least the same quantity in Γ1(µ2) than in Γ1(µ1). For the
Lipschitz property, let µ1, µ2 ∈ ∆1(Rd) and (Y1, Y2) be random variables such that Yi ∼ µi for
i = 1, 2 and E[|Y1 − Y2|1] = dW1(µ1, µ2). Let (i1, j1) ∈ I × J be any random variables defined
on the same probability space, the result follows easily from the following inequality
|E[〈Y1 − Y2, T (i1, j1)〉]| ≤ CTdW1(µ1, µ2)
where CT = sup(i,j)∈I×J |T (i, j)|∞. For the concavity, let µ1, µ2 ∈ ∆1(Rd) and µ = λµ1+(1−λ)µ2
with λ ∈ (0, 1). There exists a joint law of the pair (i, L) on {1, 2} × Rd such that P(i =
1) = λ and the conditional law of L given i is (µi)i=1,2. In the game Γ1(µ), P1 can select
i using the conditional law of i given L by using some exogenous lottery and then play an
ε-optimally in the game Γ1(µi). This process defines a strategy in Γ1(µ) which guarantees
λV 1(µ1) + (1− λ)V 1(µ1)− ε. The same arguments work for V n and V n. 
1.4. The maximal variation problem. Let us introduce some notations
Definition 1.1: For µ ∈ ∆1(Rd)
– Mn(µ) is the collection of martingales (Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n defined on some filtered probabil-
ity space (Ω,A, (Fk)k=0,..,n,P), of length n and whose final distribution [Ln] is Blackwell
dominated by µ. By convention, we set F0 = {Ω, ∅}.
– Mn(µ) is the subset of ∆((Rd)n) formed by the laws of Rd-valued martingales
(L1, .., Ln) such that the final distribution [Ln] is Blackwell dominated by µ.
Definition 1.2: Given a function F : ∆1(Rd) → R, we define the F -variation on the set
Mn(µ) by
(1.3) VFn ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
F ([Lk | Fk−1])]
where [Lk | Fk−1] denotes the conditional law of Lk given Fk−1.
The maximal F -variation is then defined as
VFn (µ) = sup
Mn(µ)
VFn .
In the sequel, when F = V 1, we will use the shorter notations Vn , VV 1n and Vn , VV1n .
The following property results directly from the concavity of V 1.
Lemma 1.1: For all µ ∈ ∆1(Rd), we have
(1.4) Vn(µ) = sup
[(Lk)k=1,..,n]∈Mn(µ)
Vn((Lk,FLk )k=1,..,n)
if we define (FLk )k=0,1,..,n as the natural filtration of (L1, .., Ln), i.e.
FLk = σ(L1, .., Lk) for k = 1, .., n and F0 = {(Rd)n, ∅}
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Proof. It is clearly sufficient to prove that Vn(µ) is not greater than the right-hand side
of (1.4). Let ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) ∈Mn(µ). Since V 1 is concave and dW1-Lipschitz, it follows from
Jensen’s inequality (see lemma 5.1) that for all k = 1, .., n
V 1([Lk | Fk−1]) ≤ V 1([Lk | FLk−1])
The proof follows then by summation over k. 
Let us now prove that the maxmin of the n-rounds game is given by the maximal V 1-
variation problem.
Proposition 1.2:
V n(µ) = Vn(µ)
Moreover, any ε-maximizer of Vn induces an (2ε)-optimal strategy for P1.
We will need the following two lemmas that are essentially classical measurable selection
results.
Lemma 1.2: For all ε > 0, there exists a measurable function
ϕε : Rd ×∆1(Rd)× [0, 1]→ I
such that the strategy induced by i1 = ϕε(L, µ, U) where U is some uniform random variable on
[0, 1] independent from L is ε-optimal in the game Γ1(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆1(Rd).
The proof of this first lemma is standard but quite long and therefore postponed to section
5. Let us denote ∆1(I × Rd) the set of joint probability distributions on I × Rd such that
the marginal probability induced on Rd is in ∆1(Rd). Note that a pair (σ1, µ) where σ1 is a
strategy of P1 in the game Γ1(µ) defines naturally a probability in ∆1(I × Rd) that will be
denoted pi(σ1, µ).
Lemma 1.3: For all ε > 0, there exists a universally measurable function
τε : ∆1(I × Rd)→ ∆(J)
such that for all (σ1, µ)
EΠ(µ,σ1,τε(pi(σ1,µ)))[〈L, T (i1, j1)〉] ≤ V 1(µ) + ε
Proof. Endow the set ∆1(I×Rd) with the coarsest topology such that the applications pi →∫
g(i, x)dpi(i, x) are continuous for all real-valued continuous functions g such that |g(i, x)| ≤
C(1 + |x|) for some constant C independent of i. If we endow ∆(J) with the usual weak
topology, then the application
(pi, τ)→
∫
〈x, T (i, j)〉dpi(i, x)⊗ τ(j)
is jointly measurable. If µ denotes the marginal law on Rd induced by pi, the set
{(pi, τ) :
∫
〈x, T (i, j)〉dpi(i, x)⊗ τ(j) ≤ V 1(µ) + ε}
is therefore a Borel subset of ∆1(I × Rd) × ∆(J). The existence of an ε-optimal universally
measurable selection ψ follows therefore from Von Neumann’s selection theorem (see appendix
theorem 2.3). 
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Proof of proposition 1.2. This proof is just an adaptation of the one appearing in [25]
that we tried to make as precise as possible for the purpose of this work. Note however that
the second part is slightly different since we consider the maxmin of the game and not the
value. Let us start with an ε-maximizer (Lk)k=1,..,n for the problem Vn. Formally, since only
the law of the chosen martingale is relevant, given the state variable L and a sequence U1, .., Un
of independent random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent from L, there
exists a sequence of measurable functions (f1, fn) such that the martingale
Lk = fk(L,U1, .., Uk) for k = 1, ..n
has the same law as the initially chosen martingale (so that we use the same notation). Now from
the previous lemma, we can define P1’s strategy σ as follows: given a sequence (Y1, .., Yn) of in-
dependent random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent from (L,U1, .., Un),
the action ik of P1 at stage k is
ik(L1, .., Lk, Yk) = ϕε(Lk, [Lk | L1, .., Lk−1], Yk)
This does not define directly a behavioral strategy, since P1 has to remember at each stage
the value of the auxiliary variables Lk (or Uk). But this mixed strategy defines a joint law on
(L, i1, .., in) which can always be disintegrated in a behavioral strategy that does not depend
on P2’s actions 3. We can clearly keep the above representation of P1’s strategy to compute
his payoff against some strategy τ , even if it is not expressed as a behavioral strategy, since
these computations depend only on the induced law on (L, i1, ..in). Without loss of generality,
given a sequence (W1, ..,Wn) of independent random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1]
and independent from (L,U1, Y1, .., Un, Yn) we can assume that the strategy τ is given by a
sequence g1, .., gn of measurable functions such that the action of P2 at stage k is given by
jk = gk(i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1,Wk)
Let us define the filtration (Hk)k=1,..,n by Hk = σ(L1, Y1,W1, .., Lk, Yk,Wk). With this notation,
variables ik, jk are Hk-measurable and we have the following equalities between the conditional
laws for all k = 1, .., n
[L | Hk] = [L | L1, .., Lk], [Lk | Hk−1] = [Lk | L1, .., Lk−1]
The conditional payoff at round k given the past actions of the players is
E[〈L, T (ik, jk)〉 | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1] = E[E[〈L, T (ik, jk)〉 | Hk] | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1]
= E[〈Lk, T (ik, jk) | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1] = E[E[〈Lk, T (ik, jk)〉 | Hk−1] | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1]
where the second equality follows from the linearity of the payoff. Finally the conditional
expectation given Hk−1 above is exactly the payoff in a one-round game where the law of the
state variable is [Lk | L1, .., Lk−1] and the joint conditional law of [Lk, ik | L1, .., Lk−1] has been
constructed so that
E[〈Lk, T (ik, jk)〉 | Hk−1] ≥ V 1([Lk | L1, .., Lk−1])− ε
3. There is no need to refer to the general Kuhn’s theorem here (which applies however in our case), since
this strategy is actually a strategy in a 1 player game.
1. LINEAR GAME MODEL 21
Summing up these inequalities proves that Vn(µ) ≥ Vn−nε and we obtain a first inequality by
sending ε to zero.
It remains to prove the reverse inequality. Let us fix a pair (µ, σ) where σ is a behavioral
strategy for P1 in Γn(µ) and some ε > 0. We will construct a strategy τ for P2 by induction
such that for all k = 1, .., n the expected payoff at round k is not greater than
EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[V 1([Lk | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1])] + ε
where Lk is defined by EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[L | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1, ik]. Note for this that adding jk in
the conditional expectation defining Lk does not change its value, which does not depend on
τk. Suppose that (τ1, .., τk−1) is already constructed. Since (µ, σ, τ1, .., τk−1) defines a joint
law on (L, i1, .., ik, j1, .., jk−1) that will be denoted P, the conditional expectation Lk is well-
defined and P-almost surely equal to a Borel mapping fk(ik, i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1). The disinte-
gration theorem (appendix theorem 1.1) implies the existence of a ∆1(Rd × I)-valued Borel
mapping Mk(i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1) which is a regular version of the conditional law [Lk, ik |
i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1]. Using lemma 1.3, the mapping τε being universally measurable, there exists
a Borel mapping τ˜ε which is almost surely equal to τε with respect to the law of the random vari-
able [Lk, ik | i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1] (or the image probability of P induced by the mappingMk which
therefore depends of P which is known by P2). The strategy τk = τ˜ε(Mk(i1, j1, ..., ik−1, jk−1))
has then the required properties. The overall payoff of P2 is therefore not greater than
EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[
n∑
k=1
V 1([Lk | i1, j1, .., ik−1, jk−1])] + nε ≤ Vn(µ) + nε
which concludes the proof since ε was arbitrary. 
Another useful property is the following, which is theorem 4 in [25] and is only reproduced
in section 5 for the sake of completeness since the proof is exactly the same.
Proposition 1.3: Assume that for all µ ∈ ∆1(Rd), the game Γn(µ) has a value (i.e. V n(µ) =
V n(µ). If (σ, τ) is a pair of optimal strategies in Γn(µ), then the expected belief martingale
induced by (µ, σ, τ) is optimal in the maximization problem Vn(µ).
Remark 1.1: The proof of proposition 1.2 implies that if a strategy of P1 is ε-optimal in Γn(µ)
and does not depend on the actions of P2, then the induced martingale of expected beliefs is
ε-optimal for Vn(µ) independently of the strategy of P2.
The non-revealing game. Let us now define the maxmin and minmax of the non-
revealing game, which is a modified version of Γ1(µ) in which P1 is not informed of the re-
alization L. In the following definition, the set of strategies in Σ1 that do not depend on L is
identified with ∆(I).
u(µ) , sup
σ∈∆(I)
inf
τ∈∆(J)
EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [〈L, T (i1, j1)〉]
u(µ) , inf
τ∈∆(J)
sup
σ∈∆(I)
EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [〈L, T (i1, j1)〉]
Let us list some easy properties
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Lemma 1.4:
∀µ ∈ ∆1(Rd), u(µ) = V 1(δE(µ)) and u(µ) = V 1(δE(µ))
with E(µ) =
∫
Rd xdµ(x) ∈ Rd and δx denotes the Dirac mass at x.
The functions u and u are Lipschitz with respect to the distance dW1 and positively homoge-
nous in the sense of (1.2).
Proof. The equality relating u to V 1 follows easily from the independence of (i1, j1) and
L, which imply that we can integrate the payoff with respect to L at first by Fubini’s theorem.
The other properties can be proven as in lemma 1.1. 
1.5. Reduced strategies. We introduce the notion of reduced strategies, which are simply
strategies that do not depend on P2’s past actions.
A reduced strategy τ for P2 is a sequence (τ1, ..., τn) of transition probabilities
τk : (I)k−1 → ∆(J).
A reduced strategy for P1 is a sequence σ = (σ1, ..., σn) of transition probabilities
σk : Rd × (I)k−1 → ∆(J).
Let Σrn (resp. T rn ) the set of reduced behavioral strategies of P1 (resp. P2). Given a reduced
strategy σ of P1, the pair (µ, σ) induces a probability on Rd × (I)n. The next proposition
implies that an optimal strategy in the game restricted to reduced strategies is still optimal in
the initial game.
Proposition 1.4: If a strategy guarantees the quantity C in the game Γn(µ) where the strategy
sets of the players are restricted to reduced strategies, then it guarantees C in the initial game.
Proof. This proof is a direct adaptation of the one appearing in [23]. For any τ ∈ Tn,
there exists a reduced strategy τ̂ giving the same payoff as τ against any reduced strategy
of P1. The strategy τ̂ proceeds as follows : at step k, P2 does not remind his past actions
(j1, .., jk−1), but using past actions of P1, he generates a virtual history (iq, ĵq)q=1,..,k−1 by
choosing ĵq with the probability τ(i1, ĵ1, .., iq−1, ĵq−1). He selects then at stage k an action jk
with the probability τ((iq, ĵq)q=1,..,k−1). Since the action of P1 does not depend on past actions
of P2, the conditional distribution of (ik, jk) given (L, i1, .., ik−1) is the same as if P2 was using
τ , and so is the conditional expected payoff at stage k. The situation is not symmetric for P1,
because to generate a virtual history of the past actions of P2, he has to know which strategy
P2 is using. However, given τ ∗ ∈ T rn , the same argument shows that for all σ ∈ Σn, there exists
a reduced strategy σ̂ giving the same payoff as σ against the fixed strategy τ ∗, which allows to
conclude. 
1.6. The “Cav(u)” theorem. We assume here and in the following section that µ ∈
∆(P ) ⊂ ∆1(Rd) for some compact convex subset P of Rd. We are now able to state the
classical “Cav(u)” theorem of Aumann-Maschler in this context whose proof is divided in two
propositions.
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Proposition 1.5: For all µ in ∆(P ), we have
Cav(u)(µ) ≤ 1
n
V n(µ) ≤ Cav(u)(µ) +
1
n
VN1n (µ)
where N1 is the centered L1 norm defined on the set ∆1(Rd) by N1(µ) = E[|X − E[X]|1] for
X ∼ µ and Cav denotes the concavification operator on ∆(P ).
Proof. The proof proceeds exactly as in the finite case (see [41] propositions 5.2.8-9). Let
us fix ε > 0. At first, let (λq)q=1,..,l be a finite convex combination and (µq)q=1,..,l in ∆(P ) such
that
l∑
q=1
λqu(µq) ≥ Cav(u)(µ)− ε
There exists a joint law of the pair (r, L) on {1, .., l} × Rd such that P(r = q) = λq and the
conditional law of L given r is (µr)r=1,..,l. P1 selects r using the conditional law of r given L
using some exogenous lottery and then plays ε-optimally in the game Γ1(δE(µr)) at each round
(using independent copies of these lotteries and without using any information on L). This
process defines a behavioral strategy and this strategy guarantees nCav(u) − 2nε. The first
inequality follows by sending ε to zero.
The second inequality follows directly from proposition 1.1. Using the Lipschitz property
of V 1 and the fact that dW1(µ, δE(µ)) = N1(µ), we have
∀µ ∈ ∆1(Rd), V 1(µ) ≤ u(µ) + CTN1(µ)
Applying this inequality in the expression of VV 1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n) implies with Ln+1 ∼ µ a terminal
variable added to the martingale.
VV 1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n) ≤ E[
n∑
k=1
u([Lk | L1, .., Lk−1])] + CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
≤ E[
n∑
k=1
u([Ln+1 | L1, .., Lk−1])] + CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
≤ E[
n∑
k=1
Cav(u)([Ln+1 | L1, .., Lk−1])] + CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
≤
n∑
k=1
Cav(u)([Ln+1]) + CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
≤ nCav(u)(µ) + CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
The second line follows from the definition of u, the third from the definition of the concav-
ification operator. The fourth one follows from Jensen’s inequality (lemma 5.1). Application
of Jensen’ inequality is possible since u is weakly continuous on the weakly compact set ∆(P )
and bounded, which implies that Cav(u) is weakly upper semi-continuous and bounded (see
lemma 26.13 in [20]). 
As for the proof of the “Cav(u)” theorem given in [41], the error term appearing in the
previous result can be easily bounded using classical probability results.
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Proposition 1.6: For all µ in ∆(P ),
1
n
VN1n (µ)−→n→∞0
Proof. We will actually prove a more precise result, namely that the maximal N1-variation
is bounded by C
√
n for some constant C depending on µ. Note at first that the centered L1-
norm is given by the following optimization problem
(1.5) N1(µ) = Eµ[|X − E[X]|1] = max
[X]=µ, Y ∈{−1,1}d
E[〈(X − E[X]), Y 〉]
where the maximum is taken over all joint distributions of pairs of random variables (X, Y )
fulfilling the mentioned marginal constraints. The maximum is reached for the sign function
Y = S(X − E[X]) , (sgn(Xi − E[Xi])i=1,..,d). Let us now consider a martingale (L1, .., Ln+1)
such that Ln+1 ∼ µ. We have
VN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
|Lk − Lk−1|1]
Define Yk = S(Lk − Lk−1) and Zk = Yk − E[Yk | FLk−1]. Using the martingale property, we find
VN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
〈Lk − Lk−1, Yk〉] = E[
n∑
k=1
〈Lk − Lk−1, Zk〉]
= E[
n∑
k=1
〈Lk, Zk〉] = E[
n∑
k=1
〈Ln+1, Zk〉]
= E[〈Ln+1,
n∑
k=1
Zk〉]
Applying Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we find
1√
n
VN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n) ≤ ‖Ln+1‖L2‖
1√
n
n∑
k=1
Zk‖L2
and the L2-norm above is bounded by 2
√
d using the orthogonality of the increments of a
martingale in L2 which concludes the proof. 
We can now state the announced extension of the “Cav(u)” theorem.
Theorem 1.1: For all µ ∈ ∆(P )
1
n
V n(µ)−→n→∞Cav(u)(µ)
Remark 1.2: The preceding proof can be extended to ∆p(Rd) for p > 1 by replacing Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality by Holder’s inequality and applying then Burkholder’s inequality to bound
the last term.
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1.7. The limit continuous-time optimization problem. The following continuous-
time probabilistic formulation is very easy to obtain from the definition of the concavification
operator and is reminiscent from the result given in theorem 3.1 of [17] for differential games
with incomplete information (possibly non-homogenous in time).
Proposition 1.7: For all µ ∈ ∆(P ),
(1.6) Cav(u)(µ) = sup
(Xt)t∈[0,1]∈M(µ)
E[
∫ 1
0
gu(Xt)dt]
whereM( µ) is the set of (laws of) ca`dla`g martingales (Xt)t∈[0,1] whose final distribution [X1]
is Blackwell dominated by µ. Moreover, X is a maximizer if and only if for dt-almost all s in
[0, 1]
E[gu(Xs)] = Cav(u)(µ)
Proof. Note at first that any martingale in M( µ) has trajectories in the set P with
probability 1. Since X is a martingale we have for all s ≤ t, [Xs]  [Xt] using the definition
of Blackwell order. From the definition of gu, for all t ∈ [0, 1], we have gu(Xs) = u([X1 |
FXs ]) almost surely where FX denotes the filtration generated by X. By the definition of the
concavification operator and since u is continuous, we have
(1.7) E[gu(Xs)] = E[u([X1 | Fs])] ≤ E[Cav(u)([X1 | Fs])] ≤ Cav(u)([X1]) ≤ Cav(u)(µ)
where the second inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality (lemma 5.1) and the third from
the fact that Cav(u), being the pointwise limit of nondecreasing functions for the Blackwell
order, is itself nondecreasing. Using Fubini’s theorem, the right-hand side of (1.6) is less or
equal than Cav(u)(µ). To prove the converse inequality, let (µi)i=1,..,e in ∆(P ) and (λi)i=1,..,n
a convex combination such that
n∑
i=1
λiµi = µ, and
n∑
i=1
λiu(µi) ≥ Cav(u)(µ)− ε
Let (S, Y1, .., Yn) be independent random variables such that Yi ∼ µi and P(S = i) = λi. Define
a martingale by the relation X1 = YS and Xt =
∑n
i=1 E[Yi]1IS=i for all t ∈ [0, 1). Then
E[
∫ 1
0
gu(Xs)ds] =
∫ 1
0
n∑
i=1
λigu(E[Yi])ds =
∫ 1
0
n∑
i=1
λiu(µi)ds ≥ Cav(u)(µ)− ε
and the proof follows by sending ε to zero 4. For the second assertion, if the property is met,
then X is clearly a maximizer. If X is a maximizer and this property is false, then we obtain
a contradiction using the inequalities 1.7 and integrating with respect to s. 
Let us now prove the convergence of maximizers of the maximal variation problem to the
maximizers of the continuous-time problem we just define. We need the following notation
Notation 2: Given a discrete-time process (L1, .., Ln), the continuous-time version of this
process is defined by
Πnt = Lbntc for t ∈ [0, 1]
where bac is the greatest integer less or equal to a.
4. The ε is actually unnecessary but convenient for the presentation.
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Proposition 1.8: Let (Ln) be an asymptotically maximizing sequence of Vn(µ) inMn(µ), i.e.
such that
1
n
Vn(Ln,FLn)−→
n→∞Cav(u)(µ).
Then the continuous-time versions of these martingales define a weakly relatively compact se-
quence of laws for the Meyer-Zheng topology (see [45]) and any limit point belongs to
P∞(µ) = argmax
[X]∈M(µ)
E[
∫ 1
0
gu(Xt)dt].
Proof. We refer to [45] for properties of the pseudo-paths or Meyer-Zheng topology on
the Skorokhod space. This topology is defined on the set D([0, 1], P ) of ca`dla`g functions as the
convergence in measure with respect to Lebesgue’s measure (denoted λ) together convergence
of the value at time 1 : a sequence yn converges to y if
∀ε > 0, λ({|yn(x)− y(x)| ≥ ε})−→
n→∞0, and yn(1)−→n→∞y(1)
The subsetM( µ) of laws of martingales (in ∆(D([0, 1], P )) is weakly compact using theorem
2 in [45], the fact that the projection (Xt)t∈[0,1] → X1 at time 1 is weakly-continuous and that
condition [X1] ≤ µ is closed. Moreover, the functional [X]→ E[∫ 10 gu(Xt)dt] is by construction
weakly continuous. Let us denote Πn denote the sequence of continuous-time versions of Ln, and
notice that [Πn] ∈M( µ) by construction. Assume, up to the extraction of some subsequence,
that [Πn] converges weakly to some limit [Π]. Then, using the previous propositions,
1
n
Vn((Lk)k=1,..,n) ≤ E[
n∑
k=1
1
n
u([Lk | L1, .., Lk−1])] + 1
n
CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
= E[
n∑
k=1
1
n
gu(Lk−1)] +
1
n
CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
= E[
∫ 1
0
gu(Πnt )dt] +
1
n
CTVN1n ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
−→
n→∞E[
∫ 1
0
gu(Πt)dt]
We conclude that [Π] ∈ P∞(µ) since by assumption the left-hand side of the above inequality
converges to the value of problem (1.6). 
We point out in proposition 1.7 that the maximizers of the continuous-time problem are
degenerate in the following sense. If we have u(µ) < Cav(u)(µ), then any optimal martingale
jumps at the beginning to a position where E[gu(X0)]) = Cav(u)(µ) and then can either stop
moving or evolve freely within a set on which u is linear. For the extremal situations, if u is
strictly concave at µ, then the optimal martingale never moves and is uniquely determined. On
the contrary, if u is linear on ∆(P ), then any martingale will be optimal. It means that the
asymptotic behavior of the optimal strategies of P1 is in general degenerate from the dynamic
point of view.
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2. Dual game
We introduce in this section an auxiliary game of complete information known in the finite
case as the dual game, and that was at first introduced in De Meyer [23]. In order to simplify
the proofs, we will consider in all this section an exchange game game (T, I, J) with a state
variable in compact convex subset P of Rd. This case contains the partially revealing game
associated to a finite game introduced in the next section. We show that the results obtained in
Laraki [40] can be generalized in our model, including the representation of the concavification
of u as a the solution of a dual Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We deduce from this result a proof
based on duality of the fact that the minmax of Γn divided by n converges to Cav(u).
2.1. The model. We consider the game Γn(µ) defined by (T, I, J) where µ ∈ ∆(P ) for
some compact convex subset P of Rd. Given φ ∈ C(P,R), the dual game Γ∗n(φ) is defined as
follows. A strategy for P1 is a pair (µ, σ) where µ ∈ ∆(P ) and σ ∈ Σn. A strategy for P2 is
some τ ∈ Tn. The payoff function is defined by
(µ, σ, τ)→ g∗n(φ, µ, σ, τ) = EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[〈L,
n∑
k=1
T (ik, jk)〉 − φ(L)]
Let us now define the maxmin and minmax of this game as
(2.1) W n(φ) = sup
(µ,σ)∈∆(P )×Σn
inf
τ∈Tn
g∗n(φ, µ, σ, τ)
(2.2) W n(φ) = inf
τ∈Tn
sup
(µ,σ)∈∆(P )×Σn
g∗n(φ, µ, σ, τ)
Our aim is to study the asymptotic behavior of the dual game, and precisely of W n.
Notation 3: In the following, the convex conjugation denoted by ∗ applied to functions defined
on ∆(P ) or C(P ) refers to the duality between the space M(P ) of signed Radon measures on
P and C(P ). All the functions defined on ∆(P ) are extended on the whole space M(P ) by the
value +∞. Since ∆(P ) is a weakly closed set in M(P ), if F is convex continuous on ∆(P ), its
extension is l.s.c. and convex and therefore (F )∗∗ = (F ).
The following result is a direct consequence of the definition.
Proposition 2.1: For all φ ∈ C(P ) and µ ∈ ∆(P )
W n(φ) = (−V n)∗(−φ) and V n(µ) = −W ∗n(−µ)
For all φ ∈ C(P ) and µ ∈ ∆(P )
W n(φ) ≥ (−V n)∗(−φ) and V n(µ) ≤ −W ∗n(−µ)
Notation 4: Any function φ ∈ C(P ) is implicitly identified with its extension on Rd which is
equal to φ on P and to +∞ outside P . Its convex conjugate φ∗ is therefore the usual convex
conjugate of the extended function and if φ is convex on P , then φ = φ∗∗.
Lemma 2.1: For all φ ∈ C(P )
W n(φ) ≤ Ŵn(φ) , inf
τ∈T rn
sup
(i1,..,in)∈In
φ∗(
n∑
k=1
T (ik, τk))
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where T (ik, τk) =
∫
J T (ik, jk)dτk(i1, .., ik−1)(jk).
Proof. At first we have from proposition 1.4
W n(φ) ≤ inf
τ∈T rn
sup
(µ,σ)∈∆(P )×Σn
g∗n(φ, µ, σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T rn
sup
(µ,σ)∈∆(P )×Σrn
g∗n(φ, µ, σ, τ)
since T rn ⊂ Tn and P1 cannot obtain a better payoff against a reduced strategy of P2 by using
non-reduced strategies. The set of strategies (µ, σ) ∈ ∆(P )×Σrn can be identified to the set of
joint distributions on P × In. Moreover, the structure of reduced strategies allows to integrate
at first the payoff function with respect to τ conditionally on (i1, .., in) and by Fubini theorem
inf
τ∈T rn
sup
(µ,σ)∈∆(P )×Σrn
g∗n(φ, µ, σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T rn
sup
pi∈∆(P×In)
Epi[〈L,
n∑
k=1
T (ik, τk)〉 − φ(L)]
The supremum over ∆(P × In) is then equal to the supremum over P × In. The supremum
over P being by definition φ∗(∑nk=1 T (ik, τk)), this concludes the proof. 
A recurrence formula.
Let Cv(Rd) denote the set of continuous convex functions f on Rd.
Lemma 2.2: The operator H below defines a map from Cv(Rd) to itself.
H(f)(x) = inf
τ∈∆(J)
sup
i∈I
f(x+ T (i, τ))
and for all ε > 0, there exists Borel measurable function
τε : Rd → ∆(J)
which is ε-optimal in the sense
∀x ∈ Rd, sup
i∈I
f(x+ T (i, τε(x))) ≤ H(f)(x) + ε
Proof. H(f) is real-valued since T is bounded and f continuous. For the convexity of
H(f) let x1, x2 ∈ Rd and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let τ1, τ2 be η-optimal for the problems H(f)(x1) and
H(f)(x2), then λτ1 + (1 − λ)τ2 is η-optimal for the problem H(f)(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) using the
linearity of the integral and the convexity of f . The conclusion follows by sending η to zero.
For the functions τε, we proceed by discretization. For any fixed τ , the function
x→ sup
i∈I
f(x+ T (i, τ))
is continuous since it is locally bounded and convex. Since so is H(f), any ε/2 optimal τ in x is
therefore ε-optimal in a neighborhood of x. It follows that there exists a countable measurable
partition of Rd and a function τε constant on the element of the partition having the required
properties. 
We prove in the following proposition that Ŵn satisfies a recurrence formula.
Proposition 2.2: For all φ ∈ C(P )
Ŵn(φ) = Hn(φ∗)(0), with Hn = H ◦ ... ◦H︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
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Proof. By induction, it is sufficient to prove that
Ŵn(φ) = inf
τ∈T rn−1
sup
i1,..,in−1
H(φ∗)(x)
with
x =
n−1∑
k=1
T (ik, τk)
For any reduced strategy τ ∈ T rn , we have the following inequality
sup
i1,..,in
φ∗(
n∑
k=1
T (ik, τk)) = sup
i1,..,in
φ∗(x+ T (in, τn(i1, .., in−1)))
≥ sup
i1,..,in−1
H(φ∗)(x)
which allows to prove a first inequality by taking the infimum over τ on both sides. For the
reverse inequality, take τn = τε(x) with τε given by the previous lemma for f = φ∗. For any
(τ1, .., τn−1) ∈ T rn−1, the above definition of τn defines a reduced strategy in T rn and we have
φ∗(
n∑
k=1
T (ik, τk)) = φ∗(x+ T (in, τε(x))) ≤ H(φ∗)(x) + ε
which allows easily to conclude by taking successively the supremum over (i1, .., in−1) and the
infimum over (τ1, ..τn−1) and then by sending ε to zero. 
The dual PDE formulation. Let us define ψn(µ) = 1nV n(µ). As for the previous dual
inequality, we have
(−ψn)∗(−φ) = sup
µ∈∆(P )
1
n
V n(µ)− 〈φ, µ〉 = 1
n
sup
µ∈∆(P )
inf
τ∈Tn
sup
σ∈Σn
g∗n(nφ, µ, σ, τ)
≤ 1
n
W n(nφ) ≤ 1
n
Ŵn(nφ) =
1
n
Hn((nφ)∗)(0)
The above expression suggests to introduce the following family of operators on the set
C(Rd) of continuous functions on Rd.
Rδ(f)(x) = inf
τ∈∆(J)
sup
i∈I
f(x+ δT (i, τ))
It is easily seen that 1
n
Hn((nφ)∗)(0) = Rn1/n(φ∗).
Let also BUC(Rd) denote the set of bounded uniformly continuous functions on Rd endowed
with the uniform norm and for Lipschitz functions, let Lip(f) denote the Lipschitz constant of
f .
Lemma 2.3: The family of operators (Rδ)δ≥0 maps BUC(Rd) into itself and has the following
properties
1) For all f ∈ BUC(Rd), R0(f) = f
2) For all f ∈ BUC(Rd), the function δ → Rδ(f) is continuous .
3) There exists a constant C1 such that ‖Rδ(f)‖∞ ≤ C1δ + ‖f‖∞
4) For all f, g ∈ BUC(Rd), α ∈ R, Rn(f + α) = Rn(f) + α
5) For all f, g ∈ BUC(Rd), ‖Rδ(f)−Rδ(g)‖∞ ≤ ‖f − g‖∞
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6) For all f ∈ BUC(Rd) which is Lipschitz, Lip(Rδ(f)) ≤ Lip(f) and there exists a constant
C2 depending only on Lip(f) such that ‖Rδ(f)− f‖ ≤ C2δ.
7) There exists a constant C3 such that for all f ∈ BUC(Rd) of class C2 with bounded
derivatives, we have ∣∣∣∣∣Rδ(f)− fδ − gu(∇f)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C3δ(‖∇2f‖∞)
where gu(x) = u(δx)
Proof. The first six points are obvious. For the last one, we have using the second order
Taylor expansion of f
f(x+ δT (i, τ)) = f(x) + δ〈∇f(x), T (i, τ)〉+ δ2R(x, i, τ)
where |R(x, i, τ)| ≤ C‖∇2f‖∞ for some constant C depending only on T . It follows that∣∣∣∣∣ infτ∈∆(J) supi∈I f(x+ δT (i, τ))− infτ∈∆(J) supi∈I
[
f(x) + δ
∫
J
〈∇f(x), T (i, j)〉dτ(j)
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Cδ2‖∇2f‖∞
which concludes the proof since from the definition of u
inf
τ∈∆(J)
sup
i∈I
∫
J
〈∇f(x), T (i, j)〉dτ(j) = gu(∇f(x))

Lemma 2.4: The function gu is positively homogenous and Lipschitz on Rd.
Proof. This follows directly from the properties of u. 
These properties allow us to apply the results on approximation schemes of Souganidis [55]
as in Laraki [40].
Theorem 2.1: For all convex Lipschitz functions f on Rd, Rn1/n(f)(0)→ W (f) where W (f) =
χ(1, 0) with χ the unique viscosity solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(2.3)
{
∂χ
∂t
(t, x)− gu(∇xχ(t, x)) = 0 for (t, x) ∈ (0, 1]× Rd
χ(0, x) = f(x) for x ∈ Rd
in the class of uniformly continuous functions. Moreover, there exists a constant C0 depending
uniquely on the Lipschitz constant of f such that
|Rn(f)(0)− χ(1, 0)| ≤ C0√
n
Proof. That the solutions are unique within the class of uniformly continuous functions
for the considered equation follows from Bardi and Evans [5] (theorem 3.1), we always consider
these solutions in the following. Note that if χ is the solution to (2.3) and α ∈ R, then χ + α
is the solution to the same equation with boundary condition χ(0, .) = f + α. Using property
4 in lemma 2.3, this allows to assume that f(0) = 0. For all n, Rn1/n(f)(0) depends only of the
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restriction of f to the ball B(0, CT ). Therefore f can be replaced by a truncation βb(f) with
βb defined by
βb : R→ R : x→

b if x ≥ b
x if |x| ≤ b
−b if x ≤ −b
for some sufficiently large b. Lemma 2.3 and 2.4 allows us to apply the introductory theorem
in [55] which implies that Rn1/n(f)(0) → χb(1, 0) where χb is the unique viscosity solution of
the following Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(2.4)
{
∂χ
∂t
(t, x)− gu(∇xχ(t, x)) = 0 for (t, x) ∈ (0, 1]× Rd
χ(0, x) = βb(f(x)) for x ∈ Rd
Moreover, the cited theorem asserts that there exists a constant C0 which depends only on
‖βb(f)‖∞ and Lip(βb(f)) such that
|Rn1/n(f)(0)− χb(1, 0)| ≤
C0√
n
for n large enough (the bound depending also only on the same constants (see [55] p.21). Since
these two quantities are bounded by (CT ∨ 1)Lip(f), this constant C0 depends only on Lip(f)
and is independent of b. Using that gu is positively homogenous and Lipschitz, proposition 3.1
in [7] shows that χb = βb(χ) where χ is the unique solution of (2.3) (with boundary condition
f). We can therefore fix b sufficiently large so that χ(1, 0) = χb(1, 0) which concludes the
proof. 
Gathering the preceding results, we obtain
Corollary 1: There exists a constant C0 such that for all φ ∈ C(P ),
1
n
W n(φ) ≤ W (φ∗) + C0√
n
Proof. Apply the preceding result to all the function φ∗ for φ ∈ C(P ). Since for φ ∈ C(P ),
φ∗ is CP -Lipschitz where CP = sup
x∈P
|x| the constant C0 does not depend on φ. 
Let us now relate this result with the study of the primal game Γn. For this, let us recall
Hopf’s formula, which gives an explicit expression for the solution of (2.3).
Proposition 2.3: For all Lipschitz functions f ∈ Cv(Rd), W (f) = (f ∗ − gu)∗(0).
Proof. The solution χ is given by the Hopf’s formula ([5] theorem 3.1)
χ(t, x) = sup
p∈Rd
inf
q∈Rd
[f(q) + 〈p, x− q〉+ tgu(p)].
And a direct computation shows that χ(1, 0) = (f ∗ − gu)∗(0). 
This Hopf’s function is actually related to the concave conjugate of u.
Lemma 2.5: The conjugate of the function u defined on the set C(P ) verifies
∀φ ∈ C(P ), (−u)∗(−φ) = W (φ∗)
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Proof. It follows from the definition that
(−u)∗(−φ) = sup
µ∈∆(P )
u(µ)− 〈φ, µ〉
= sup
x∈P
(
sup
µ :E(µ)=x
gu(x)− 〈φ, µ〉
)
= sup
x∈P
gu(x)− φ∗∗(x) = (φ∗∗ − gu)∗(0) = W (φ∗)
where the third equality follows from the continuity of φ which implies
inf
µ :E(µ)=x
〈φ, µ〉 = φ∗∗(0)

We are now able to prove the dual version of the “Cav(u)” theorem.
Proposition 2.4: For all µ ∈ ∆(P )
Cav(u)(µ) ≤ 1
n
V n ≤ Cav(u)(µ) + C0n−1/2
Proof. The first inequality is proved as in proposition 1.5. For the second one, let us
define ψn(µ) = 1nV n(µ). We have
(−ψn)∗(−φ) = sup
µ∈∆(P )
1
n
V n(µ)− 〈φ, µ〉 = 1
n
sup
µ∈∆(P )
inf
τ∈Tn
sup
σ∈Σn
g∗n(nφ, µ, σ, τ)
≤ 1
n
W n(nφ) ≤ Rn1
n
(φ∗)(0) ≤ W (φ∗) + C0n−1/2
Using that (−u)∗(−φ) = W (φ∗), the preceding relation implies
ψn(µ) ≤ −(−u)∗∗(µ) + C0n−1/2.
Using that u is concave and weakly continuous, we have that −(−u)∗∗(µ) = Cav(u) and this
concludes the proof. 
Let us also mention the following corollary
Corollary 2: If the non-revealing game has a value for all x ∈ P (or equivalently for all
µ ∈ ∆(P )), then
Cav(u)(µ) ≤ 1
n
V n(µ) ≤
1
n
V n(µ) ≤ Cav(u)(µ) + C0n−1/2
where u = u = u.
3. Finite games.
3.1. A first identification. In the following, for a finite set K, its cardinal is also denoted
K and ∆(K) denotes the set of probabilities over K. A finite Game G1(p) with incomplete
information on one side a` la Aumann-Maschler is represented by (I, J,K,A). I, J,K are finite
sets which are respectively the action sets of P1,P2 and the state space. The last term A
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represents the payoff function and is a matrix of real numbers (Aki,j)(i,j,k)∈I×J×K . p is an element
of ∆(K). Formally, the value of such a game is given by
v1 : ∆(K)→ R : p→ sup
σ∈∆(I)K
inf
τ∆(J)
∑
i,j,k
pkσk(i)τ(j)Aki,j
As usual, the set ∆(K) is identified in this formula to the (K − 1)-dimensional simplex in RK
which will be denoted SK when needed in order to avoid confusions. We will now introduce
another identification which is different from this classical one. Let (ek, k = 1, .., K) denote
the canonical basis of RK . At first, we can identify K with the subset {ek, k = 1, .., K} of
RK . This map induces naturally a linear isomorphism h between ∆(K) and the set ∆({ek, k =
1, .., K}) ⊂ ∆(RK) of probabilities over RK supported by {ek, k = 1, .., K}. Precisely,
h : p = (pk)k=1,..,K ∈ ∆(K) −→
K∑
k=1
pkδek
where δek is the Dirac mass in ek. Using this identification, the sum over k appearing in the
definition of the value v1 can be seen as the expectation with respect to some RK-valued random
variable L of law h(p). σ can be extended to any function σ˜ defined on the whole space RK
such that σ˜(ek) = σk. Denoting T (i, j) = (Aki,j)k=1,..,K , we obtain
(3.1)
∑
i,j,k
pkσk(i)τ(j)Aki,j = EΠ(h(p),σ˜,τ)[〈L, T (i, j)〉]
(T, I, J) defines a game Ĝ1(µ) in the class of linear games introduced above. Let also Gn and
Ĝn denote the n-times repeated games in behavioral strategies associated to G1 and Ĝ1. The
next results shows that our extension has the required properties.
Proposition 3.1: For all µ ∈ ∆1(RK), the value Vn(µ) = V n(µ) = V n(µ) of the game Ĝn(µ)
exists and
∀p ∈ ∆(K), Vn(h(p)) = vn(p).
Proof. Since the expectation (3.1) does not depend on the choice of the function σ˜, the
value V1 of Ĝ1 exists on h(∆(K)) and is such that for all p ∈ ∆(K), V (h(p)) = v(p). The same
argument also works for Gn. It remains to prove that the value of Ĝn(µ) exists for all µ. We
will show that this game has a value in reduced strategies which is sufficient using proposition
1.4. The set of reduced strategies of P1 is the set of joint laws pi over RK × In having for
marginal µ on RK . The set of reduced strategies of P2 is the set of sequences τ = (τ1, .., τn)
with τq ∈ ∆(J)(q−1)I for q = 1, .., n. These two sets are weakly compact and the payoff function
is bilinear and weakly continuous with respect to (pi, τ) so that the result follows from the
minmax theorem of Sion [53]. 
Note that actually all the preceding results apply for the extended finite game Ĝn(µ) on
∆(SK). Moreover, the dual inequalities mentioned in the previous section are equalities. Pre-
cisely, the following is a direct consequence of the minmax theorem.
Proposition 3.2: Let Ĝn denote the partially revealing game extending Gn and Ĝ∗n(φ) the
associated dual game defined for φ ∈ C(SK). Then, Ĝ∗n(φ) has a value Wn(φ) and
(−Vn)∗(−φ) = Wn(φ)
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Moreover 1
n
Wn(φ)→ W (φ∗).
3.2. The partially revealing game. The above identification is not introduced here as
a remark but was already noticed to be useful for the study of repeated games in the work
of De Meyer an Marino [29] where an extended game called the partially revealed game was
introduced. The authors defined this game as the modification of the game Gn(p) where P1,
instead of being informed of the true state that has been selected in K, only receives a random
signal s. Since only the conditional law of k given s is relevant, we can assume that the state
space is ∆(K). Indeed, in this game the joint law of (k, s) is known and this amounts to
assume that Nature selects at random a variable in ∆(K) using some probability distribution
over ∆(K). This extended game is therefore defined on ∆(∆(K)) = ∆(SK) which is identified
as the subset of ∆(RK) of probabilities supported by the (K − 1)-dimensional simplex SK .
It is easily seen that the formal definitions of Ĝ and of the partially repeated game coincide
on ∆(∆(K)). To see this, just note that for a fully informative signal s, the conditional law
of k given s is the Dirac mass δk. The game G1(p) is therefore identified to Ĝ1(h(p)) as in
the previous section. Despite the fact that the partially repeated game has a more intuitive
meaning, we chose to keep the extension Ĝ as a definition in order to unify our results with the
model of financial exchange games detailed in the next section.
3.3. Discussion and an open question. The structure of the partially revealing game
allows to state a representation formula as the value function of a maximal variation problem,
which holds even for µ = h(p). Using the former notations, we have for the value of Gn(p)
vn(p) = sup
[(Lk)k=1,..,n]∈Mn(h(p))
E[
n∑
k=1
V1([Lk | FLk−1])]
where vn is the value of the initial finite game Gn and V1 the value of Ĝ1. In order to
avoid confusions, let us denote w(p) the value of the non-revealing game associated to G1(p)
and u the value of the non revealing game associated to Ĝ1(µ) as in the previous sections.
With these notations, for all p ∈ ∆(K), w(p) = u(h(p)). Moreover, Cav∆(K)(w)(p) is equal to
Cav∆(SK)(u)(h(p)) since h(∆(K)) is a face of ∆(SK). The results of Cardaliaguet in [17] imply
that that the function Cav(w)(p) is the unique viscosity solution of the following first-order
Hamilton-Jacobi equation with obstacle in ∆(K)
(3.2) max{w(p)− φ ; λmax(∇2φ)} = 0
There is therefore a PDE formulation of Cav(u) on a finite-dimensional simplex of ∆(SK).
It is shown in [16] that being solution of the above equation is equivalent to being a dual
solution of some auxiliary equation. In our (very) particular case, we have the following dual
representation. The “conjugate” of Cav(w) in the sense y → (−Cav(w)∗(−y)) is the value in
(t, x) = (1, 0) of the solution of (2.3) with boundary condition
fy(x) = sup
k∈K
(x− y)k.
(see proposition 3.1 in [17] together a change of variable, and also [40]). The results of the
previous section on the dual game applied to Ĝ∗n show that this dual representation is still true
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on the whole set C(SK). To see this, note that the relation
(3.3) (−Cav(u))∗(−φ) = (−u)∗(−φ) = W (φ∗)
relates the conjugate of Cav(u) to the value in (1, 0) of the solution of (2.3) with boundary
condition φ∗. That this result is really an extension follows from the fact that fy is the convex
conjugate of the linear function x→ 〈y, x〉 (restricted to SK). The dual representation given in
Laraki [40] appears therefore as the equation (3.3) restricted to the finite-dimensional subspace
of linear functions in C(SK).
Finally, let us mention an open question. Despite the dual formulation and the martingale
representation (proposition 1.7 have been extended to the whole sets C(SK) and ∆(SK), the
question of the formulation of a primal PDE generalizing (3.2) on ∆(SK) is still opened. How-
ever, due to the relationship outlined in [18] between the primal and dual formulations of some
PDE problems arising in differential games and recent works (for example Cardaliaguet and
Souquiere [19]) dealing with PDE in measure spaces, we think (and hope) that this formulation
will appear in some future works. Let us also mention that exactly the same situation will be
observed for the second order analysis exposed in the next chapter.
4. The financial exchange models
Let us now present briefly the model that was the first motivation for studying the problems
of maximal variation. It will be studied in greater details in chapter 3.
4.1. A financial exchange game. Consider two players (P1 and P2) exchanging a risky
asset A against a nume´raire asset N . The liquidation value at date t = 1 of the asset A
is denoted L and the liquidation value of N is assumed to be equal to 1. Exchange occurs
repeatedly during n rounds from date t = 0 up to date t = 1. At the beginning of the game,
the price L is drawn according to some probability µ over R. P1 is informed of the realization
of L while P2 knows only µ and that his opponent is informed. Each transaction round is a
zero-sum exchange game described by an abstract exchange mechanism T = (R,N). The two
players have Polish actions sets I,J and T is a Borel mapping from I × J to R2 that represents
what P1 receives from P2. Precisely, if the players choose the pair of actions (i, j), then P1 will
receive from P2 R(i, j) shares of asset A and the quantity N(i, j) in Nume´raire (typically one
is positive and the other negative). If portfolio of P1 after round k is denoted yk = (yAk , yNk )
and (ik, jk) the pair of actions played at round k, then
yk = yk−1 + T (ik, jk)
This repeated game in behavioral strategies is denoted En(µ). Strategies are defined exactly
as in section 1. Players are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have sufficiently large initial
endowments so that the constraints yk ≥ 0 and zk ≥ 0 are ignored. This amounts to assume
that the initial portfolios are such that y0 = 0 , z0 = 0. En(µ) is then a zero-sum game, and
P1’s payoff is the expectation of his final portfolio given by
EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[〈yLn , L〉+ yNn ]
Note that this payoff is an affine function of the state variable L.
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The Price Process. Since the liquidation value at date 1 of the risky asset A is L, the
valuation of this asset by a risk-neutral agent round k is simply the expected value of L given
the available information. Let us define the price after round k as the valuation of the risky
asset for the uniformed player P2. Available information after round k is given by the σ-field
Fk = σ(i1, j1, ..., ik, jk) of past observations. Formally, our price process is the martingale
Lk = EΠ[L | Fk].
4.2. Identification to a linear game. Defining L˜ = (L, 1) ∈ Rd+1, the above payoff
function is linear with respect to the state variable L˜, equal to E[〈L˜,∑nk=1 yk〉]. This is the
payoff function of the linear game Γn(µ ⊗ δ1) defined by T, I, J . Using this identification, the
game we just described is a linear game as defined in section 1 with state variable L˜. The set
of admissible distributions for L˜ is just restricted to distributions of the type µ˜ , µ⊗ δ1.
The price process (L1, .., Ln) in En we just defined is therefore the first coordinate of the
expected belief martingale of P2 in the extended linear game. Since this linear game is restricted
to distributions of the type µ⊗ δ1, the second coordinate of any martingale of expected beliefs
in the extended game Γn(µ˜) is always constant and equal to 1. It is not difficult in this context
to traduce the results given in proposition 1.2 and 1.3 in terms of the truncated martingale
(L1, .., Ln).
4.3. Invariance hypotheses. Let us now present the set of hypotheses given in [25] on
the financial game model to obtain asymptotic results on the equilibrium price processes.
The main result in [25] concerns the asymptotic of the price process at equilibrium. Suppose
that the above described game has a value vn(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆2(R) and that both players have
optimal strategies. Let us consider a sequence of price processes induced by a some pair of
optimal strategies in the game En(µ) denoted (Lnk)k=0,...,n. The n transaction rounds occur
between the date t = 0 when P1 receives the message the date t = 1. Assuming that round k
occurs at time t = k
n
we can then extend this price process in a continuous time process Πnt ,
piecewise constant on the intervals [ k
n
, k+1
n
). Precisely, with bac the greater integer less or equal
to a, and Ln0 = E(L), we define:
∀t ∈ [0, 1] Πnt = Lnbntc
When n becomes large, the time between two transaction rounds tends to zero, and the price
process appears naturally as an approximation of a continuous-time price process. The limit,
if it exists, of the processes Πnt , represents then a continuous-time “equilibrium” price process.
From proposition 1.2, the problem of identifying the set of limit equilibrium price processes is
equivalent to the study of the asymptotic behavior of sequences of martingales of length n that
maximize the functional Vv1n in Mn(µ). This type of problems will be intensively explored in
the next chapter.
The main result in [25] is that, under some hypotheses on the exchange mechanism, Πn con-
verges in distribution to some continuous-time martingale depending only on the law µ, called
continuous martingale of maximal variation (CMMV) (see chapter 3 for a precise statement).
The hypotheses on the exchange mechanism are the following
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H1) Existence of a value: For all n and µ the game En(µ) has a value vn(µ) and both
players have optimal strategies.
H2)* Continuity : The value v1 is Lipschitz with respect to the Wasserstein distance of
order p for a p ∈ [1, 2). This property is always true in the models we consider with
p = 1, but it was introduced for games in which T is not bounded (see [25] and also
chapter 3 for an example of game with possibly unbounded payoff).
H3) Invariance with respect to the nume´raire scale
∀α ≥ 0, ∀X ∼ µ ∈ ∆2(R), v1([αX]) = αv1([X]).
It means that replacing for example euros by dollars does not affect the value.
H4) Invariance with respect to the risk-less part of the risky asset
∀β ∈ R, ∀X ∼ µ ∈ ∆2(R), v1([X + β]) = v1([X]).
It means that replacing L by L + x where x is some constant (a non-risky asset), does
not affect the value of the game
H5) Positive value of information: v1 is nonnegative and there exists µ such that v1(µ) > 0.
Remark 4.1: Let us denote V1 the value of the extended game Γ1 with state variable L˜ which
exists using H1 for all distributions of type µ⊗ δ1 (and their dilatations) since it is equivalent
to E1(µ). We have moreover the straightforward relation
∀µ ∈ ∆2(R), V1(µ⊗ δ1) = v1(µ)
The hypothesis H3 does not follow from the positive homogeneity of V1 (lemma 1.1). Indeed,
let (X, 1) be a random variable of law µ⊗ δ1, then we only have that
V1([αX,α1]) = αV1([X, 1]) = αv1([X])
while v1([αX]) = V1([αX, 1]).
Note that the value of the non-revealing game constructed from Γ1 has a value denoted u for all
the distributions, which equals the value of the non-revealing game denoted w constructed from
E1 and that
∀µ ∈ ∆2(R), u(µ˜) = w(µ) = v1(δE(µ))
4.4. Second order analysis. From the results of section 1, the asymptotic behavior of
Vn is described by the Cav(u)-theorem, and the first term in the asymptotic expansion of
Vn is nCav(u). As shown for the case of the partially revealing game, if u is not linear,
then the asymptotic behavior of the optimal expected belief martingales in the problem of
maximal variation is degenerate. The results developed in [25] concern the second term in this
asymptotic expansion which is of order
√
n and appears only, in the context of finite games,
when u is linear. The hypothesis that brings us to this case in this financial model is H4.
This hypothesis means that adding a non-risky asset to the original one does not affect the
value of the game, implying that P1 can take benefit only of the asymmetry of information.
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By linearity, for a law µ, w(µ) = v1(δx) where δx is the Dirac mass at the point x = Eµ[X].
Moreover, the continuity of v1 (H2) implies that, with X ∼ µ and if x = 0
v1(δ0) = lim
λ→0, λ>0
v1([λX]) = lim
λ→0, λ>0
λv1([X]) = 0
Therefore, using this invariance property v1(δx) = 0 for all x and this in turn implies w = 0
and Cav(w) = 0 (and Cav(u) = 0 on the face of admissible laws µ˜). In such a game, contrary
to the case of non-linear functions u, the optimal behavior of the informed player will be to
reveal progressively his information.
4.5. The translation invariance hypothesis. The invariance by translation hypothesis
H4 allows us to reformulate the problem of maximal variation given in proposition 1.2 in order
to obtain the same type of functional as the ones introduced in [43] and [25]. Precisely, for a
linear game Γn defined by I, J, T , assume
(H ′4) ∀β ∈ Rd,∀X ∼ µ ∈ ∆1(Rd), V 1([X + β]) = V 1([X])
then for all µ ∈ ∆1(Rd) and all martingales (Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n ∈Mn(µ)
(4.1) Vn((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
V 1([Lk − Lk−1 | Fk−1])]
since H ′4 implies V 1([Lk | Fk−1]) = V 1([Lk−Lk−1 | Fk−1]). In order to study the optimization
problem defined in proposition 1.2, it is then equivalent to know the function V 1 on the subset
of centered probabilities, and to take (4.1) as definition for the V 1-variation.
The next chapter is devoted to a general study of this kind of problems of maximal variation
over martingales, which are from the previous discussion intimately related to the asymptotic
study of linear games under the hypothesis H ′4.
5. Technical proofs.
Proof of lemma 1.2. At first, this statement is equivalent to the existence of a measur-
able function
Hε : Rd ×∆1(Rd)→ ∆(I)
having the property that the strategy L → Hε(L, µ) is ε-optimal in Γ1(µ) using the corre-
spondence φε(L, µ, U) = Φ(Hε(L, µ), U) where Φ is given by theorem 1.3 in the appendix. The
main problem here is that there is no easily tractable topology on the set of P1 strategies (usual
Young topologies require a reference measure µ which will be a variable for us), but thanks to
the regularity of the payoff function with respect to the state variable, we can proceed by a
standard (but quite long) discretization method. Let us fix some 0 < η < 1. Let B(n) denote
the closed ball of radius n in Rd. For all µ ∈ ∆1(Rd) we define the Borel measurable function
n∗(µ) = min{n ∈ N∗ :
∫
B(n)c
|x|1dµ(x) ≤ η}
For each B(n), let (Ωnq )q=1,..,Qn be a finite measurable partition of B(n) of mesh smaller than η
and (xnq )q=1,..Qn a sequence of points such that xnq ∈ Ωnq for all q. Define then Λn as the subset
of convex combinations λ ∈ ∆(Qn) such that for all q = 1, .., Qn, λq ∈ { kNn , k = 0, .., Nn} for
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some Nn to be fixed later. Let us define the following applications, R being the conditional law
of µ on B(n∗(µ)) and λn a discretization of this law on a grid.
R : ∆1(Rd)→ ∆1(Rd) : µ→ R(µ)
where for any Borel subset U, R(µ)(U) = µ(U ∩B(n
∗(µ)))
µ(B(n∗(µ)))
λn : ∆(B(n))→ Λn : µ→

λnq (µ) =
bR(µ)(Ωnq )Nnc
Nn
for q = 1, ..., Qn − 1
λnQn(µ) = 1−
∑Qn−1
q=1 λ
n
q (µ)
Hereafter, we adopt the convention that n = n∗(µ) in order to shorten notations. At first,
these applications allow to define an approximation of µ by the probability with finite support∑Qn
q=1 λ
n
q (µ)δxnq . Indeed, we have the following inequalities (we leave the proof to the reader)
dW1(µ,R(µ)) ≤ 2η
dW1(R(µ),
Qn∑
q=1
R(µ)(Ωnq )δxnq ) ≤ η
dW1(
Qn∑
q=1
µ(Ωnq )δxnq ,
Qn∑
q=1
λnq (µ)δxnq ) ≤
2nQn
Nn
Now, for each element λ ∈ Λn, there exists an η-optimal strategy of P1 in the game
Γ1(
∑Qn
q=1 λqδxnq ) denoted hn(λ), which we can clearly identify to an element of ∆(I)Qn with
coordinates hn(λ)q. Let also i0 ∈ I be a fixed element. We are now able to define P1’s strategy:
Hε(L, µ) =
{
δi0 if L /∈ B(n)
hn(λn(µ))q if L ∈ Ωnq
This defines a jointly measurable application and it remains to prove that it guarantees the
right quantity. Let us fix µ ∈ ∆1(Rd) and a strategy τ for P2. The triplet (µ,H(., µ), τ) defines
a joint probability pi. The associated payoff is
Epi[〈L, T (i, j)〉] = Epi[〈L, T (i, j)〉1IL/∈B(n)] + Epi[〈L, T (i, j)〉1IL∈B(n)]
The first term is bounded by CTη, and the second is equal to
µ(B(n))Epi[〈L, T (i, j)〉 | L ∈ B(n)]
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By construction µ(B(n)) ≥ 1− η
n
and we have
Epi[〈L, T (i, j)〉 | L ∈ B(n)] ≥ Epi[
Qn∑
q=1
1IL∈Ωnq 〈xnq , T (i, j)〉 | L ∈ B(n)]− CTη
=
Qn∑
q=1
R(µ)(Ωnq )〈xnq ,
∫
T (i, j)d[hn(λn(µ))q(i)⊗ τ(j)]〉 − CTη
≥
Qn∑
q=1
λnq (µ)〈xnq ,
∫
T (i, j)d[hn(λn(µ))q(i)⊗ τ(j)]〉 − 2Qn
Nn
CTn− CTη
≥ V 1(
Qn∑
q=1
λnq (µ)δxnq )− η −
2Qn
Nn
CTn− CTη
Defining Nn sufficiently large so that 2QnNn CTn is bounded by η for all n, we only need to bound
the difference
|V 1(
Qn∑
q=1
λnq (µ)δxnq )− V 1(µ)|
Using that V 1 is CT -Lipschitz for the Wasserstein distance of order 1 dW1 and the preceding
inequalities, this quantity is bounded by CT (3η + 2nQnNn ). Finally
Epi[〈L, T (i, j)〉] ≥ (1− η
n
)(V 1(µ)− 4CT (η +
nQn
Nn
)− η)− CTη = V 1(µ) + r(η)
where r(η) is going to zero with η. Indeed, the only term we still need to bound is η
n
V 1(µ) and
this bound is given by (recall that n depends on µ)
|η
n
V 1(µ)| ≤
η
n
(|V 1(δ0)|+ CT
∫
Rd
|x|1dµ(x)) ≤ η
n
(|V 1(δ0)|+ CT (nµ(Bn) + η))
≤ η
n
(|V 1(δ0)|+ CT (n+ 1)) ≤ η(|V 1(δ0)|+ 2CT )

Proof of lemma 1.3. The proof is just sketched since the technical details are the same
as for proposition 1.2. Define Π(µ, σ, τ), the filtration (Fk)k=0,..,n and the martingale of expected
beliefs as in (1.1). With our assumptions, for all k = 1, .., n, after round k, the expected
conditional payoff Xk given Fk of the n− q remaining rounds is at least V n(L | Fk). Otherwise
P1’s strategy wouldn’t be optimal since the expected payoff of the first k rounds cannot be
greater that V k([Lk]) and using equality ??. Suppose then that the event {uk > vk} occurs
with positive probability with
uk = EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[〈Lk, T (ik, jk)〉 | Fk−1], and vk = V 1([Lk | Fk−1])
At round k, since P2 can compute the above quantities, he could deviate using an ε-optimal
response to τq the strategy of P1 in the one round game Γ1([Lk | Fk−1]) (constructed as in
the previous proof) and follow then by playing an ε-optimal response to the remaining part of
the strategy of P1 in the game Γn−k([L | Fk]) (again, this law does not depend on τq). The
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payoff of P1 in the remaining part of the game denoted Yk will therefore be less or equal to
V n(L | Fk) + η and therefore
vk + η + Yk ≤ vk + V n(L | Fk) + 2η < uk +Xk
for η small enough, which implies that we have constructed a profitable deviation for P2. The
event {vk < uk} has therefore zero probability and it follows by summation that
EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[
n∑
k=1
V 1([Lk | Fk−1])] ≥ EΠ(µ,σ,τ)[
n∑
k=1
〈Lk, T (ik, jk)〉 | Fk−1] = Vn(µ)

5.1. Jensen Inequality. Let p ∈ [1,∞) and ∆p(Rd) the set of probabilities with finite
moment of order p. The vector space Mp of finite signed Borel measures µ on Rd such that∫
Rd |x|pd|µ| < ∞ is endowed with initial topology generated by the set Cp(Rd) of continuous
functions on Rd with at most polynomial growth of order p. The induced topology on ∆p is
metrizable by the wasserstein distance dWp (see appendix).
Lemma 5.1: Let (Ω,A,P) a probability space, G ⊂ F two sub σ-algebra of A, and f a concave
upper semi-continuous mapping from ∆p to R which is bounded by C(1 + dWp(δ0, .)). Then, for
all Rd-valued random variable X with finite moment of order p
– f([X]) ≥ E[f([X | F ])]
– f([X | G]) ≥ E[f([X | F ]) | G] almost surely.
Proof. Note that all the expectations in the proof are well-defined using the bound on f
and the integrability condition on X. Since X has a finite moment of order p, we can assume
that the random variable [X | F ] is ∆p-valued. Let Φ denote its distribution (in ∆(∆p(Rd))).
f being upper semi-continuous, it is sufficient to prove that µ = [X] is the barycenter of Φ.
But, for all h ∈ Cp(Rd), it follows from the properties of the conditional expectation that∫
〈h, ν〉dΦ(ν) = E[E[h(X) | F ]] = E[h(X)] = 〈h, µ〉
which proves the first result. The second one follows by the same method. It is sufficient to
prove that [X | G] is almost surely the barycenter the ∆(∆p(Rd))-valued G-measurable random
variable
Ψ = [[X | F ] | G] .
Applying the previous argument to a well-chosen countable subset C0 of Cp(Rd) and by using
the definitions of conditional laws and conditional expectations, we have with probability one
(5.1) ∀h ∈ C0,
∫
〈h, ν〉dΨ(ν) = E[h(X) | G]
Now C0 can be taken as the union of x → (1 + |x|p) and of a countable dense subset of the
set of bounded uniformly continuous functions on Rd with respect to the metric |.| ∧ 1. The
property (5.1) can therefore be extended to all h ∈ Cp(Rd) and this implies
f([X | G]) ≥ E[f([X | F ]) | G]
with probability one. 
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Remark 5.1: The same results holds with the same proof when replacing ∆p by ∆(P ) for some
compact convex subset P of Rd and considering a bounded concave u.s.c. function and P -valued
random variables.
CHAPITRE 2
Proble`mes de variation maximale de martingales.
On pre´sente dans ce chapitre une ge´ne´ralisation des re´sultats de Mertens-Zamir [43] et De
Meyer [25] sur une famille de proble`mes de variation maximale de martingales. Les sections 3 a` 6
concernent la convergence du proble`me en temps discret vers un proble`me limite d’optimisation
sur un ensemble de lois de martingales en temps continu.
Les sections 7 et 8 s’inte´ressent a` la repre´sentation duale en termes d’e´quations aux de´rive´es
partielles de ce proble`me limite.
Enfin, les sections 9 a` 11 concernent le comportement asymptotique des maximiseurs du
proble`me en temps discret et la caracte´risation des solutions du proble`me limite. On retrouve
en particulier les re´sultats asymptotiques obtenus dans [25].
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1. Introduction
We call problems of maximal variation of martingales of length n ∈ N a class of stochastic
optimization problems generalizing the problem of maximal L1-variation introduced in [43] to
more general functions than the L1-norm. Given some real-valued function V and a probability
µ over Rd, we aim to maximize a functional called the V -variation, over the set Mn(µ) of
Rd-valued martingales of length n whose terminal distribution is Blackwell dominated by µ
(see definition 12.1). More precisely, let V be a real-valued function defined on the set of
probabilities over Rd. We define the V -variation of length n of the martingale (Lk)k=1,..,n as
VVn ((Lk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
V ([Lk − Lk−1 | (Li, i ≤ k − 1)])]
where [Lk−Lk−1 | (Li, i ≤ k−1)] denotes the conditional law of Lk−Lk−1 given (Li, i ≤ k−1)
with the convention L0 = E[L1]. The value function of the above problem is denoted
Vn(µ) =
1√
n
sup
(Lk)k=1,..,n∈Mn(µ)
VVn ((Lk)k=1,..,n)
This problem has been recently studied in De Meyer [25] for the case d = 1. The main result in
[25] is two-fold. At first, a characterization of the limit V∞ = limn Vn as a maximal covariance
function is given. Then, it is shown that any sequence of asymptotically optimal martingales for
Vn, considered as piecewise constant continuous-time processes, converges in law to a specific
continuous-time martingale called Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation (CMMV) when
n goes to∞. The most surprising aspect of this result is that the law of the limit process CMMV
does not depend on V , and neither does V∞ up to a multiplicative constant.
Our aim of this work is to extend these two results in a multi-dimensional setting.
Assumptions on V . We introduce five assumptions denoted A1-A5 on the function V .
Assumptions A1-A4 are the natural generalizations of the assumptions given in [25], while A5
is specific to the multi-dimensional case.
Let ∆2 denote the set of probabilities with finite second-order moments over Rd and ∆20
the subset of centered probabilities. Let L2 denote the space of Rd-valued square-integrable
random variables defined on some atomless probability space. We assume that the real-valued
function V defined on the set ∆20 has the following properties
(A1) V ≥ 0 and has no degenerate directions : ∀x ∈ Rd, there exists µ ∈ ∆20 such that
µ(Rx) = 1, and V (µ) > 0.
(A2) V is K-Lipschitz for the Wasserstein distance 1 of order p for some p ∈ [1, 2).
(A3) V is positively 1-homogenous : for any random variable X ∈ L2 and λ > 0,
V ([λX]) = λV ([X])
where [X] denotes the law of X.
(A4) V is concave on ∆20 (seen as a convex subset of the space of Radon measures on Rd).
1. We will assume without loss of generality in the proofs that 1 < p < 2.
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The last assumption requires the introduction of two auxiliary functions R and r depending
on V . The function R depends only on the covariance matrices of the probabilities in ∆20
(denoted cov(µ)). Precisely, R is defined on ∆20 by
R(µ) = sup
ν∈∆20:cov(ν)=cov(µ)
V (ν) = r(cov(µ))
and r is the induced function defined on the set of semi-definite positive symmetric matrices
Sd+. Note that R defines naturally a function on L2 by R(Y ) = r(cov(Y )). Our last assumption
is
(A5) R is quasiconvex on L2 ⇔ ∀α ∈ R, {Y ∈ L2 | r(cov(Y )) ≤ α} is convex in L2.
The second formulation is a geometric constraint on the sub-level sets of r that will be called
L2-convexity (see section 3 for a discussion).
Remark 1.1: Note that the function R is concave on ∆20 and convex on L2 (from A3 and A5),
but that that the linear structures are not the same. If d = 1, it is easy to check that A5 is
always true and that r is determined uniquely up to a multiplicative constant (see section 11).
A simple example of such a function V is given by the Lp-norm V (µ) = ‖X‖Lp for some
p ∈ [1, 2) where [X] = µ. A larger class of functions is obtained by considering the upper
envelopes of maximal covariance functions (see section 12.1)
(1.1) V : µ→ sup
ν∈I
C(µ, ν)
where I ⊂ ∆20 is convex, has uniformly bounded moments of order q for some q > 2, and
contains some ν such that cov(ν) in non-degenerate. The function C is defined by
(1.2) C(µ, ν) = sup
[X]=µ , [Y ]=ν
E[〈X, Y 〉].
where 〈., .〉 denotes the scalar product in Rd, and the maximum is over all the joint distributions
of pairs (X, Y ) meeting the marginal constraints [X] = µ and [Y ] = ν.
Main results. In order to state the first result, we need the following definition
Definition 1.1: Given the function r defined above, the subsets Γ and G of Sd+ are defined by
Γ = co(G), and G = {P ∈ Sd+ : ∀M ∈Md, r(MMT ) ≤ 1⇒ Tr(
√
PM) ≤ 1}
where Md denotes the set of d× d matrices, Tr() the trace, and
√
P the semi-definite positive
square root of P .
Our first main theorem shows that limn Vn depends only on V through the auxiliary function
R (or r).
Theorem 1.1: Under assumptions A1-A5, the limit V∞ of the sequence Vn exists and is given
by
lim
n→∞Vn(µ) = V∞(µ) , maxν∈QΓ(1)
C(µ, ν)
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where QΓ is the compact convex set of laws of RRd-valued martingales (Zt)t∈[0,1] with continuous
trajectories whose quadratic covariation process 〈Z〉t is such that with probability 1
(1.3) ∀ 0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1, 1
t− s(〈Z〉t − 〈Z〉s) ∈ Γ
and QΓ(1) is the set of laws of variables Z1 for all the processes Z whose law is in QΓ.
The proof of this theorem has two distinct parts. The first one shows that the limit V∞ is
in fact an upper bound for limsupn Vn, and relies on a central limit result for martingales (see
proposition 5.1). The second part shows that V∞ is a lower bound for liminfn Vn. This lower
bound property relies on the following reformulation of the problem V∞ as an optimization
problem over continuous-time martingales distributions (lemma 6.2)
(1.4) V∞(µ) = Wac(µ) , sup
X∈Mac(µ)
E[
∫ 1
0
r( d
ds
〈X〉s)ds]
whereMac(µ) is the set of distributions of martingales (Xt)t∈[0,1] with continuous trajectories,
having a quadratic variation process (〈X〉t)t∈[0,1] which is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue’s measure, and whose final distribution [X1] is Blackwell dominated by µ.
This continuous-time formulation allows us to prove in proposition 6.1 that for an ε-optimal
X ∈Mac(µ), there exists a sequence of discretizations Xn = (Xnk )k=1,..,n of X that are asymp-
totically ε-optimal for Vn (i.e. such that liminfn Vn(Xn) ≥ Wac(X) − ε). We emphasize that
our approximation procedure is not the usual time-discretization, since we have to introduce a
second level of discretization based on the central limit theorem for the Wasserstein distance.
In the second part, we introduce the convex dual problem V ∗∞ of V∞, and obtain a dual
equality using results appearing in the theory of optimal transport (proposition 7.1). This dual
problem is then shown to be a PDE problem of HJB type appearing in stochastic control theory
(proposition 8.1).
The third part of this work is devoted to the problem of identifying the limits of optimizers
of Vn. Precisely, given a discrete-time process (L1, .., Ln), the continuous-time version of this
process is defined by
Πnt = Lbntc for t ∈ [0, 1]
where bac is the greatest integer less or equal to a. We aim to characterize the limits in law
of the continuous-time versions of asymptotically optimal sequences inMn(µ) for the problem
Vn(µ). This is done in two steps. The first one is the following reformulation of V∞
V∞(µ) = W (µ) , max
X∈M(µ)
H(X)
where M(µ) is the set of distributions of martingales (Xt)t∈[0,1] with ca`dla`g trajectories 2
whose final distribution is Blackwell dominated by µ. The functional H is defined in section 9
and extends the integral functional given in (1.4) to the set M(µ).
This second formulation is introduced in order to obtain compactness, and to show that
the set of maximizers of W contains the set of accumulation points of the maximizers of the
discrete-time problem. Precisely
2. Recall that ca`dla`g is the french acronym for right-continuous with left-hand limits
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Theorem 1.2: Let (Ln) be an asymptotically maximizing sequence of Vn(µ) in Mn(µ). Then
the continuous-time versions of these martingales define a weakly relatively compact sequence
of laws for the Meyer-Zheng topology (see [45]) and any limit point belongs to
P∞(µ) = argmax
X∈M(µ)
H(X).
In the second step, we use the dual formulation to derive some properties of P∞. It will be
too long to state completely these results in the introduction, but as a motivation and in order
to give an insight of the characterization we obtain, let us mention a corollary of theorem 10.1,
theorem which also implies the former results obtained in [25] concerning the class CMMV (see
section 11).
Theorem 1.3: Let u(t, x) be the unique viscosity solution (see lemma 8.7) of the following
HJB equation
(1.5)
−∂tu− supP∈Γ Tr(P∇
2u) = 0 in (0, 1)× Rd
u(1, x) = f(x) in Rd
where f is a C1 convex function on Rd such that ∇f has at most polynomial growth. Assume
that u is a classical C1,2 solution. Let Z be a martingale whose law P is in QΓ and such that
(1.6) d
dt
〈Z〉t ∈ argmax
P∈Γ
Tr(P∇2u(t, Zt)) dt⊗ dP almost surely
Then, if µ is the law of ∇f(Z1), the set P∞(µ) is exactly the set of laws of the martingales
(Xt)t∈[0,1] = (∇u(t, Z˜t))t∈[0,1]
where the law of Z˜ ranges through all the laws in QΓ verifying (1.6) and ∇f(Z˜1) ∼ µ.
2. Problem and Notations
2.1. Equivalent Formulations of the problem. As it will be convenient to consider
martingales defined with respect to a larger filtration than the filtration generated by the
process itself, let us now introduce an equivalent formulation of the V -variation.
Definition 2.1: Mn(µ) is the collection of martingales (Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n defined of some filtered
probability space (Ω,A, (Fk)k=1,..,n,P), of length n and whose final distribution is Blackwell dom-
inated by µ ([Ln]  µ). By convention, we set F0 = {Ω, ∅}.
With a slight abuse of notations, we extend the definition of the V variation to martingales
in Mn(µ) by
(2.1) VVn ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
V ([Lk − Lk−1 | Fk−1])]
Lemma 2.1:
(2.2) Vn(µ) =
1√
n
sup
((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n)∈Mn(µ)
VVn ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n)
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Proof. Given a distribution [(L1, .., Ln)] ∈ Mn(µ), then the two notions of V -variation
agree if we define (FLk )k=1,..,n as the natural filtration of (L1, .., Ln), i.e.
FLk = σ(L1, .., Lk) for k = 1, .., n and F0 = {(Rd)n, ∅}
then
VVn ((Lk)k=1,..,n) = VVn ((Lk,FLk )k=1,..,n)
This proves that Vn is not greater than the right-hand side of (2.2). To prove the reverse
inequality, let ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) ∈Mn(µ). Since V is concave and dWp-Lipschitz, it follows from
Jensen’s inequality (lemma 5.1 in chapter 1) that for all k = 1, .., n
V ([Lk − Lk−1 | Fk−1]) ≤ V ([Lk − Lk−1 | FLk−1])
The proof follows then by summation over k. 
Notation 5: The function V is extended (keeping the same notation) on ∆2 by
(2.3) V ([X]) , V ([X − E[X]])
The same notation will be used in the next sections with the functions R and R′. We have
therefore for all martingales
VVn ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) = E[
n∑
k=1
V ([Lk | Fk−1])]
2.2. Index of Notations.
– ∆(X) denotes the set of probabilities defined on the Borel σ-field of a topological space
X, endowed with the usual weak* topology.
– |x|p stands for the usual p-norm in Rd and we omit the index when p = 2 (euclidian
norm), the scalar product is denoted 〈., .〉, vectors are identified to column matrices and
.T denotes transposition.
– If a Rd-valued random variable X defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) has law µ,
we write X ∼ µ or [X] = µ. For a sub-σ-field G, [X | G] denotes a regular version of the
conditional law of X given G. Recall that [X | G] defines a G measurable map with values
in ∆(Rd) (see appendix).
– The vectorial Lp-norm is defined by ‖X‖Lp = ‖µ‖p = E[∑di=1 |X i|p]1/p.
– Md denotes the set of d× d square matrices and Sd the subset of symmetric matrices. Sd+
(resp. Sd++) denotes the cone of symmetric semi-definite (resp. definite) positive matrices
and ≤ the associated order between symmetric matrices. The norm |.| on these sets is
the induced euclidian norm of Md. For M ∈ Sd+,
√
M = M 12 is the unique N ∈ Sd+ such
that N2 = M .
3. Properties of the auxiliary function R
Definition 3.1: The two auxiliary functions R and r are respectively defined on ∆20 and Sd+
by the relation
R(µ) = sup
ν∈∆20:cov(ν)=cov(µ)
V (ν) = r(cov(µ))
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which implies
∀M ∈ Sd+, r(M) = sup
ν∈∆20:cov(ν)=M
V (µ)
The next two lemmas and definitions explore the notion of L2-convexity in Sd+.
Lemma 3.1: For all P,Q ∈ S+d and µ ∈ ∆2 such that cov(µ) = P , we have
sup
ν∈∆20:cov(ν)≤Q
C(µ, ν) = sup
ν∈∆20:cov(ν)=Q
C(µ, ν) = Tr
(
(
√
PQ
√
P ) 12
)
= sup
D∈Md :DDT=Q
Tr(ND)
where the last equality holds for any N such that NNT = P (in particular
√
P ).
Proof. If X ∼ µ and Y ∼ ν are given random variables such that U = Q − cov(ν) ≥ 0,
one can construct a variable Z independent of (X, Y ) such that E[Z] = 0 and cov(Z) = U .
From this construction E[〈X, Y + Z〉] = E[〈X, Y 〉] and cov(Y + Z) = Q, and this proves the
first equality. If X, Y are random variables in L2 such that X ∼ µ and cov(Y ) = Q, then
Z = (X, Y ) is a vector of random variables taking values in R2d so that
cov(Z) = Cψ =
(
P ψ
ψT Q
)
≥ 0
and E[〈X, Y 〉] = E[〈X − E[X], Y 〉] = Tr(ψ). The value of the semi-definite positive program{
max Tr(ψ)
Cψ ∈ Sd+
is given by
max
Cψ∈Sd+
Tr(ψ) = Tr
(
(
√
PQ
√
P ) 12
)
for any pair of covariance matrices (see [49] th. 3.4.1 and references therein), and this bound
is reached by compactness. To prove the second equality, if P = cov(X) ∈ Sd++ consider the
mapping x ∈ Rd →Mx ∈ Rd with the matrix M defined by
M =
√
P
−1 (√
PQ
√
P
) 1
2
√
P
−1
Then with Y = M(X − E[X]) we have E[〈X, Y 〉] = Tr
(
(
√
PQ
√
P ) 12
)
. For the last equality,
one can always construct a random variable U such that E[U ] = 0 and cov(U) = Id and
X = NU + E[X] ∼ µ, then with Y = DU , we have E[〈X, Y 〉] = Tr(DN) which implies the
result since this bound is reached with D = MN . These equalities extend then to Sd+ by a
continuity argument. 
Notation 6:
– L2 denotes the hilbert space L2([0, 1], dx;Rd) of Rd-valued random variables.
– L20 denotes the subset of random variables X ∈ L2 such that E[X] = 0.
– A function f defined on ∆2 is “extended” to L2 using the convention f(X) = f([X]).
– To a subset Λ of ∆2, we associate the subset Λ˜ of L2 containing elements of L2 whose
distributions belong to Λ
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– To a subset Θ of Sd+, we associate the subset Θ̂ of variables X ∈ L20 such that
cov(X) = E[XXT ] ∈ Θ.
Definition 3.2: A subset Θ of Sd+ is said to be L2-convex if Θ̂ is convex in L20.
Definition 3.3: The polar set C◦ of C ⊂ L20 is defined by
C◦ = {X ∈ L20 : sup
Y ∈C
E[〈X, Y 〉] ≤ 1}
Now we give a characterization of L2-convexity.
Lemma 3.2: Let Θ be a nonempty comprehensive subset od Sd+, i.e. such that
P ∈ Θ and Q ≤ P ⇒ Q ∈ Θ.
Then Θ̂◦ = Θ̂† where
Θ† = {P ∈ Sd+ : sup
Q∈Θ
Tr
(
(
√
PQ
√
P ) 12
)
≤ 1}
and Θ̂ is closed and convex in L20 if and only if Θ†† = Θ.
Proof. Note that Θ̂ = ∪Q∈Θ{Y ∈ L20 : cov(Y ) ≤ Q}. We claim that if X ∈ L20 is
µ-distributed, then
sup
Y ∈L20 : cov(Y )≤Q
E[〈X, Y 〉] = sup
ν∈∆20:cov(ν)≤Q
C(µ, ν)
Given a joint law pi ∈ P(µ, ν) such that cov(ν) ≤ Q, then enlarging the probability space, we can
define a variable Y such that (X, Y ) ∼ pi. But we can replace Y by its conditional expectation
given X, E[Y | X] = φ(X) , which is defined on the original probability space as a function
of X. We check easily that E[〈X, Y 〉] = E[〈X,φ(X)〉] and that cov(φ(X) ≤ cov(Y ) ≤ Q. It
follows then from lemma 3.1 that with cov(X) = P we have
sup
Y ∈Θ̂
E[〈X, Y 〉] = sup
Q∈Θ
sup
Y ∈L20 : cov(Y )≤Q
E[〈X, Y 〉] = sup
Q∈Θ
Tr
(
(
√
PQ
√
P ) 12
)
The conclusion follows then from the usual characterization of the closed convex hull as the
bipolar in L20 since our assumption implies that 0 ∈ Θ. 
The following lemma lists some properties of the function r.
Lemma 3.3: The function r is non-negative, concave, non-decreasing and continuous on Sd+.
Moreover:
(3.1) ∀λ > 0, r(λM) =
√
λr(M).
(3.2) r(M) = max
µ∈∆20:cov(µ)≤M
V (µ)
Proof. Note at first that the dWp-closure of {ν ∈ ∆20 : cov(ν) = M} is {ν ∈ ∆20 :
cov(ν) ≤ M} (see the proof of lemma 6.5 in section 12), so that (3.2) follows from A2. Since
cov is linear and V is 1-homogenous, non-negative and concave, the non-negativeness, concavity
and (3.1) are obvious. Let us prove continuity on some compact subset E. Note that the subset
{µ ∈ ∆20 : cov(µ) ≤ M} is dWp-compact since moments of order 2 > p are uniformly bounded.
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The continuity of r follows therefore from Berge’s maximum theorem (see [8] p.116) since the
set-valued mapping
M → {µ ∈ ∆20 : cov(µ) ≤M}
is both upper and lower semi-continuous when ∆20 is endowed with the metric dWp . 
Let F = {M ∈ Sd+ : r(M) ≤ 1}. Using the notations of the previous lemmas, the sets Γ
and G defined in (1.1) are such that
Γ = co(G) and G = F † = {P ∈ Sd+ : sup
M∈Md :MMT∈F
Tr(M
√
P ) ≤ 1}
Our main result in this section is the following upper bound for V , which is a modification of
R that takes into account the Lipschitz assumption A2.
Proposition 3.1: V ≤ R′ on ∆20 with R′(µ) = sup
ν∈T
C(µ, ν) and
T = {ν ∈ ∆20 : cov(µ) ∈ Γ , ‖µ‖p′ ≤ 2K}
with p′ the conjugate exponent of p.
Proof. Since these two functions also positively homogenous (A3), it is sufficient to prove
the inclusion
(3.3) {X ∈ L20 | R′(X) ≤ 1} ⊂ {X ∈ L20 | V (X) ≤ 1}
Note at first that lemma 3.3 and A1 imply that F is compact and is a neighborhood of 0 in
Sd+. Define the following subsets of ∆20
F = {µ ∈ ∆20 : r(cov(µ)) ≤ 1} Bp1/K = {µ ∈ ∆20 : ‖µ‖p ≤
1
K
}
We claim that
(3.4) co(F̂ , B˜p1/K) is a closed convex set and is included in {X ∈ L20 | V (X) ≤ 1}.
Using assumption A5, F̂ is weakly compact and convex and B˜p1/K is weakly closed and convex,
the convex envelope is then weakly closed, hence closed in L20 for the norm topology. Let X ∈ F̂ ,
Y ∈ B˜p1/K and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Using the Lipschitz property of V , we deduce
V (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ V (λX) +K ‖(1− λ)Y ‖Lp
≤ λr(cov(X)) + (1− λ) ≤ 1
which proves (3.4). Next, for X ∈ L20, we define the function R∗(X) = sup
Y ∈F̂
E[〈X, Y 〉]. From
lemma 3.1, the function R∗ depend only on cov(X), that is R∗(X) = r∗(cov(X)) with
r∗(P ) = sup
Q∈F
Tr
(
(
√
PQ
√
P ) 12
)
Since F is a neighborhood of {0} in Sd+, we can always choose Q = λP ∈ F with λ > 0 in
the above supremum and it follows that r∗ is positive outside {0} . r∗ is continuous since F is
compact. Therefore G = {M ∈ Sd+ : r∗(M) ≤ 1} is compact and a neighborhood of {0} in Sd+.
Define
Γ = {µ ∈ ∆20 : cov(µ) ∈ Γ} Bp
′
2K = {µ ∈ ∆20 : ‖µ‖p′ ≤ 2K}
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The function R′ : ∆2 → R is equal to
R′(µ) = sup
pi∈P(µ,Γ∩Bp′2K)
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y) = sup
ν∈Γ∩Bp′2K
C(µ, ν)
Extending the function R′ on L2, we have that :
(3.5) ∀X ∈ L2, R′(X) = sup
Y ∈Γ̂∩B˜p′2K
E[〈X, Y 〉]
The proof of (3.5) proceeds as for lemma 3.2 since Γ̂∩ B˜p′K is stable by conditional expectations.
Next, we prove that
(3.6) {X ∈ L20 | R′(X) ≤ 1} ⊂ co(F̂ , B˜p1/K)
Suppose that Y /∈ co(F̂ , B˜p1/K), then there exists Z in L20 such that :
E[〈Z, Y 〉] > α = sup
X∈co(F̂ ,B˜p1/K)
E[〈Z,X〉]
This implies :
α ≥ sup
X∈B˜p1/K
E[〈Z,X〉] ≥ 12K ‖Z‖p′
α ≥ sup
X∈F̂
E[〈Z,X〉] = R∗(Z)
The first inequality implies ‖Z‖p′ <∞ and the second that Zα ∈ Ĝ ⊂ Γ̂ since R∗ is the support
function in L20 of F̂ = Ĝ◦. Now Zα ∈ Γ̂ ∩ B˜p
′
2K and R′(Y ) ≥ E[〈Zα , Y 〉] > 1 which proves (3.6).
Finally, we deduce (3.3) from (3.4) and (3.6) and this concludes the proof. 
During the proof, we used the following property which follows from the duality between Ĝ
anf F̂ in L20
Lemma 3.4:
∀M ∈Md, r(M) = max
N∈Md :NNT∈G
Tr(MN)
4. An upper bound for the V-variation
Since we proved in the previous section that V ≤ R′, we have
VVn ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) ≤ VR
′
n ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n)
for any martingale where VR′n is defined by replacing V by R′ in (2.1). Therefore
√
nVn(µ) ≤ VR
′
n (µ) , sup
(Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n∈Mn(µ)
VR′n ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n)
Definition 4.1: Define T n as the set of distributions in ν ∈ ∆2((Rd)n) of sequences S1, ..Sn
such that
∀k = 1, .., n, [Sk | S1, ..., Sk−1] ∈ T, ν a.s.
where T is defined in proposition 3.1.
Then we have
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Lemma 4.1:
VR′n (µ) = max[(Sk)k=1,..,n]∈Tn,[L]µE[〈L,
n∑
k=1
Sk〉]
Proof. At first, note that T n is compact convex. Indeed, by a monotone convergence
argument ν ∈ T n is equivalent to
Eν [φ(S1, .., Sk−1)Sk] = 0, Eν [φ(S1, .., Sk−1)SkSTk ] ∈ Eν [φ(S1, .., Sk−1)].Γ
and Eν [φ(S1, .., Sk−1)|Sk|p′p′ ] ≤ (2K)p
′Eν [φ(S1, .., Sk−1)]
for all k = 1, .., n, where φ ranges through all nonnegative continuous functions bounded by
1. Since all these applications are affine and continuous, it defines a closed convex set, and
relative compactness follows from the uniform bound on the moments of order p′. Existence of a
maximum follows therefore from lemma 12.3 and 12.1. For any law of martingale [(Lk)k=1,..,n] ∈
Mn(µ), denoting (Fk)k=1,..,n the natural filtration of (Lk)k=1,..,n, we will prove
(4.1) VR′n ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) ≤ max
S∈Tn,[L]µ
E[〈L,
n∑
k=1
Sk〉]
Recall that for κ ∈ ∆2, with R′ defined on ∆2 by (2.3)
R′(κ) = sup
ν∈T
C(κ, ν) = max
pi∈P(κ,T )
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
P(κ, T ) is compact and from lemma 12.3 the map
pi →
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
is continuous on P(Br, T ) for any r ≥ 0 where Br is the closed ball {κ : ‖κ‖2 ≤ r} of ∆2.
Moreover, the set-valued map
κ→ P(κ, T )
has a closed graph. Therefore, using a measurable selection theorem (see appendix theorem
2.1) , the set-valued map
κ→ argmax
pi∈P(κ,T )
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
admits a measurable selection f(µ) on Br for any r > 0 and thus on ∆2. Since the martingale
has finite second order moments, the conditional second order moments are almost surely finite
and there exists a family (µk)k=1,..,n of regular versions of the conditional laws [Lk | L1, .., Lk−1]
induced by (Lk)k=1,..,n that defines measurable maps
µk : (Rd)k−1 → ∆2
such that [Lk | L1, .., Lk−1] = µk(L1, .., Lk−1) a.s.. Up to enlarging the probability space,
we assume the existence of a sequence (Vi)i=1,..,n of independent uniform random variables
independent of (L1, .., Ln). Then we can construct 3 a sequence of random variables (S1, .., Sn)
as a measurable function of (Lk, Vk)k=1,..,n such that the conditional laws are optimals, i.e.
∀k = 1, .., n, [(Lk, Sk) | L1, .., Lk−1] = f(µk(L1, .., Lk−1)) a.s.
3. see theorem 1.3 and the following discussion in the appendix.
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By construction, and using the martingale property
E[〈Ln, Sk〉 | L1, .., Lk−1] = E[〈Lk, Sk〉 | L1, .., Lk−1] = R′(µk(L1, .., Lk−1)).
We deduce by summation that
VR′n ((Lk,Fk)k=1,..,n) = E[〈Ln,
n∑
k=1
Sk〉]
and inequality 4.1 follows. The other inequality is straightforward, given a pair
(L, (Sk)k=1,..,n), one has to define a martingale by projecting (using conditional expectations)
L on the natural filtration of (Sk)k=1,..,n and the proof follows from the definition of R′. 
5. Convergence of the upper bound
Notation 7:
– D([0, 1],Rd) denotes the set of ca`dla`g functions from [0, 1] to Rd endowed with the Sko-
rokhod topology.
– C([0, 1],Rd) denotes the set of continuous functions from [0, 1] to Rd endowed with the
topology of uniform convergence and is identified with the subset of continuous functions
in D([0, 1],Rd).
– M (resp. Mc) denotes the subset of ∆(D([0, 1],Rd)) (resp. ∆(C([0, 1],Rd))) such hat
under P ∈M (resp. Mc) the canonical coordinate process is a martingale with respect to
the filtration generated by the projections.
– If the probability space is not mentioned, the martingales we considered will be defined on
the canonical space of suitable dimension. For a martingale (Zt)t∈[0,1] we denote (FZt )t∈[0,1]
the right-continuous filtration it generates defined by FZt = ∩s>tσ(Zu, u ≤ s) and by 〈Z〉
its predictable quadratic covariation process. Filtrations are not assumed to be complete
unless for the natural filtration of some Brownian motion B denoted FB.
Recall the following definition given in the introduction :
Definition 5.1: Given a compact convex subset B of Sd+, we define QB as the subset of P in
Mc such that with P-probability 1 :
(5.1) ∀0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1, 1
t− s(〈Z〉t − 〈Z〉s) ∈ B and Z0 = 0
where Z denotes the canonical coordinate process on C([0, 1],Rd).
We will also need later the following notations, for t ∈ [0, 1], QB(t) denotes the set of laws
of variables Zt and pit(QB) the set of laws of processes (Zs)s≤t when the law of (Zt)t∈[0,1] ranges
through QB.
Remark 5.1: Note that this definition implies that there exists a predictable process ρ taking
values in B with probability 1 such that 〈Z〉t =
∫ t
0 ρsds.
Lemma 5.1: QB is closed, convex and tight (hence compact) and is a face of the convex set
Mc.
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Proof. Fix P ∈ QB, then
d∑
i=1
(〈Zi〉t − 〈Zi〉s) ≤ CB(t− s)
with CB = sup
M∈B
‖M‖. Hence using proposition VI.3.35 and VI.4.13 in [36], QB is tight and
using proposition VI.6.29 in [36], for any sequence Pn ∈ QB converging to some limit P, we
have that the sequence of distributions of (Zn, 〈Zn〉) under Pn converges to the law of (Z, 〈Z〉)
under P in ∆(C([0, 1],Rd × S+d )). As a consequence the sequence of laws of 〈Zn〉 converges
to the law of 〈Z〉 so that P fulfills property (5.1) and thus belongs to QB (since the set of
continuous functions verifying (5.1) is closed). To prove convexity, if P = λP1 + (1− λ)P2 with
P1,P2 ∈ QB, then for i = 1, 2, it follows from the characterization of the quadratic covariation
that
(5.2) ∀ε > 0, Pi(dB( 1
t− sT
n
s,t(Z)) ≥ ε) −→n→∞ 0
where T ns,t(Z) =
∑∞
k=0(Z(s+ k+1
n
)∧t − Z(s+ kn )∧t)(Z(s+ k+1n )∧t − Z(s+ kn )∧t)
T and dB(x) is the usual
distance between x and and the compact set B. Therefore the same property holds for P and
this clearly implies (5.1), which finally implies P ∈ QB.
Finally, if P = λP1 +(1−λ)P2 with P1,P2 ∈Mc, λ ∈ (0, 1) and P ∈ QB then property (5.2)
holds for P. This property holds then also for P1 and P2, and this implies P1,P2 ∈ QB. 
The following result is the upper bound part of theorem 1.1 :
Proposition 5.1:
limsup
n→∞
1√
n
VR′n (µ) ≤ sup
[(Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈QΓ,[L]µ
E[〈L,Z1〉]
Proof. Using lemma 4.1, we have to prove that
limsup
n→∞
1√
n
sup
[(Sk)k=1,..,n]∈Tn,[L]µ
E[〈L,
n∑
k=1
Sk〉] ≤ sup
[(Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈QΓ,[L]µ
E[〈L,Z1〉]
Let (Ln, (Snk )k=1,..,n) be a maximizing sequence. Let define Pn as the set of processes distribu-
tions of the continuous-time processes :
Znt =
1√
n
bntc∑
k=1
Snk
The sequence Pn is tight since Znt are martingales with respect to the right-continuous filtration
Fnt = σ(Snk , k ≤ bntc) and their predictable quadratic covariation is C-tight. To prove the last
point, note that 〈Zn〉t is piecewise constant on the intervals [ kn , k+1n ) and that
(5.3) 〈Zn〉 k+1
n
− 〈Zn〉 k
n
= 1
n
E[Snk+1(Snk+1)T | Sn1 , ..Snk ] ∈
1
n
Γ
Since Γ is bounded by some constant CΓ, the trace of this matrix-valued process is strongly
majorized by the process t → CΓbntc
n
. The associated sequence of laws is therefore C-tight by
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proposition VI.3.35 in [36]. To prove that the sequence Pn is itself C-tight, it is sufficient
according to lemma VI.3.26 in [36] to prove that
∀ε > 0, Pn( sup
t∈[0,1]
| ∆Znt |> ε)−→n→∞0
where ∆Znt = Znt − Znt− is the jump of Zn at time t. Since
sup
t∈[0,1]
| ∆Znt |= sup
k=0,..,n−1
1√
n
| Snk+1 − Snk |
we have :
Pn( sup
t∈[0,1]
| ∆Znt |> ε) ≤
n−1∑
k=0
Pn(| Snk+1 − Snk |> ε
√
n)
≤
n−1∑
k=0
EPn [| Snk+1 − Snk |p′ ]
(ε
√
n)p′ ≤ n
(2K)p′
(ε
√
n)p′ −→n→∞0
Suppose now that some subsequence still denoted Pn converges to P. Then the sequence
of laws Qn ∈ D([0, 1],Rd × Sd+) of (Zn, 〈Zn〉) is itself C-tight (corollary VI.3.33 in [36]) and
converges to some lawQ (up to the extraction of some subsequence) of a process (Z,A) such that
Z has law P. Now the processes Zn and Zn(Zn)T−〈Zn〉 are martingales with respect to Fn and
the families of random variables {Znt , t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ N} and {Zn(Zn)Tt −〈Zn〉t, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ N}
are uniformly integrable since respectively bounded in L2 and L p
′
2 . Applying proposition IX.1.12
in [36] to each coordinate of these process, we conclude that Z and ZZT − A are martingales
relative to the filtration F generated by (Z,A). The process A is F -predictable since it is
F -adapted and has continuous trajectories. Therefore, we have with probability 1,
∀t ∈ [0, 1], 〈Z〉t = At
This implies that for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1 and ε > 0,
(5.4) P(dΓ(
1
t− s(〈Z〉t − 〈Z〉s)) > ε) ≤ lim infn P
n(dΓ(
1
t− s(〈Z
n〉t − 〈Zn〉s)) > ε)
and using (5.3)
Pn( 1
t− s(〈Z
n〉t − 〈Zn〉s) ∈ bntc − bnsc
n(t− s) Γ) = 1
which implies
Pn(dΓ(
1
t− s(〈Z
n〉t − 〈Zn〉s) > |1− bntc − bnsc
n(t− s) |CΓ) = 0
This equality implies that the right-hand side of (5.4) is equal to zero for all ε, which in turn
implies (5.1) and we deduce finally that P ∈ QΓ.
The conclusion follows now easily, any sequence of maximizing joint distributions (Ln, Zn1 )
is tight in ∆(Rd×Rd) and from the preceding discussion it converges to the law of (L,Z1) which
is in P({.  µ}, QΓ(1)). Since Zn1 has bounded second order moments and Ln has uniformly
integrable second order moments (its marginal law is Blackwell dominated by µ), we have from
lemma 12.3 that
E[〈Ln, Zn1 〉]−→n→∞E[〈L,Z1〉]
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
6. The continuous-time problem and the discretization procedure
The main result of this section is the following lower bound property that completes the
proof of theorem 1.1.
Proposition 6.1:
liminf
n→∞
Vn(µ) ≥ V∞(µ)
This proposition will be proved using the first reformulation Wac of V∞ announced in the
introduction.
Definition 6.1: Consider the canonical space C([0, 1],Rd) endowed with the standard d di-
mensional Wiener measure P0. In order to avoid confusions, let (Bt)t∈[0,1] denote the canonical
process and FB its natural filtration. Let HG be the set of Md-valued FB-progressively measur-
able processes ρ such that ρρT ∈ G. Define the subset Q˜G of Mc as the set of laws of processes
Yt =
∫ t
0 ρsdBs with ρ ∈ HG.
Lemma 6.1: Q˜G(1) is dense in QΓ(1).
The proof of this lemma is postponed to section 12. This density result allows us to prove
the following representation lemma.
Lemma 6.2:
V∞(µ) = Wac(µ) , sup
X∈Mac(µ)
E[
∫
r( d
ds
〈X〉s)ds]
where Mac(µ) ⊂ Mc is the subset of distributions of martingales (Xt)t∈[0,1] whose final dis-
tribution is Blackwell dominated by µ, and such that with probability 1, the quadratic variation
process (〈X〉t)t∈[0,1] is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Moreover,
the supremum in Wac can be restricted to martingales with respect to a fixed d-dimensional
Brownian filtration.
Proof. We prove at first that Wac ≤ V∞. Let X be a martingale whose law is inMac(µ).
Then there exists on an extension 4 denoted (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) of our filtered probability space
a d-dimensional Brownian motion W and a F -progressively measurable process qs ∈ Md such
that Xt =
∫ t
0 qsdWs (see e.g. [39] theorem 3.4.2). Moreover, we have 〈X〉t =
∫ t
0 qsq
T
s ds. Define
the progressively measurable process σs = φ(qs) where φ is some measurable selection of the
set-valued map
(6.1) M ∈Md → argmax
N∈Md :NNT∈G
Tr(MN)
The law of the process (
∫ t
0 σsdWs)t∈[0,1] is by construction in QΓ and we have
(6.2) V∞(µ) ≥ E[〈X1,
∫ 1
0
σsdWs〉] = E[
∫ 1
0
Tr(qsσs)ds] = E[
∫
r( d
ds
〈X〉s)ds]
4. All the extensions we consider in this work are always the canonical Wiener extensions as defined in [35].
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where the last equality follows from lemma 3.4. Let us prove the second inequality V∞ ≤ Wac.
Using lemma 6.1 and 12.3, we have
V∞(µ) = sup
ν∈Q˜G(1)
C(µ, ν)
Let B be a d-dimensional Brownian motion and FB its natural filtration. Using the above
equality, for all ε > 0, there exists an ε-optimal pair (L, (Zt)t∈[0,1]) defined on the same proba-
bility space as B such that
Zt =
∫ t
0 σsdBs for some FB progressive process σ such that σsσTs ∈ G
[L]  µ
E[〈L,Z1〉] ≥ V∞(µ)− ε
We can clearly assume that L is FB1 -measurable by replacing L by its conditional expectation
given FB1 . Using the predictable representation property of the Brownian filtration, there exist
an FB progressive process λs such that L = ∫ 10 λsdBs. Then
E[〈L,Z1〉] = E[
∫ 1
0
Tr(λsσTs )ds] ≤ E[
∫ 1
0
r(λsλTs )ds] ≤ Wac(µ)
which ends the proof of the second inequality and of the last assertion concerning the Brownian
filtration. 
Remark 6.1: Since we postponed the proof of density lemma 6.1, the previous lemma deserves
some comments. If we replace G by Γ in (6.1), the supremum will be in general strictly larger,
since the problem is not convex with respect to NNT . The proof of the density lemma basically
says that after discretization in time, it is possible to replace the piecewise constant process of
instantaneous covariance with values in Γ by another piecewise constant process (on a refined
partition) with covariance in G (using Caratheodory’s theorem). This construction cancels the
effect of the possibly strict inequality we just mentioned, and we conclude using that the sequence
of discretizations converge in the appropriate sense to the initial problem.
The proof of proposition 6.1 is based on the following four technical lemmas whose proofs
are standards and therefore postponed to section 12.
Some Technical Results. The first lemma is the usual central limit theorem for the
Wasserstein distance. Let RC1(q, C) = {µ ∈ ∆20 : cov(µ) = Id, ‖µ‖q ≤ C}. Define then
RCn(q, C) as the set of rescaled convolutions of these distributions, precisely all distributions
of the variables
n∑
k=1
Si√
n
where the sequence (Si)i=1,..,n is independent and identically distributed for some law µ ∈
RC1(q, C). We will also use the notation µ⊗n for the law (in ∆((Rd)n)) of an i.i.d. sequence of
random variables of law µ.
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Lemma 6.3: Using the previous notations and with N (0, Id) being the standard centered gauss-
ian distribution in Rd, we have for all q > 2:
lim
n→∞ supν∈RCn(q,C)
dW2(ν,N (0, Id)) = 0
Moreover, given µ ∈ RC1(q, C), there exists a measurable selection
µ→ pi(µ) ∈ P(µ⊗n,N (0, Id))
such that
Epi(µ)[‖
n∑
k=1
Si√
n
−N‖2] ≤ sup
ν∈RCn(q,C)
dW2(ν,N (0, Id))
where ((Si)i=1,..,n, N) ∼ pi(µ).
The second shows an approximation result for processes without expectations (and therefore
without convexity assumptions on the state space).
Lemma 6.4: Let c be a bounded, measurable and adapted Rd-valued process defined on some
filtered probability space. Then
i) limh→0 E[
∫ 1
0 |ct − ct−h|2dt] = 0 with the convention ct = 0 for t < 0.
ii) There exists a sequence δn ∈ [0, 1] and a sequence of simple processes cn such that
limn→∞E[
∫ 1
0
|ct − cnt |2dt] = 0
and cnt =
n−1∑
k=0
c k−δn
n
1I[ k
n
, k+1
n
)(t).
Due to the Lipschitz property of V with respect to the wasserstein distance of order p, we
have the following approximation result
Lemma 6.5: For all q > 2 we have lim
C→∞
z(q, C) = 0 with
z(q, C) = sup
M∈Md:|M |=1
r(MMT )− sup
X∼ν∈∆20:cov(ν)=Id ,‖ν‖q≤C
V (MX)

Moreover, there exists a measurable selection
M ∈ Sd+ → χ(M) ∈ {ν ∈ ∆20 : cov(ν) = Id , ‖ν‖q ≤ C}
such that
r(MMT )− V (M]χ(M)) ≤ |M |z(q, C)
where ν → M]ν denotes the map which associates to ν the image probability of ν induced by
the linear map x→Mx.
Lemma 6.6:
Let (Xk, Yk)k=1,..,n be two Rd-valued martingales defined on the same probability space with
respect to the same filtration (Fk)k=1,..,n. Then
1√
n
| VVn (X,F)− VVn (Y,F) |≤ βK‖Xn − Yn‖L2
where β is a constant such that |x|p ≤ β|x|2.
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Proof of proposition 6.1. Let B be a d-dimensional Brownian motion and FB its
natural filtration. According to lemma 6.2, for all ε > 0, there exists an FB martingale
(Lt =
∫ t
0 λsdBs)t∈[0,1] such that [L1]  µ and an FB-progressively measurable process (σt)t∈[0,1]
such that σtσTt ∈ G and
E[〈L1,
∫ 1
0
σsdBs〉] = E[
∫ 1
0
Tr(λsσTs )ds] = E[
∫ 1
0
r(λsλTs )ds] ≥ V∞(µ)− ε
Applying lemma 6.4 to σ, there exists an FB-simple process σn such that σn(σn)T ∈ G, piece-
wise constant on the intervals [ k
n
, k+1
n
) such that E[
∫ 1
0 |σs − σns |2 ds]−→n→∞0. Let λn be also a
piecewise constant approximation of λ by a simple process on the same partition. Let us
denote
σns =
n∑
k=1
cnk1I[ k−1
n
, k
n
)(s) λns =
n∑
k=1
unk1I[ k−1
n
, k
n
)(s)
With these notations and denoting ∆nkB = Bk/n −B(k−1)/n, we have
E[〈
∫ 1
0
λnsdBs,
∫ 1
0
σns dBs〉] = E[
n∑
k=1
E[〈cnk∆nkB, unk∆nkB〉 | FBk−1
n
]](6.3)
= E[
n∑
k=1
1
n
Tr(unk(cnk)T )] ≤
1
n
E[
n−1∑
k=0
r(unk(unk)T )](6.4)
since cnk(cnk)T ∈ G. On the other hand
E[〈
∫ 1
0
λnsdBs,
∫ 1
0
σns dBs〉]−→n→∞E[〈L1,
∫ 1
0
σsdBs〉]
Our goal is to construct a discrete-time approximation of the martingale E[L | FBt ] using
a double-scale of discretization. The first scale is the usual time-discretization on the intervals
[k/n, (k + 1)/n) and the second level of discretization acts on the integrator B rather than on
the integral itself. Each increment ∆nkB will be replaced by a sufficiently long normalized sum
of i.i.d. random variables whose laws will be chosen in order for the V -variation to be close to
the R′-variation.
Up to enlarging the probability space, we assume that there is a sequence (Vi)i∈N of uniform
random variables independent of B. Let us fix C > 0 and q > 2. According to lemma 6.3,
given a sequence ηn converging to zero, there exists an increasing sequence Nn of integers such
that
∀r ≥ Nn sup
µ∈RCr(q,C)
dW2(µ,N (0, Id)) ≤ ηn
For a vector (N(k, n))k=1,..,n of integers such that N(k, n) ≥ Nn, define the partial sums
D(k, n) = ∑ki=1N(i, n) and D(0, n) = 0. Using the notations of lemma 6.5, define the se-
quence (νnk )k=1,..,n of Rd-valued transitions probabilities by νnk = χ(unk), having the property
that for any variable Y such that [Y | unk ] = νnk
(6.5) r(unk(unk)T )− V ([unkY | unk ]) ≤ |unk |z(q, C)
where z(q, C) is defined in lemma 6.5. There exists a family of random variables (Si)i=1,..,D(n,n)
and a filtration (Hi)i=1,..,D(n,n) (both depending on n and of the chosen sequence N(k, n))
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fulfilling the following properties:
E

∥∥∥∥∥∥∆nkB −
D(k,n)∑
i=D(k−1,n)+1
Sni√
nN(k, n)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
|HD(k−1,n)
 ≤ η2n
n
(6.6)
[Si | Hi−1] = νnk∗(i) ∈ RC1(q, C)(6.7)
Hi = σ((unk , λnk ,∆nkB), k ≤ k∗(i) ; Sj, j ≤ i) for i = 0, .., D(n, n)(6.8)
where k∗(i) is defined by the relation D(k∗(i) − 1, n) ≤ i < D(k∗(i), n). This construction
is simply obtained using the principle of rescaled convolutions explained in lemma 6.3 which
implies that there exists a “good” measurable selection
pi(νnk ) ∈ P((νnk )⊗N(k,n),N (0, Id)).
Using the variable Vk (independent from all the past variables), it is then possible to construct
the sequence (Si)i=D(k−1,n)+1,..,D(k,n) such that the conditional law of
((Si)i=D(k−1,n)+1,..,D(k,n),∆nkB) given HD(k−1,n) is pi(νnk ) 5. The above mentioned properties
follows then from lemma 6.3. Now we can consider the martingale (Mi = E[L | Hi], i =
0, .., D(n, n)) and its approximation
M˜i =
k∗(i)−1∑
k=1
D(k,n)∑
j=D(k−1,n)+1
unkSj√
nN(k, n)
+
i∑
j=D(k∗(i)−1,n)+1
unk∗(i)Sj√
nN(k∗(i), n)
.
which is also an H-martingale. Using lemma 6.6, we have
(6.9)
∣∣∣VVD(n,n)(M,H)− VVD(n,n)(M˜,H)∣∣∣ ≤ βK√D(n, n) ∥∥∥L− M˜D(n,n)∥∥∥L2
where we replaced MD(n,n) by L using the martingale property. And
∥∥∥L− M˜D(n,n)∥∥∥
L2
≤ E[
∫ 1
0
|λs − λns |2ds]
1
2
+ E
 n∑
k=1
E[|unk(∆nkB −
D(k,n)∑
i=D(k−1,n)+1
Sni√
nN(k + 1, n)
)|2 | FBk−1/n]
 12
≤ E[
∫ 1
0
|λs − λns |2ds] + αηnE[
∫
|λns |2ds]
1
2
5. See the discussion following theorem 1.3 in the appendix
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using (6.6) and where α is such that |Px| ≤ α|P ||x| for all P ∈ Md and x ∈ Rd. Using (6.9),
these inequalities reduce our problem to the study of the V -variation of M˜ .
VVD(n,n)(M˜,H) = E
 n∑
k=1
D(k,n)∑
i=D(k−1,n)+1
V [M˜i − M˜i−1 | Hi−1]

≥ E
 n∑
k=1
D(k,n)∑
i=D(k−1,n)+1
r(unk(unk)T )− |unk |z(q, C)√
nN(k, n)

≥ E
 n∑
k=1
D(k,n)∑
i=D(k−1,n)+1
nE[〈cnk∆nkB, unk∆nkB〉]− |unk |z(q, C)√
nN(k, n)

= E
[
n∑
k=1
√
nN(k, n)
(
E[〈cnk∆nkB, unk∆nkB〉]−
1
n
|unk |z(q, C)
)]
≥
√
D(n, n)
(
E[
∫ 1
0
Tr(λns (σns )T )ds]− z(q, C)E[
∫ 1
0
|λns |ds]
− max
k=1,..,n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
nN(k, n)√
D(n, n)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣E[∫ 10 Tr(λns (σns )T )ds]− z(q, C)E[
∫ 1
0
|λns |ds]
∣∣∣∣

where the two first inequalities follow from (6.5) and (6.3). Using the former results, for any
sequence of vectors N(k, n) indexed by n such that
(6.10) max
k=1,..,n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
nN(k, n)√
D(n, n)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −→n→∞0
we have
liminf
n→∞
VVD(n,n)(M˜,H)√
D(n, n)
≥ V∞(µ)− z(q, C)E[
∫ 1
0
|λs|ds]− ε
The condition (6.10) is not restrictive since for fixed n, any vector of integer N(k, n) ∈ {m;m+
1} for m ≥ Nn is such that
max
k=1,..,n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
nN(k, n)√
D(n, n)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Nn
and then any value above nNn is admissible for D(n, n). It implies that
liminf
n→∞
Vn(µ) ≥ V∞(µ)− z(q, C)E[
∫ 1
0
|λs|ds]− ε
The result follows by sending C to +∞ and ε to 0. 
7. The dual problem : Dual equality
This section is devoted to prove the following dual representation of V∞
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Proposition 7.1:
V∞(µ) = inf
φ∈C2(Rd)
(Eµ[φ(L)] + V ∗∞(φ))(7.1)
= min
φ∈Conv(Rd)
(Eµ[φ(L)] + V ∗∞(φ))(7.2)
where
V ∗∞(φ) , sup
[(Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈QΓ
E[φ∗(Z1)]
C2(Rd) is the set of continuous functions with at most quadratic growth and Conv(Rd) the set
of l.s.c. proper convex functions from Rd to R ∪ {+∞}.
Notation 8: Let ∂V∞(µ) denote the set of φ ∈ Conv(Rd) minimizing the right-hand side of
(7.1).
Proof. Note at first that we can replace the constraint [L]  µ given in the definition of
V∞ by [L] = µ since the maximal covariance functions C(., ν) defined in section 12 are Blackwell
increasing (see lemma 12.4). Moreover, it’s sufficient to prove the result for µ ∈ Delta20 since the
set QΓ(1) contains only centered probabilities. Applying then theorem 12.1 using the notation
〈φ, µ〉 = Eµ[φ(L)] for expectations, we obtain
V∞(µ) = max
ν∈QΓ(1)
inf
(φ− 12 |.|2,ψ− 12 |.|2)∈Cb(R2)2;φ+ψ>〈.,.〉
(〈φ, µ〉+ 〈ψ, ν〉)
QΓ(1) is a compact subset of ∆2(Rd), and weak convergence coincides in this set with
the dW2-convergence since since moments of order q > 2 are uniformly bounded. Therefore
and since the function ψ in the above expression of V∞(µ) has at most quadratic growth, the
application
ν → Eν [ψ(Z1)]
is affine and continuous on QΓ(1). On the other hand, the application
(φ, ψ)→ (〈φ, µ〉+ 〈ψ, ν〉)
is affine on the convex set {(φ, ψ) ∈ (12 |.|2 +Cb(Rd))× (12 |.|2 +Cb(Rd)) : φ+ ψ > 〈., .〉}, so that
the minmax theorem ([53]) implies:
V∞(µ) = inf
(φ− 12 |.|2,ψ− 12 |.|2)∈Cb(Rd)2;φ+ψ>〈.,.〉
(〈φ, µ〉+ max
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈ψ, ν〉)
For a function f defined on Rd, let f ∗ denote the Fenchel transform of f . Since for any pair
(φ, ψ) we have (φ∗)∗ ≤ φ and φ∗ ≤ ψ, we infer:
(7.3) V∞(µ) = inf
φ
(〈φ, µ〉+ sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈φ∗, ν〉)
where the infimum is taken over convex functions φ ∈ 12 |.|2 + Cb(Rd). Finally, equality still
holds for φ ∈ C2(Rd) or Conv(Rd) using Fenchel’s lemma.
Let now (φn, ψn) be a minimizing sequence with φn ∈ 12 |.|2 +Cb(Rd) and ψn = φ∗n. Replacing
(φn, ψn) by (φn − φn(0), ψn + φn(0)), we can assume that
∀y ∈ Rd, ψn(y) ≥ 0 φn(0) = 0
64 2. PROBLE`MES DE VARIATION MAXIMALE DE MARTINGALES.
The two sequences 〈φn, µ〉 and sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈ψn, ν〉 are therefore bounded from below since µ is cen-
tered and
∀x ∈ Rd, φn(x) ≥ 〈un, x〉, with un ∈ ∂φn(0).
Since their sum converges to V∞(µ), they are also bounded from above. Precisely, we have
sup
n∈N
sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈ψn, ν〉 <∞
All the probabilities in QΓ(1) being centered, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that
β = sup
n∈N
ψn(0) <∞.
Let Br be the ball of center 0 and radius r in Rd. We prove next that for all r > 0, we have
sup
n∈N
sup
y∈Br, x∈∂ψn(y)
|x| <∞
Suppose on the contrary that there exists a sequence (yk, xk) such that yk ∈ Br, xk ∈ ∂ψn(k)(yk)
for some sequence of integers n(k) and |xk| → ∞. This implies
ψn(k)(y) ≥ ψn(k)(yk) + 〈xk, y − yk〉 ≥ 〈xk, y − yk〉
On the line {y = t xk|xk| , t ∈ R}, we have
ψn(k)(y) ≥
{
0 if t ≤ r
〈xk, y − rxk|xk|〉 if t > r
Using that Γ is a neighborhood of 0, there exists νk in QΓ(1) which is a normal distribution on
the line {y = t xk|xk| , t ∈ R} with variance greater than some constant ε > 0 independent of k.
To prove this, note that for any vector x, the law of a Brownian motion with covariance λxxT
is in QΓ for some sufficiently small λ > 0 and that the variance can be bounded from below
independently of the direction of x using that Γ is a neighborhood of 0. We deduce that
〈ψn(k), νk〉 → ∞
using a change of variable formula and monotone convergence, which brings a contradiction.
Ascoli’s theorem implies therefore that the sequence ψn is relatively compact in C(Rd) for the
uniform convergence on compact sets. Let ψ denote the limit of some convergent subsequence
also denoted ψn. Pointwise convergence implies that ψ(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Rd, and we deduce
therefore from Fatou’s lemma that
sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈ψ, ν〉 ≤ liminf
n→∞
sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈ψn, ν〉
For l ∈ N, let ξBl the convex indicator function equal to 0 on Bl and +∞ otherwise. For any
function f , we define f ∗l = (f + ξBl)∗, so that the sequence f ∗l is nondecreasing and converges
pointwise to f ∗. Using that Fenchel transform is an isometry for the uniform norm, l being
fixed, ψ∗ln converges uniformly to ψ∗l when n goes to +∞. Using these notations∫
ψ∗ldµ = lim
n→∞
∫
ψ∗ln dµ ≤ liminf
n→∞
∫
ψ∗ndµ
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Monotone convergence implies lim
l→∞
∫
ψ∗ldµ =
∫
ψ∗dµ, then:∫
ψ∗dµ ≤ liminf
n→∞
∫
φndµ
Finally, the pair (ψ∗, ψ) is optimal. 
The next result is quite similar to the characterization given in theorem 12.2.
Lemma 7.1: In the following, φ ∈ Conv(Rd), µ denotes the law of the variable L in ∆2, and Z
is a process whose law is in QΓ, both defined on the same probability space. The two following
assertions are equivalent
i)L ∈ ∂φ∗(Z1) almost surely, and E[φ∗(Z1)] = sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈φ∗, ν〉
ii) The joint distribution of (L,Z1) is optimal for V∞(µ)
and φ ∈ ∂V∞(µ).
Proof. It follows directly from the definition of V∞ and Fenchel’s lemma. Indeed, suppose
ii)
V∞(µ) = E[〈L,Z1〉] ≤ E[φ(L) + φ∗(Z1)] ≤ 〈φ, µ〉+ sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈φ∗, ν〉 = V∞(µ)
Therefore, all the above inequalities are equalities, and 〈L,Z1〉 = φ(L)+φ∗(Z1) with probability
1 which proves the result by Fenchel’s lemma. Conversely, if i) is true, then it follows from
(7.1) that
V∞(µ) ≥ E[〈L,Z1〉] = E[φ(L) + φ∗(Z1)] = 〈φ, µ〉+ sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
〈φ∗, ν〉 ≥ V∞(µ)
which ends the proof. 
8. The dual problem : PDE formulation.
The aim of this section is to characterize V ∗∞ as a second-order nonlinear PDE problem
(HJB) and to state a comparison result associated with this HJB equation.
We know from proposition 7.1 and lemma 7.1 that all the optimizers of V∞ are linked with
the optimizers of the dual problem V ∗∞. Moreover, the set of dual variables ψ can be restricted
to the set of functions such that ψ∗ = f is a real-valued convex function defined on Rd and
∀x, f(x) ≥ −|x|
2
2 ; supP∈QΓ
EP[f(X1)] <∞
Define the associated time-dependent value function
u : (0, 1]× Rd −→ R : (t, x) −→ sup
P∈QΓ
EP[f(x+X1−t)]
Then we have, using ∂t for the time derivative and ∇2 for the spatial hessian matrix :
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Proposition 8.1: The function u is the unique continuous viscosity solution of
(8.1)
−∂tu− supP∈Γ Tr(P∇
2u) = 0 in (0, 1)× Rd
u(1, x) = f(x) in Rd
in the class of functions C with the following restriction on growth:
u ∈ C⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ (0, 1), ∃M,ρ > 0, ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, 1]× Rd, |u(s, x)| ≤Meρ|x|2
Moreover, V ∗∞(f
∗) = sup
P∈QΓ
EP[f(X1)] = lim
t→0 u(t, 0).
The proof follows from the usual method: at first we prove that u satisfies a dynamic
programming principle (DPP), and we deduce from this that u is a viscosity solution of (8.1).
Then we show that equation (8.1) satisfies a comparison principle. All of these proofs follow
the usual methods of stochastic control, and this equation appears in many recent works in
relation with the G-expectation (see [47] and [33]), but our particular case is not explicitly
treated due to our particular growth condition on the boundary condition f . Therefore we give
proof of these results for the sake of completeness. Moreover the following lemma which gives
a characterization of the set QΓ in terms of solutions of a a submartingale problem allows to
give a short and simple proof for the DPP. Let us define the support function of Γ in Sd+ by
SΓ : Sd −→ R+ : Q −→ sup
P∈Γ
Tr(PQ)
Note that SΓ is nonnegative since 0 ∈ Γ.
Lemma 8.1: For a probability P ∈Mc, we have
(8.2) P ∈ QΓ ⇐⇒ ∀φ ∈ C∞c (Rd), (Y φt )t∈[0,1] is a submartingale.
where C∞c (Rd) is the set of real-valued infinitely differentiable functions with compact support
and
Y φt =
∫ t
0
SΓ(∇2φ(Xs))ds− 2φ(Xt)
Proof. If P ∈ QΓ, the first implication follows easily form Ito’s formula applied to φ(Xt)
and using remark 5.1. For the converse implication, note that the property extends to the set
C2b (Rd) of twice continuously differentiable functions with bounded derivatives using Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem. Then given M ∈ Sd+, there exists a sequence φn ∈ C2b (Rd)
such that
∀x ∈ Rd, 0 ≤ ∇2φn(x) ≤M
and ∇2φn is nondecreasing and converges to M . Y φn is a submartingale bounded in L2 for each
n and therefore admits a unique Doob-Meyer decomposition as the sum of a martingale and a
nondecreasing predictable process. This nondecreasing process is equal from Ito formula to
V φnt =
∫ t
0
SΓ(∇2φn(Xs))ds− Tr(
∫ t
0
∇2φn(Xs)d〈X〉s)
Therefore for s < t we have∫ t
s
SΓ(∇2φn(Xu))du− Tr(
∫ t
s
∇2φn(Xu)d〈X〉u) ≥ 0
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And, using monotone convergence for almost all ω, we obtain when n goes to ∞:
(t− s)
(
SΓ(M)− Tr(M(〈X〉t − 〈X〉s
t− s ))
)
≥ 0
Finally, using the continuity of 〈X〉 and SΓ, this property holds with probability 1 for all
rational numbers s, t ∈ [0, 1] and M in a countable dense subset of Sd+, which proves (5.1) since
Γ is closed and convex. 
We deduce from this characterization useful stability properties of QΓ. (Recall definition
5.1 for the notations.)
Lemma 8.2: Let s ∈ [0, 1] and Z a martingale defined on the filtered probability space
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) whose law is in QΓ. Then the conditional law of (Zt − Zs)t≥s given any
countably-generated sub-σ-field of Fs is almost surely in pi1−s(QΓ). On the other hand, if the
process (Yu, u ∈ [0, 1− s]) is such that its conditional distribution given σ(Zu, u ≤ s) has values
in QΓ with probability 1, the law of the process Ẑs = Zs∧t + Y(s∨t)−t is in QΓ.
Proof. The first assertion follows directly from theorem 1.2.10 in [56] applied to Y φ with
φ in a countable dense subset of C∞c (Rd). The second one follows from lemma 6.1.1 in the same
reference or lemma III.2.47 in [36] with slight modifications. 
Now we proceed to the Dynamic Programming Principle
Lemma 8.3: Let t ∈ (0, 1) and τ be a [0, 1−t]-valued stopping time of the (non right-continuous)
filtration Ft = σ(Zs, s ≤ t). Then
u(t, x) = sup
P∈QΓ
EP[u(t+ τ, x+ Zτ )]
Moreover, u is real-valued and l.s.c on (0, 1]× Rd and belongs to C.
Proof. Let us modify the definition of QΓ for this proof, assuming to shorten notations
that it is a subset of ∆(C([0,∞),Rd)) and that (5.1) is valid on the whole real line. Define the
function
J(t, x,P) : [0, 1]× Rd ×QΓ −→ R ∪ {+∞} : (t, x,P) −→ EP[f(x+ Z1−t)]
At first, J is well-defined since f(x) ≥ − |x|22 and l.s.c. in (t, x,P) using Fatou’s lemma. More-
over, J is convex in x since f is convex, and nonincreasing in t using Jensen’s inequality and
the martingale property of Z. We deduce that the function u (extended in t = 0) shares the
same properties since
u(t, x) = sup
P∈QΓ
J(t, x,P)
Using now the stability of properties of QΓ given in lemma 8.2, we have that for any τ as
defined above
J(t, x,P) = EP[EP[f(x+ Z1−t) | Fτ ]] ≤ EP[u(x+Xτ , t+ τ)]
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which proves the first part of the inequality. For the second, using theorem 2.2 in the appendix,
there exists for all ε > 0 an ε-optimal measurable selection Hε(t, x) ∈ QΓ, i.e. such that
∀(t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× Rd, J(t, x,Hε(t, x)) ≥
{
u(t, x)− ε if u(t, x) < +∞
1
ε
if u(t, x) = +∞
This allows to construct a probability Pε that coincides with P on Fτ using the above properties
such that
EPε [f(x+ Z1−t) | Fτ ] ≥
{
u(x+ Zτ , t+ τ)− ε if u(x+ Zτ , t+ τ) < +∞
1
ε
if u(x+ Zτ , t+ τ) = +∞
and this proves the result by sending ε to zero. Using the condition u(0, 0) < +∞, we will prove
that the function u is real-valued on (0, 1]×Rd. Suppose on the contrary that u(t0, x0) = +∞.
Since u is convex in x, u(t0, x) is infinite on an affine half-space H. Let M ∈ Γ ∩ Sd++ (recall
that Γ is a neighborhood of 0), and PM ∈ QΓ be a Brownian motion with constant covariance
M . This implies that the law of Zt has a full support in Rd. Construct Pε as above with τ = t.
We have
EPε [f(Z1) | Ft] ≥
{
u(Zt, t)− ε if u(Zt, t) < +∞
1
ε
if u(Zt, t) = +∞
But Pε(Zt ∈ H) = PM(Zt ∈ H) > 0 and this implies
EPε [f(Z1)] −→
ε→0 +∞
which contradicts our hypothesis. That u belongs to C follows then from the fact that for
t ∈ (0, 1), we have EPM [u(s, Zt)] <∞ for all t < 1− s. 
In order to prove that the boundary condition is satisfied by u, we need the following
domination result.
Lemma 8.4: There exists P ∈ Sd++ such that ∀M ∈ Γ, M ≤ P . Let PP be the law of a
Brownian motion (Bt)t∈[0,1] with covariance P , then for all processes Z with law ν ∈ QΓ, we
have [Zt]  [Bt] for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for sufficiently small ε > 0, the law of (Btε)t∈[01] is
in QΓ.
Proof. Consider a process Z with a law in QΓ. Let us enlarge the probability space and
consider a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion W independent of Z. From the definition
of QΓ, there exists an FZ-progressively measurable process ρ with values in Γ such that
〈Z〉t =
∫ t
0
ρsds
Define then
Yt =
∫ t
0
√
P − ρsdWs
The quadratic covariation process 〈Z, Y 〉 satisfies 〈Z, Y 〉 = 0 by construction and Z+Y follows
the law PP . Now it remains to prove that E[Y1 | Z1] = 0. But this follows from the fact that the
conditional law of Y1 given FW1 is a centered gaussian distribution 6. For the second assertion,
6. One can prove this result directly by approximations with integrals of simple processes, or deduce it from
proposition 1.1 in [35] which is much more general.
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using the scaling property of the Brownian motion, the process Btε is a Brownian motion with
covariance εP , which belongs to Γ for small ε. 
Lemma 8.5: For all x ∈ Rd, u(t, y) −→
t→1, y→x f(x).
Proof. Since QΓ is compact and u is l.s.c., we only have to prove that
∀(tn, xn,Pn)−→
n→∞(1, x,P), J(tn, xn,Pn)−→n→∞f(x)
Let h(x) = 12 |x2|. Using lemma 1.3 in the appendix, the function (t, x,P)→ EP[h(x+ Z1−t)] is
continuous, and our problem reduces then to prove that
EPn [f˜(xn + Z1−tn)]−→n→∞EP[f˜(x+ Z0)] = f˜(x)
where f˜ = f +g is by construction a nonnegative convex function. To prove this, it is sufficient
to prove that the sequence is uniformly integrable, i.e.
lim
M→∞
sup
n∈N
EPn [(f˜(xn + Z1−tn)−M)+] = 0
Let ε > 0 small and P be given by lemma 8.4, and n sufficiently large so that 1 − tn ≤ ε/2.
Then since (f˜ −M)+ is convex, lemma 8.4 implies
EPn [(f˜(xn + Z1−tn)−M)+] ≤ EPP [(f˜(xn +Bε/2)−M)+]
Since f˜ is convex, and using a finite sequence (yi ∈ Rd)i=1,..,I such that
{xn}n∈N ⊂ co({yi, i ∈ I})
we have
EPP [(f˜(xn +Bε/2)−M)+] ≤
I∑
i=1
EPP [(f˜(yi +Bε/2)−M)+]
and the right-hand side converges to 0 when M goes to ∞ since for all y
EPP [f(y +Bε/2)] ≤ u(1/2, y) <∞

The DPP implies that u is a viscosity solution of the corresponding equation. We give a
proof below of this standard result.
Lemma 8.6: The function u is a (discontinuous) viscosity solution of (8.1)
Proof. At first, the boundary condition is satisfied using the previous lemma. Next, if u
is not a supersolution of (8.1), then there exists a smooth function φ and (t, x) ∈ (0, 1) × Rd
such that min(u− φ) = 0 is reached in (t, x) and −∂φ(t, x)− SΓ(∇2φ(t, x)) < 0. There exists
therefore M ∈ Γ such that −∂φ(t, x) − Tr(M∇2φ(t, x)) < 0. This inequality is still true on a
bounded open neighborhood [t, t+h)×B(x, r) of (t, x). Let PM ∈ QΓ be the law of a Brownian
motion with covariance M and θ = min(h, TB(0,r)c) with TB(0,r)c the hitting time of B(0, r)c for
the canonical process Z. Ito formula implies (the martingale term being integrable because of
the definition of θ)
EP[φ(t+ θ, x+ Zθ)] = φ(t, x) + EP[
∫ θ
0
(
∂tφ(t+ s, x+ Zs) + Tr(M∇2φ(t+ s, x+ Zs))
)
ds]
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Since u ≥ φ and the last term is positive, this contradicts the DPP.
If the s.c.s. envelope u∗ of u is not a sub-solution of (8.1), then there exists a smooth function
φ and (t, x) ∈ (0, 1) × Rd such that max(u − φ) = 0 is reached in (t, x) and −∂φ(t, x) −
SΓ(∇2φ(t, x)) ≥ η > 0. This inequality is still true on a bounded open neighborhood (t −
h, t + h) × B(x, r) of (t, x) (up to changing the definition of η). Now, let (tn, xn) a sequence
converging to (t, x) and such that u(tn, xn) converge to u∗(t, x). We can assume that (tn, xn) ∈
(t− h, t+ h)× B(x, r) for all n. Define θn = min(t+ h− tn, TB(0,r)c), then for all P ∈ QΓ, Ito
formula implies
φ(tn, xn) ≥EP[φ(tn + θn, xn + Zθn)]
− EP[
∫ θn
0
(
∂tφ(tn + s, xn + Zs) + SΓ(∇2φ(tn + s, xn + Zs))
)
ds]
≥η + EP[u(tn + θn, xn + Zθn)]
Since φ(tn, xn) and u(tn, xn) converge to the same limit u∗(t, x), for n sufficiently large we have
u(tn, xn) ≥ η2 + EP[u(tn + θn, xn + Zθn)]
which contradicts the DPP since we can take the supremum over P in the right-hand side. 
And, finally, the following lemma 7 states a comparison result using the classical solutions
of the heat equation.
Lemma 8.7: Equation (8.1) admits a unique continuous viscosity solution in the class C.
Proof. It is clearly sufficient to prove uniqueness in [T, 1) × Rd for all T ∈ (0, 1) in the
class of locally bounded functions C(M,ρ) satisfying |u(t, x)| ≤Meρ|x|2 for some M,ρ > 0. At
first, up to replace u by w(x, t) = u(αx, t) for some sufficiently large α, we can assume that
|P | ≤ 1 for P ∈ Γ, and in particular Tr(P ) ≤ d. Suppose that v and w are respectively u.s.c.
sub-solution and l.s.c super-solutions of (8.1) in C(M,ρ), we will prove that v ≤ w which as
usual implies uniqueness. At first, we have that z = v − w is a sub-solution of the equation
(8.3)
−∂tu− supP∈Γ Tr(P∇
2v) = 0 in [T, 1)× Rd
u(1, x) = 0 in Rd
For a proof, we refer to lemma 1.2 in [21] which is far more general (all the technical difficulties
are actually contained in this result, whose proof relies on Ishii’s lemma, and the main assump-
tion we need to apply it is that Γ is bounded). The second ingredient is the following classical
solution (see [37] p.217).
Claim 8.1: For µ, ε > 0 the function
φµ(t, x) =
µ
(t− T + ε)d/2 exp(
|x|2
4(t− T + ε))
is a smooth supersolution of (8.3).
7. This proof was communicated to us by Olivier Ley (of course, any mistake is ours). The result seems to
be well-known but we were not able to find a reference covering exactly this case. Let us mention however that
this results is implicitly contained in [6] (see remark 3.6) in which a considerably wider class of equations is
considered.
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Proof of claim 8.1. Terminal condition is met since φµ ≥ 0, and
−∂tφµ(t, x)− SΓ(∇2φµ(t, x)) = µ(t− T + ε)d/2 e
( |x|
2
4(t−T+ε) )
(
d− SΓ(Id)
2(t− T + ε) +
|x|2 − SΓ(xxT )
4(t− T + ε)2
)
By hypothesis sup
P∈Γ
Tr(P ) = SΓ(Id) ≤ d and by Cauchy-Schwartz
SΓ(xxT ) ≤ 1
√
Tr(xxT )2 ≤ |x|2
which proves the result. 
Suppose that T is sufficiently close to 1 so that ρ < 14(1−T ) and for small enough ε > 0, we
have ρ < 14(1−T+ε) . This implies
z(t, x)− φµ(t, x) ≤ 2Meρ|x|2 − µ(1− T + ε)N/2 e
|x|2
4(1−T+ε) −→
|x|→∞
−∞
Therefore, for all η > 0, there exists (t, x) ∈ [T, 1]× Rd such that
sup
[T,1]×Rd
(z(t, x)− φµ(t, x)− η(1− t)) = (z(t, x)− φµ(t, x)− η(1− t))
If t < 1, the definition of z being a sub solution of (8.3) applied to the test function φµ+η(1−t)
gives in (t, x)
−∂tφµ + η − SΓ(∇2φµ) ≤ 0
which is absurd from lemma 8.1 and since η > 0. We conclude that t = 1, which means
∀(t, x) ∈ [T, 1)× Rd, z(t, x)− φµ(t, x)− η(1− t) ≤ z(1, x)− φµ(1, x) ≤ 0
This implies z(t, x) ≤ φµ(t, x) + η(1 − t) and then z(t, x) ≤ 0 by sending η, µ to zero, which
was the desired inequality. To conclude, this proof works only for T close to 1, but in the
general case, if T ′ is sufficiently close to 1, the above proof shows uniqueness on [T ′, 1] and
since z(T ′, x) ≤ 0, the argument can be repeated on the interval [T ′ − (1 − T ′), T ′], and this
allows to conclude by induction. Finally, this result also proves that u is continuous. Indeed,
using the former notations, the function u(t, x) is l.s.c. and thus a super-solution of (8.1) and
its u.s.c. envelope u∗(t, x) is a sub-solution (lemma 8.5 is needed here to prove that u∗ fulfills
the boundary condition). Since by definition u∗ ≥ u, we conclude that u = u∗ and thus u is
continuous. 
9. Asymptotic distributions : A first reduction
Before going to the proof of theorem 1.2, we need to recall some useful properties properties
of the Meyer-Zheng topology (see [45]) on the space of martingale distributions. This topology
is defined on the set D([0, 1],Rd) of ca´dla´g functions as the convergence in measure with respect
to Lebesgue’s measure (denoted λ) together convergence of the value at time 1 : a sequence yn
converges to y if
∀ε > 0, λ({|yn(x)− y(x)| ≥ ε})−→
n→∞0, and yn(1)−→n→∞y(1)
The following lemma summarizes some useful properties of the M-Z topology.
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Lemma 9.1: The sets of martingale’s distributions uniformly bounded in Lq for some q > 1
are compact in ∆(D([0, 1],Rd)) when endowed with the topology of convergence in distribution
associated to the M-Z topology (that will be also called M-Z for simplicity). This implies as a
corollary that the setM(µ) ⊂ ∆(D([0, 1],Rd)) of martingales whose law at time 1 is Blackwell
dominated by µ is also compact. Moreover, the M-Z topology coincides with the product M-Z-
topology on D([0, 1],R)d (which is not the case for the Skorokhod topology).
Proof. The topology introduced in [45] was defined on D([0,∞),Rd) and the definition
given above is just the induced topology on ∆(D([0, 1],Rd)) which is seen as the closed subset
of functions that remain constant after time 1. The first result is therefore the traduction of
theorem 2 in [45]. The second follows from the fact that the projection (Xt)t∈[0,1] → X1 at time
1 is (M-Z)-continuous and that the condition [X1] ≤ µ is closed. The last is obvious from the
definition. 
It is now quite direct from the preceding results to express the problem as an optimization
problem over continuous-time martingales :
Lemma 9.2:
(9.1) V∞(µ) = W (µ) , max
[(Xt)t∈[0,1]]∈M(µ)
H([(Xt)t∈[0,1]])]
where
(9.2) H(P) , max
[(Xt,Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈M(P,QΓ)
E[〈X1, Z1〉]
and where M(P, QΓ) is the set of martingales distributions in ∆(D([0, 1],R2d)) of processes
(X,Z) such that [(Xt)t∈[0,1]] = P and [(Zt)t∈[0,1]] ∈ QΓ (using the identification of the continuous
functions as a subset of D). The set of maximizers is a non empty (M-Z)-compact convex subset
of M(µ) denoted P∞(µ).
Proof. From the definition of V∞, we have
V∞(µ) = max
[(Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈QΓ,[L]µ
E[〈L,Z1〉]
Therefore
W (µ) = max
[(Xt,Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈M(µ,QΓ)
E[〈X1, Z1〉] ≤ V∞(µ)
whereM(µ, QΓ) = ⋃
P∈M(µ)
M(P, QΓ) since the marginal distribution of [X1, (Zt)t∈[0,1]] fulfills
the constraints of the definition.
For the converse inequality, just define Xt = E[L | Zs, s ≤ t]. The setM(µ, QΓ) is (M-Z)-
compact since it is the intersection of the set of martingale distributions uniformly bounded in
L2 by (CΓ +‖µ‖2) and of the set P(M(µ), QΓ). Compactness and convexity of P(M(µ), QΓ)
follows from lemma 12.1. Indeed, the M-Z topology is a product topology and it is weaker than
the Skorokhod topology (so that QΓ is M-Z compact). The application
[(Xt, Zt)t∈[0,1]] −→ E[〈X1, Z1〉]
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is (M-Z)-continuous and affine on M(µ, QΓ) since the projection at time 1 is linear and con-
tinuous and using lemma 12.3. We deduce that the set of maximizers is nonempty and compact
convex. Its marginal projection P∞(µ) on the first coordinate of the product D([0, 1],Rd)2 is
then compact convex. 
Proof of theorem 1.2. Using the proof of lemma 4.1, given an optimal sequence of mar-
tingales ((Lnk)k=1,..,n)n∈N, we can construct a sequence ((Lnk , Snk )k=1,..,n)n∈N such that
[(Snk )k=1,..,n] ∈ T n and
VVn ((Lk)k=1,..,n)√
n
≤ E[〈Lnn,
∑n
k=1 S
n
k√
n
〉]
Denoting the continuous-time versions
Znt =
1√
n
bntc∑
k=1
Snk , X
n
t = Lnbntc
the sequence of joint distributions [(Xnt , Znt )t∈[0,1]] is (M-Z)-relatively compact from lemma 9.1.
Any limit distribution is a martingale using that the sets of uniformly L2 bounded martingale’s
distributions are closed. The marginal laws of the coordinates of any limiting distribution are
respectively in the compact sets M(µ) by lemma 9.1 and QΓ using proposition 5.1 (conver-
gence to an element of QΓ holds for a stronger topology along a subsequence). Moreover, along
any convergent subsequence we know from lemma 12.3 that the application
[(Xnt , Znt )t∈[0,1]] −→ E[〈Xn1 , Zn1 〉]
is continuous and since by hypothesis E[〈Xn1 , Zn1 〉]−→n→∞V∞(µ), we deduce that the limiting dis-
tribution of [(Xnt )t∈[0,1]] belongs to P∞(µ). 
10. Asymptotic distributions : Characterization
In order to obtain to study the properties of the set P∞, we introduce the time-dependent
value function.
Definition 10.1:
U(t, µ) = sup
ν∈QΓ(t)
C(µ, ν)
Lemma 10.1: For all t ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ ∆2, we have
U(t, µ) =
√
tV∞(µ)
Proof. If (Zt)t≥0 is a martingale, then Yt = (α−
1
2Zαt) is a martingale such that 〈Y 〉t =
α−1〈Z〉αt. It follows easily that QΓ(t) = (x →
√
tx)]QΓ(1) and we conclude the proof using
that ν → C(µ, ν) is positively homogenous in the sense (A3). 
Lemma 10.2: Let µ1  µ2 ∈ ∆2 and let (X1, X2) a martingale such that Xi ∼ µi for i = 1, 2.
Then, for all t ∈ [0, 1],
V∞(µ2) ≥ U(t, µ1) + E[U(1− t, [X2 | X1])]
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Proof. Note at first that the cases t = 0 and t = 1 follows respectively from Jensen’s
inequality (lemma 5.1 in chapter 1) and from the Blackwell nondecreasing property of V∞
(which is a supremum of nondecreasing functions). Let t ∈ (0, 1) and (X̂1, (Zs)s∈[0,t]) be optimal
for the problem U(t, µ1), which means
[X̂1] = µ1, [(Zs)s∈[0,t]] ∈ pit(QΓ), and U(t, µ1) = E[〈X̂1, Zt〉].
Let F (x) be a regular version of the conditional law of X2 given X1 = x and let Ψ be a
measurable selection on ∆2 of the set-valued mapping (see theorem 2.1 in the appendix)
µ→ argmax
pi∈P(µ,pi1−t(QΓ))
∫
〈x, y(1− t)〉dpi(x, y(.))
Construct on an enlarged probability space a variable (X̂2, (Yu)u∈[0,1−t]) whose conditional law
given (X̂1, (Zs)s∈[0,t]) is Ψ(F (X1)). Using lemma 8.2, the law of the process Ẑs = Zs∧t +Y(s∨t)−t
is in QΓ and
U(t, µ1) + E[U(1− t, [X2 | X1])] = E[〈X̂1, Zt〉] + E[E[〈X̂2, Y1−t〉 | X̂1, (Zs)s∈[0,t]]]
= E[〈X̂2, Ẑ1〉] ≤ V∞(µ2)

Lemma 10.3: For all (law of) martingale X in P∞(µ), we have
V∞(µ) = U(t, [Xt]) + E[U(1− t, [X1 −Xt | Xt])]
Proof. Using lemma 9.2, for any law in P∞(µ), there exists a (law of) martingale
(Xt, Zt)t∈[0,1] maximizing H (see (9.2)) in M(µ, QΓ) such that X follows the prescribed law.
Note at first that the martingale property implies
V∞(µ) = E[〈X1, Z1〉] = E[〈Xt, Zt〉] + E[〈X1 −Xt, Z1 − Zt〉]
Assume that E[〈Xt, Zt〉] < U(t, [Xt]). Let F (x) be a regular version of the conditional law of
(X1 − Xt, (Zs − Zt)s≥t) given Xt. F is almost surely valued in P(∆2, pi1−t(QΓ)) using lemma
8.2. Let (S, (Ws)s∈[0,t]) be a pair such that [S] = [Xt], [(Ws)s∈[0,t]] ∈ pit(QΓ) and E[〈S,Wt〉] =
U(t, [Xt]). Construct on a possibly enlarged probability space a pair (T, (Ys)s∈[0,1−t]) whose
conditional law given (S, (Ws∈[0,t])) is F (S). It follows that [S + T ] = µ, [(Ẑs)s∈[0,1]] ∈ QΓ with
Ẑs = Ws∧t + Y(s∨t)−t (using lemma 8.2 and the fact that pi1−t(QΓ) is a closed convex set) and
E[〈S + T, Ẑ1〉] = E[〈S,Wt〉] + E[〈T, Y1−t〉] > V∞(µ)
which contradicts the definition of V∞(µ). The second part of the proof is similar to the previous
lemma. 
Lemma 10.4: The function V∞ is strictly increasing with respect to the Blackwell order.
Proof. Let µ1  µ2 ∈ ∆2 and let (X1, X2) a martingale such that Xi ∼ µi for i = 1, 2.
Assume that V∞(µ1) = V∞(µ2). From the previous lemma, we have for all t ∈ (0, 1)
V∞(µ2) ≥ U(t, µ1) + E[U(1− t, [X2 | X1])] =
√
tV∞(µ1) +
√
1− tE[V∞([X2 | X1])]
10. ASYMPTOTIC DISTRIBUTIONS : CHARACTERIZATION 75
This implies
E[V∞([X2 | X1])] ≤ 1−
√
t√
1− tV∞(µ2)
and we deduce that the first term is equal to zero by sending t to 1. In order to conclude
that µ1 = µ2, it remains to prove that V∞(µ) = 0 implies that µ is a Dirac mass. Recall that
V∞(µ) = sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
C(µ, ν). Using lemma 12.4, it is then sufficient to prove that QΓ(1) contains a
law which is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue’s measure. But QΓ contains the
laws of Brownian motion processes with constant instantaneous covariance equal to P ∈ Γ∩Sd++
which concludes the proof. 
Notation 9: Given some function φ ∈ Conv(Rd), and some Rd-valued random variables Z,X,
then
X = ∇φ(Z) means
{
P(Z ∈ {x ∈ Rd : ∇φ exists}) = 1
P(X ∈ ∂φ(Z)) = 1
In this case, the random variable ∇φ(Z) is well-defined and is almost surely equal to any g(Z)
for g a measurable selection of the subdifferential of φ.
Lemma 10.5: Let µ ∈ ∆2 and φ ∈ ∂V∞(µ). Then for any optimal joint distribution of (L,Z1)
in the problem V∞(µ), we have L = ∇φ∗(Z1) almost surely.
Proof. Using lemma 7.1, for any optimal variables (L,Z1) we have L ∈ ∂φ∗(Z1) almost
surely. It follows that
V∞(µ) = E[〈L,Z1〉] = E[〈g(Z1), Z1〉] = V∞(µˆ)
where µ is the law of L and µˆ the law of g(Z1) = E[L | Z1] since g(Z1) ∈ ∂φ∗(Z1) using
the properties of the subgradient. On the other hand, µˆ is Blackwell dominated by µ. Using
lemma 10.4, V∞ is strictly increasing and therefore µ = µˆ which implies L = g(Z1). To
conclude define the variable X such that its conditional law given Z1 is uniform on the set 8
(g(Z1) + B(0, ε)) ∩ ∂φ∗(Z1) and a Dirac mass on ∇φ∗(Z1) when this set is reduced to a single
point. X ∈ L2 and X̂ = E[X | Z1] ∈ L2 since |X − L| ≤ ε. Applying again lemmas 7.1
and 10.4, we deduce as above that X = X̂ almost surely, which implies g(Z1) = ∇φ∗(Z1) and
concludes the proof. 
Proposition 10.1: Let µ ∈ ∆2 and φ ∈ ∂V∞(µ). Then for any (law of) martingale (X,Z) in
M(µ, QΓ) maximizing H, we have for all t ∈ [0, 1]
Xt = ∇u(t, Zt) almost surely.
where u is the solution of (8.1).
Proof. Let us fix t ∈ [0, 1]. Using lemma 10.5, we have
Xt = E[X1 | FX,Zt ] = E[∇φ∗(Z1) | FX,Zt ].
8. The probability whose density with respect to the Lebesgue’s measure on the affine subspace generated
by this convex set, is just the normalized indicator function of the set.
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But from lemma 10.3, we know that E[〈Xt, Zt〉] = U(t, [Xt]). Using then lemma 10.1, 7.1 and
10.5, we deduce that Xt = ∇g(Zt) almost surely for some function g ∈ Conv(Rd). It follows
that
Xt = E[X1 | Zt] = E[∇φ∗(Z1) | Zt].
By lemma 7.1, the process Z is optimal in the dual problem which implies that u(t, Zt) =
E[φ∗(Z1) | Zt]. Let v denotes a measurable selection of ∂φ∗. We have by definition
∀z, h ∈ Rd, φ∗(z + u+ h) ≥ φ∗(z + u) + 〈v(z + u), h〉
Taking conditional expectations, we obtain
u(t, Zt + h) = E[φ∗(Zt + (Z1 − Z − t) + h) | Zt]
≥ E[φ∗(Zt + (Z1 − Zt)) | Zt] + 〈E[v(Zt + (Z1 − Zt)) | Zt], h〉
Note that since X1 = v(Z1), Xt = E[v(Zt + (Z1 − Zt)) | Zt] and it follows that
u(t, Zt + h) ≥ u(t, Zt) + 〈Xt, h〉
We conclude that Xt ∈ ∂u(t, Zt) since the above inequality holds almost surely for a countable
dense subset of h in Rd. The end of the proof is similar to lemma 10.5. 
We can now state a corollary, which is a kind of verification theorem.
Theorem 10.1: Under the same hypotheses as proposition 10.1 and if the solution u is C1
with respect to the space variable, then P∞ is the set of all laws of processes
(Xt)t∈[0,1] = (∇u(t, Zt))t∈[0,1]
where the law process Z ranges through the set of maximizers of
V ∗∞(φ) such that ∇φ∗(Z1) ∼ µ.
Proof. For any (law of) martingale (X,Z) in M(µ, QΓ) maximizing H, we have from
proposition 10.1 with probability 1,
∀t ∈ [0, 1], t rational, (Xt)t∈[0,1] = (∇u(t, Zt))t∈[0,1]
The process in the right-hand side has continuous trajectories and X has ca`dla`g trajectories so
that the equality can be extended to all t ∈ [0, 1]. The results follows then from proposition
10.1. 
Let us now prove the result announced in the introduction.
Proof of theorem 1.3. In view of the previous results, we only need to prove that Z is
a maximizers of V ∗∞(φ) if and only if property (1.6) is true. But this follows directly from Ito’s
formula since u is assumed to be C1,2. 
An example of explicit solution using this method is given in chapter 3.
We state now some easy properties that allows to reduce the size of Γ.
Definition 10.2: Let ∂+Γ be positive boundary of Γ in the following sense
∂+Γ = {M ∈ Sd+ : (M + Sd++) ∩ Γ = ∅}
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Definition 10.3: Let Q∂+Γ be the set of laws P in QΓ such that
EP[
∫ 1
0
1Iρs /∈∂+Γds] = 0
where ρ is the process defined by
ρs = limnn(〈Z〉s − 〈Z〉(s− 1
n
)+)
and Z denotes the canonical coordinate process.
Lemma 10.6: Let f be a real-valued convex function defined on Rd such that
sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
∫
fdν <∞.
For all P ∈ QΓ there exists P+ ∈ Q∂+Γ such that if Z and Z+ follow respectively the laws P and
P+, we have
EP[f(Z1)] ≤ EP+ [f(Z+1 )]
Moreover, if P /∈ Q+Γ and f is non-linear, this inequality is strict.
Proof. Let Z be defined on the canonical space. Let us consider an extension of the
filtered probability space on which is defined a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion W
independent of Z. From the definition of QΓ, the process ρ given in definition 10.3 has values
in Γ with probability 1 and
〈Z〉t =
∫ t
0
ρsds
Let h : Γ → ∂+Γ be a measurable function such that h(M) − M ∈ Sd++ if M /∈ ∂+Γ and
h(M) = M otherwise. Define then
Yt =
∫ t
0
(h(ρs)− ρs) 12dWs
The quadratic covariation process 〈Z, Y 〉 = 0 by construction and Z+ = Z + Y has a law in
Q∂+Γ. Using the properties of the Wiener integral, since W is independent from Z, we have
that the conditional law of Z+1 given FZ1 is a gaussian distribution with mean Z1 and with
covariance matrix
∫ 1
0 (h(ρs) − ρs)ds (see proposition 1.1 in [35]). Therefore (Z1, Z+1 ) is a two-
step martingale and the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. If moreover the law of
Z is not in Q∂+Γ, then this implies that P(
∫ 1
0 (h(ρs) − ρs)ds ∈ Sd++) > 0 and we deduce that
E[f(Z+1 ) | FZ1 ] > f(Z1) on this set which in turn implies the result. 
Note that ∂+Γ is closed but not necessarily convex so that Q∂+Γ is not closed in general.
We will see however two examples in the next section where this set is convex. As a corollary,
we have
Corollary 3: For all µ ∈ ∆2
V∞(µ) = sup
ν∈Q∂+Γ(1)
C(µ, ν)
Proof. The last lemma implies that laws in QΓ(1) are always Blackwell dominated by
some law in Q∂+Γ(1). The conclusion foolows using the nondecreasing property of C. 
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11. Application : the unidimensional case and the L1-variation
Our examples will be based on the following simple type of L2-convex subset of Sd+ :
Lemma 11.1: If Φ is a comprehensive convex subset of Sd+, i.e. such that
(11.1) N ∈ Φ and M ≤ N ⇒M ∈ Φ
then Φ is L2-convex.
Proof. Let X, Y ∈ Φ̂ and P = cov(X) Q = cov(Y ). Then
cov(λX + (1− λ)Y ) = λ2P + (1− λ)2Q+ λ(1− λ)(cov(X, Y ) + cov(Y,X))
Since λP + (1− λ)Q ∈ Φ, we just have to show that the difference is nonnegative
λP + (1− λQ)−
(
λ2P + (1− λ)2Q+ λ(1− λ)(cov(X, Y ) + cov(Y,X))
)
= λ(1− λ)(P +Q− cov(X, Y )− cov(Y,X)) = λ(1− λ)cov(X − Y ) ≥ 0

The one-dimensional problem.
Assume that d = 1 and assumptions A1-A4. Then
Theorem 11.1: For all µ ∈ ∆2(R), the set P∞(µ) is reduced to the single point Pµ which is
the law of the martingale
Xµt = E[fµ(B1) | FBt ]
where B is a standard Brownian motion and
fµ = F−1µ ◦ FN (0,ρ2)
where ρ = r(1) and F−1µ is the right-continuous inverse of the distribution function of µ.
Proof. Since r is nondecreasing, the set F = {r ≤ 1} is an interval [0, 1/ρ2] where ρ2
is such that r(1) = ρ. The set F̂ is the closed ball in L20 of radius 1/ρ, and this implies A5
by lemma 11.1. Now Ĝ is the ball of radius ρ and therefore G = Γ and QΓ is the set of
distributions of continuous R-valued martingales such that 〈Z〉 is ρ2-Lipschitz with respect to
the time-variable. Proposition 7.1 implies
V∞(µ) = min
φ∈Conv(R)
(
∫
φdµ+ sup
ν∈QΓ(1)
∫
φ∗dν)
We assume that the optimal φ is such that φ∗ is not linear, otherwise, µ would be a Dirac mass,
and the solution in this case is obvious. For any such φ, the law of a Brownian motion with
instantaneous variance ρ2 is the unique maximizer of
sup
[Zt]t∈[0,1]
E[φ∗(Z1)]
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using proposition 10.6, and since ∂+Γ = {ρ2}. It remains to characterize the optimal φ. Using
the previous result and proposition 7.1, if φ is optimal for µ, then µ = ∇φ∗]N (0, ρ). This
relation implies that φ∗ is given by
φ∗(x) =
∫ x
0
fµ(u)du with fµ = F−1µ ◦ FN (0,ρ2)
We conclude finally that P∞(µ) = {P(µ)} with Pµ the law of the martingale
Xµt = E[fµ(B1) | FBt ]
To prove this, note that any maximizer (X,B) of H inM(µ,QΓ) is a martingale, and optimality
implies that B is an FX,B-Brownian motion and X1 = fµ(B1). Therefore,
Xt = E[X1 | FX,Bt ] = E[fµ(B1) | FBt ] = u(t, Bt)
where u is the solution of the backward heat equation with terminal condition u(1, x) = fµ(x).

Remark 11.1: Using this result and theorem 1.2, we recover the main result given in [25] where
Xµ is called the Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation with final distribution µ.
Symmetric separable functions and the L1-norm. Consider functions V given by
V (µ) =
d∑
i=1
w(µi)
where µi are the marginal distributions of µ and w is a function defined on ∆2(R) meeting
assumptions A1-A4. Let us add the following symmetry hypothesis :
∀Xi ∈ L2, w([−Xi]) = w([Xi])
Theorem 11.2: Under the preceding hypotheses, the assumption A5 is true, and
∂+Γ = co({ρ2(Mij)i,j=1,..,d : ∀i, Mii = 1, ∀i < j, Mij ∈ {−1, 1}})
with ρ = sup
E[X2i ]=1
w([Xi]).
Proof. From the definition of r we have
r(M) = sup
cov(X)=M
(
d∑
i=1
w([Xi])) ≤
d∑
i=1
sup
E[X2i ]=Mii
w([Xi]) =
d∑
i=1
ρ
√
Mii
where ρ = sup
E[X2i ]=1
w([Xi]). The symmetry assumption implies that the above inequality is an
equality. At first, since w is concave, for any random variable Xi ∈ L2, the law obtained by the
convex combination 12([Xi] + [−Xi]) in ∆2(R) is such that
w(12([Xi] + [−Xi])) ≥ w([Xi])
Therefore we can restrict the supremum in the definition of ρ to the set of symmetric distribu-
tion, i.e. laws of variables Xi such that [Xi] = [−Xi]. Let (ν) be an ε-optimal symmetric law for
80 2. PROBLE`MES DE VARIATION MAXIMALE DE MARTINGALES.
this supremum. Let Dν be the set of attainable covariance matrices of vectors X = (Xi)i=1,..,d
such that [(Mii)−1/2Xi] = ν for all i = 1, .., d. For such a vector X, we have
d∑
i=1
w([Xi]) ≥
d∑
i=1
(ρ− ε)
√
Mii
The result follows then by sending ε to zero if we can prove that M ∈ Dν . Dν is a closed convex
set included in the convex set D of Sd+ of matrices with diagonal (Mii)i=1,..,d. This inclusion
is an equality since Dν contains extremal elements of D that are obtained by variables of the
form (X1,±X1, ..,±X1). Finally, the set F̂ is given by
F̂ = {X ∈ L2 : ρ
d∑
i=1
‖Xi‖L2 ≤ 1}
which clearly implies A5 by lemma 11.1. We check easily that
Ĝ = {X ∈ L2 : max
i=1,..,n
‖Xi‖L2 ≤ ρ}
The corresponding set G is the set of matrices M ∈ Sd+ such that for all i = 1, .., d, Mii ≤ ρ2.
Since it is already convex, we have Γ = G and
∂+Γ = co({ρ2(Mij)i,j=1,..,d : ∀i, Mii = 1, ∀i < j, Mij ∈ {−1, 1}})

Remark 11.2: This result applies in particular for w = ‖.‖L1 with ρ = 1 and will be applied in
chapter 3 to financial games. Note also that the set Q∂+Γ in the previous result is exactly the
set of martingales (Z1, .., Zd) such that any coordinate is a Brownian motion with covariance
ρ2.
12. Auxiliary results and technical proofs.
12.1. Optimal transportation and Wasserstein distances. We present in this section
results about optimal transportation and Wasserstein distances. This material is well-known
and can be found in [57] or [2]. Let X,Y be two separable metric spaces and Q,R two subsets
of ∆(X) and ∆(Y ). Then P(Q,R) denotes the set of probabilities over X × Y whose marginal
distributions over X and Y belongs respectively to Q and R. If Q = {µ}, we will simply write
P(µ,R).
Lemma 12.1: Let X,Y be two separable metric spaces and Q,R two tight (resp. closed, convex)
subsets of ∆(X) and ∆(Y ). Then the set P(Q,R) is itself tight (resp. closed, convex).
The Wasserstein distances. The Wasserstein distance of order p is defined on the set
∆p(Rd) by
dWp(µ, ν) = min
pi∈P(µ,ν)
(
∫
|y − x|ppdpi(x, y))
1
p = min{‖X − Y ‖Lp | X ∼ µ , Y ∼ ν}
The metric space (∆p(Rd), dWp) is polish. Convergence for dWp is equivalent to classic weak
convergence together convergence of the moments of order p and the sets of probabilities with
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uniformly integrable moments of order p are relatively compact. Moreover, we have the following
useful lemma
Lemma 12.2: For any continuous function f and K > 0 such that | f(x) |≤ K(1+ | x |p), the
application
∆p(Rd)→ R : pi →
∫
f(x)dpi(x)
is dWp- continuous
and the following which is lemma 5.2.4 in [2].
Lemma 12.3: Let X = Y = Rd and pin ∈ P(X ×Y ) be a weakly converging sequence with limit
pi such that
sup
n
∫
|x|p + |y|qdpin(x, y) <∞ for some p, q ∈ (1,∞) such that 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1
If the sequence of marginals µn on X has uniformly integrable moments or order p (resp. νn
on Y has uniformly integrable moments of order q) then∫
〈x, y〉dpin(x, y)−→
n→∞
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
Maximal covariance functions. . These functions are also optimal transport value func-
tions, related to the square Wasserstein distance. Precisely, the maximal covariance between
two probabilities on Rd is defined by
C : ∆2(Rd)×∆2(Rd) −→ R : (µ, ν) −→ max
pi∈P (µ,ν)
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
We have then the straightforward relation
∀µ, ν ∈ ∆2(Rd), d2W2(µ, ν) = ‖µ‖22 + ‖ν‖22 − 2C(µ, ν)
and the classical dual equality
Theorem 12.1: For all µ, ν ∈ ∆2(Rd), we have the following equalities
max
pi∈P(µ,ν)
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y) = inf
(φ− 12 |.|2,ψ− 12 |.|2)∈Cb(Rd)2;φ+ψ>〈.,.〉
(
∫
φdµ+
∫
ψdν)
= min
φ∈Conv(Rd)
∫
φdµ+
∫
φ∗dν
where φ + ψ > 〈., .〉 means φ(x) + ψ(y) > 〈x, y〉 for all x, y and Cb(Rd) denotes the set of
real-valued bounded continuous functions on Rd.
Let us also mention the following characterization
Theorem 12.2: For all µ, ν ∈ ∆2(Rd), we have the following equivalence
pi∗ ∈ argmax
pi∈P(µ,ν)
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)⇐⇒ ∃φ ∈ Conv(Rd), y ∈ ∂φ(x) pi∗ -almost surely
where ∂φ denotes the subgradient.
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Blackwell order.
Definition 12.1: µ1∆(Rd) is Blackwell-dominated by µ2 ∈ ∆(Rd) ( denoted µ1  µ2) if there
exists a two-steps martingale X1, X2 such that Xi is µi distributed for i = 1, 2.
This order is also often called convex order between probability measures since (see Blackwell
[12])
(12.1) µ1  µ2 ⇔ ∀f ∈ Conv(Rd),
∫
fdµ1 ≤
∫
fdµ2
Let us now list some useful properties
Lemma 12.4: The set {ν ∈ ∆2 : ν  µ} is dW2-compact (hence weakly compact). The function
µ→ C(µ, ν) is nondecreasing for the Blackwell order, strictly if ν is absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue’s measure.
Proof. For the first assertion, uniform integrability of the second order moment follows
from jensen inequality and the martingale characterization of the Blackwell order. Closedness
follows from the convex representation (12.1) since the map µ→ ∫ fdµ is lower continuous for
any f ∈ Conv(Rd). For the second assertion, let ν be absolutely continuous and µ1  µ2 ∈ ∆2.
using theorem 12.2, we have
C(µi, ν) = min
φ∈Conv(Rd)
∫
φdµi +
∫
φ∗dν
Let φ2 be optimal in the above minimization problem for µ2. If φ2 is also optimal for µ1, in
which case theorem 12.2 implies ∇φ2]ν = µ1 = µ2 since ν is absolutely continuous. Therefore,
if µ1 6= µ2, φ2 is not optimal for µ1, and we deduce from (12.1) that
C(µ1, ν) <
∫
φdµ1 +
∫
φ∗dν ≤
∫
φdµ2 +
∫
φ∗dν = C(µ2, ν)
which concludes the proof. 
12.2. Technical proofs.
Proof of lemma 6.1. Using Caratheodory’s theorem together a measurable selection re-
sult, we can parametrize points in Γ as follows
∀Q ∈ Γ, Q =
d(d+1)
2 +1∑
i=1
λi(Q)Pi(Q)
where the λi form a convex combination and Pi ∈ G, all these functions being measurable.
Let Z be the canonical process defined on the canonical space endowed with a law in QΓ.
Then there exists on an extended filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) a d-dimensional
Brownian motion W and an F -progressively measurable process qs such that Zt = ∫ t0 qsdWs
(see e.g. [39] theorem 3.4.2) such that with probability 1, qsqTs ∈ Γ. Define bnk =
∫ (k−1)/n
(k−2)/n qsds
for k ≥ 2 and bn1 = 0. The processes
qns =
n∑
k=1
bnk1I[ (k−1)
n
, k
n
)(s)
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define a sequence of simple processes approximating qs in the Hilbert space L2(Ω×[0, 1], dP⊗dt),
and such that bn1 is constant, bnk is F(k−1)/n-measurable and bnk(bnk)T ∈ Γ. The last property
follows from the fact that the set of square root matrices of Γ in Md is closed convex (the
argument is the same as in lemma 11.1). Since the L2-convergence mentioned above implies
convergence in law at time 1, it is sufficient to prove that the law of
∫ 1
0 q
n
s dWs is in Q˜G(1).
From the definition of Q˜G, to show this, given a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion B
defined on the canonical space, we have to construct a process τ ∈ HG such that the stochastic
integral
∫ 1
0 τsdBs has the same law as
∫ 1
0 q
n
s dWs. Note that the law of
∫ 1
0 q
n
s dWs is determined
by the law of the vector (bnk∆nkW )k=1,..,n where ∆nkW = Wk/n −W(k−1)/n. The conditional law
of nbnk∆nkW given F(k−1)/n is a normal distribution with covariance matrix cnk = bnk(bnk)T ∈ Γ.
We will construct by induction the process τ and a sequence (ĉnk)k=1,..,n such that ĉnk is FB(k−1)/n-
measurable and ĉn1 = cn1 . Assume that the process τ on [0, (k−1)/n) and the variables (ĉni )i=1,..,k
are given and such that (
∫ (k−1)/n
0 τsdBs, ĉ
n
k) has the same law as (
∫ (k−1)/n
0 q
n
s dWs, c
n
k). Define then
τ on [ (k−1)
n
, k
n
) as the piecewise constant process equal to
√
Pi(ĉnk) on the interval
(12.2)
(k − 1)
n
+ 1
n
i−1∑
q=1
λq(ĉnk) ,
(k − 1)
n
+ 1
n
i∑
q=1
λq(ĉnk)

for i = 1, .., d(d+1)2 +1. By construction, the conditional law of n
∫ (k)/n
(k−1)/n τsdBs given
∫ (k−1)/n
0 τsdBs
is a normal distribution with covariance matrix ĉnk and using our assumption it implies that∫ k/n
0 τsdBs has the same law as
∫ k/n
0 q
n
s dWs. Next we construct a variable ĉnk+1, FBk/n measurable,
such that the pair (
∫ k/n
0 τsdBs, ĉ
n
k+1) has the same law as (
∫ k/n
0 q
n
s dWs, c
n
k+1). Using theorem 1.3
in the appendix, to construct ĉnk+1 with the prescribed conditional law given
∫ k/n
0 τsdBs, it is
sufficient to have a diffuse random variable FBk/n-measurable and independent from
∫ k/n
0 τsdBs.
We can construct such a variable as a stochastic integral
∫ k/n
(k−1)/n νsdB
1
s where B1 is the first
coordinate of B. For example, define νs as the piecewise constant process taking alternatively
the values 1 and −1 on the partition of [(k − 1)/n, k/n) obtained by dividing each element of
the partition given in (12.2) into two intervals of equal size. Usual properties of the stochastic
integral against a Brownian motion show that this variable has the required properties, and we
conclude the proof by induction. 
Proof of lemma 6.3. Let us define
Dn = sup
ν∈RCn(q,C)
d2W2(ν,N (0, Id))
Let the sequence (Si)i=1,..,n be independent and identically distributed for some law µ ∈
RC1(q, C), and let Sji denotes the j-th coordinate. Note at first that it follows from the
martingale property that
cov(
n∑
k=1
Si√
n
) = Id
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In the next result, Cq is the universal constant of Burkholder’s square function inequality for
discrete martingales (cf [14]):
E[|
n∑
k=1
Sji√
n
|q] ≤ C
q
q
nq/2
E[
(
n−1∑
k=0
(Sjk+1 − Sjk)2
)q/2
]
≤ n
q/2−1Cqq
nq/2
n−1∑
k=0
E[| Sjk+1 − Sjk |q]
≤ (2K)qCqq
Therefore, moments of order q are uniformly bounded independently of n. Recall that conver-
gence in law together uniformly bounded moments of order q > 2 imply dW2-convergence. Since
any maximizing sequence νn for Dn fulfills the classical Lindeberg condition of the the central
limit theorem (theorem VII.5.2 in [36]) for row-wise independent triangular arrays (again, since
laws in RC1(q, C) have bounded q-th order moments), we deduce that
Dn = dW2(µn,N (0, Id))−→n→∞0
Moreover, the sets RCn(q, C) are dW2 compact, and the last assertion follows directly from
theorem 2.1 in the appendix. 
Proof of lemma 6.4. See [39] problem 2.5 p134 for i). The second point is only a slight
modification of the same reference. We only sketch the proof for d = 1, the generalization is
straightforward. Let ct = 0 for t < 0, and define
c
(n,δ)
t =
n−1∑
k=0
c k−δ
n
1I[ k
n
, k+1
n
)(t)
we will show that there exists a sequence δn in [0, 1] such that
limn→∞E[
∫ 1
0
(ct − cn,δnt )2dt] = 0.
Define gn(δ) = E[[
∫ 1
0 (ct − cn,δt )2dt]. It is shown in [39] that
∫ 1
0 gn(δ)dδ converges to zero using
Fubini’s theorem and i). Therefore, we can choose δn such that
gn(δn) ≤
∫ 1
0
gn(δ)dδ
and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of lemma 6.5. Given q > 2 and C > 0 define
Λ = {ν ∈ ∆20 : cov(ν) ≤ Id}
Fq,C = {ν ∈ ∆20 : cov(ν) = Id, ‖ν‖q ≤ C}
For M ∈Md, we have obviously M](Λ) = {ν ∈ ∆20 : cov(µ) ≤MMT} (recall that M] denotes
the image probability by the linear map x→Mx). Moreover, using lemma 3.1, we have
r(MMT ) = sup
µ∈M](Λ)
V (µ) = sup
ν∈Λ
V (M]ν)
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Since Λ is Wp-compact, there exists a maximum ν∗ ∈ Λ (depending on M). We deduce that
r(MMT )− sup
ν∈Fq,C
V (M]ν) = V (M]ν∗)− sup
ν∈Fq,C
V (M]ν)
≤ KdWp(M]ν∗,M]Fq,C) ≤ KγdWp(ν∗, Fq,C)
where γ is a constant such that |Mx|p ≤ γ|M ||x|p. It is then sufficient to prove that
sup
ν∈Λ
dWp(ν, Fq,C) →
C→+∞
0.
Suppose on the contrary that there exists ε > 0 and some sequence Cn →∞ such that
∀n ∈ N, sup
ν∈Λ
dWp(ν, Fq,Cn) > ε
By compactness, there exists a maximizer µn ∈ λ for all Cn. Extracting a subsequence if
necessary, we can assume that µn dWp-converges to µ ∈ Λ.
Let Xn (resp. X) be random variables with distributions µn (resp. µ) defined on the same
probability space such that Xn converges to X almost surely and in Lp. Define
Yn = Xn1I{|Xn|q≤ 14Cn} − E[Xn1I{|Xn|q≤ 14Cn}].
Then we can check that ‖Yn‖Lq ≤ Cn2 , cov(Yn) ≤ Id and ‖Xn − Yn‖Lp−→n→∞0. Let Pn = Id −
cov(Yn). In order to conclude the proof, it is sufficient to construct a sequence of variables Zn
independent of Yn such that cov(Zn) = Pn, ‖Zn‖Lq ≤ Cn2 and ‖Zn‖Lp−→n→∞0. We would then
have
sup
ν∈Λ
dWp(ν, Fq,Cn) ≤ ‖Xn − (Yn + Zn)‖Lp−→n→∞0
and thus a contradiction since by construction [Yn +Zn] ∈ Fq,Cn . For the sake of completeness,
let us now define such a sequence. Let (U1, .., Ud) be independent uniform random variables on
[0, 1], independent of the sequence Xn. For all k ∈ N∗, define
fk : [0, 1]→ R : x→
{
0 if x ≤ 1− 1
k
k2x− k2 + k if x > 1− 1
k
Define then Zn =
√
Pn((fk(n)(Ui)1/2sgn(Ui − αk(n)))i=1,..,d) with k(n) the sequence defined by
k(n) = inf{k ∈ N∗ : ‖(fk(Ui)1/2)i=1,..,d‖Lp ≤ Cn2 }
and αk(n) ∈ [0, 1] chosen in order that E[Zn] = 0. This sequence has clearly the required
properties and can also be used to prove the closure result in lemma 3.3.
The measurable selection exists from theorem 2.1 in the appendix using that
(M, ν) ∈Md × Fq,C → V (M]ν)
is jointly continuous when Fq,C is endowed with the dW2-topology, and in particular compact.

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Proof of lemma 6.6. With the notation ∆Xk+1 = Xk+1 −Xk, we have∣∣∣VVn (X,F)−VVn (Y,F)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣E[∑n−1k=0V [∆Xk+1 | Fk]− V [∆Yk+1 | Fk]]∣∣∣
≤ KE
[∑n−1
k=0E
[
|∆Xk+1 −∆Yk+1|pp | Fk
] 1
p
]
≤ βKE
[∑n−1
k=0E
[
|∆Xk+1 −∆Yk+1|2 | Fnk
] 1
2
]
Due to Cauchy Schwartz and Jensen’s inequalities, we have
E
[∑n−1
k=0E
[
|∆Xk+1 −∆Yk+1|2 | Fk
] 1
2
]
≤ √nE[
√∑n−1
k=0E
[∣∣∣∆Xk+1 −∆Yk+1∣∣∣2 | Fk]]
≤ √n
√∑n−1
k=0E
[∣∣∣∆Xk+1 −∆Yk+1∣∣∣2]
=
√
n
√
E[|Xn − Yn|2]

CHAPITRE 3
Applications aux jeux d’e´change financiers et aux mode`les de prix.
On s’inte´resse dans ce chapitre a` l’approche strate´gique des mode`les de prix sur des marche´s
avec asyme´trie d’information introduite dans De Meyer [25]. On pre´sente un mode`le ge´ne´ral
de jeu re´pe´te´ d’e´change a` somme nulle entre deux agents risque-neutres asyme´triquement in-
forme´s. Les agents peuvent e´changer plusieurs actifs, et on s’inte´resse particulie`rement au cas
ou` il y a un actif sous-jacent et plusieurs produits de´rive´s. La fluctuation des prix dans ce
mode`le est endoge`ne et re´sulte de l’asyme´trie d’information et du comportement strate´gique
des agents. On montre que la valeur de ces jeux en temps discret ainsi que les processus de prix
a` l’e´quilibre convergent respectivement vers la valeur et les solutions d’un proble`me limite en
temps continu quand le nombre de pe´riode d’e´change tend vers l’infini. De plus, ce proble`me
limite est essentiellement inde´pendant du me´canisme d’e´change du jeu.
Dans le cas d’un mode`le a` un actif, il a e´te´ prouve´ dans [25] que le processus de prix limite
est unique et appartient a` la classe appele´e CMMV. On prouve que ce re´sultat est robuste
face a` l’introduction dans le mode`le de plusieurs produits de´rive´s monotones. Ne´anmoins, on
prouve que ce re´sultat n’est plus vrai dans des cas particuliers non-monotones, et on propose
un exemple ou` le processus de prix limite n’est plus unique.
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1. Introduction
Many financial models in use on the stock markets rely on the definition of a class of possible
price dynamics for an underlying asset. By price dynamic, we mean a probability distribution
describing the future random evolution of the price of a risky asset in continuous time. Once
this class is defined, statistical calibration tools as well as numerical methods to compute
derivatives’ prices and hedging strategies are developed and their formulation strongly depend
on the considered class. This dependence outlines the importance of the problem consisting in
the choice of a particular class.
This work is following the approach to this model selection problem initiated in the work
of [31]. This approach is different from classical financial models since it relies on a strategic
analysis using game theoretical tools, where the agents are not considered as price-taker. In
this setting, the fluctuations of the prices result from an asymmetry of information and from
agents’ strategic behavior. The randomness is therefore endogenous and this differs from the
usual justifications. Indeed, in many classes of price dynamics (as Bachelier, Black and Scholes,
and more generally the class of diffusion processes) the randomness appearing in the stock
prices is modeled by a Brownian motion and the usual justification for its appearance is the
following: prices depend on a long list of external random parameters whose effects aggregate
in a Brownian motion due to an implicit central limit theorem.
The model introduced in [31] consists in a repeated exchange game between two risk-neutral
asymmetrically informed players. The first player is an informed agent, that has to be thought
as an institutional investor having a better access to information, this advantage being known
publicly. The second player is an uninformed agent, who just knows that his opponent is
informed. Therefore, each move of the first player on the market is analyzed by the other to
infer its informational content. A naive use of information would be completely revealing, and
lead to a loss of this strategic advantage for the next periods of trade. The informed agent has
thus to care about how much information his actions will reveal. His optimal behavior in this
game is to select his actions using some random lotteries, misleading this way the beliefs of
the uninformed player. These random noises introduced at each period in the repeated trade
will aggregate in a Brownian motion. Aggregation has to be understood as the convergence of
a sequence dicrete-time approximations. Indeed, equilibrium strategies in this repeated game
define a random price process. This process is a discrete-time process, but any sequence of
these processes converges to a precise price dynamic (continuous-time) when the time between
two trading periods tends to zero.
More recently, this convergence result has been generalized in [25]. The construction and
the arguments developed in [31] are extended to a large class of repeated exchange games. The
main result is that, independently of the exchange mechanism of the game, the same asymptotic
price dynamics are obtained. The class of these dynamics, called continuous martingales of
maximal variation (CMMV), is a subclass of the local volatility diffusion processes that contains
Bachelier’s [4] and Black and Scholes’ [11] dynamics as particular cases. Due to this invariance
result, the class CMMV appears as quite robust, and a natural question to ask is whether this
result still holds in more general settings (non-zero sum games, risk aversion, multi-assets game
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...). In this paper, we aim to analyze a multi-asset model where the informed agent is dealing
various assets at a time. The main motivation for this extension is the following.
The robustness’ result proved in [25] suggests that the class CMMV could be used in
financial models as the class of possible dynamics for the stock prices, since it provides an
economic justification for this class. However, in this model, agents are trading only one asset,
and a price dynamic is mainly a tool to obtain pricing formulae for derivatives. The main
question we ask is then : Is this result still robust if we modify the model so that the agent can
also trade derivatives? More precisely, assuming that we obtain a multi-dimensional distribution
for the prices of both the underlying asset and the derivatives introduced in the model, is the
marginal distribution of the underlying asset still the same, and in particular still in the class
CMMV ?
Our results rely on the following mathematical result, generalizing the convergence result
in [25] for the unidimensional case. This result characterizes the asymptotic behavior of mar-
tingales of maximal M -variation. Given a real-valued function M defined on the set of proba-
bilities on R, the M -variation of a discrete-time stochastic process (X1, .., Xn) is the following
functional :
VMn (X) = E[
n∑
k=1
M([(Xk −Xk−1 | X1, .., Xk−1])]
where [(Xk−Xk−1) | X1, .., Xk−1] is the conditional distribution of the increment (Xk−Xk−1) of
the process given the past values (X1, .., Xk−1). A multi-dimensional extension of this theorem
is proved in chapter 2 for general functions M , including the case of the value function of an
exchange game with asymmetric information.
The main difficulty appearing in the multi-asset models that prevent us from obtaining a
straightforward generalization of the convergence result given in [25] is an effect that we will
call increasing information due to the introduction of a new asset in the model. Suppose that
the two players are exchanging two risky assets A and B, B being a derivative on A. The
first player is assumed to have some information concerning the liquidation value of A at some
future date. He will therefore try to take benefit of this advantage on both markets, using his
information about A to trade B. At this point, it is quite natural to ask if the situation can be
reduced to two separate games. It would be possible if the informed agent was not known to be
informed and acting on both markets. He could in this case use optimal strategies developed in
the one-asset models, using all information available for each asset independently. In our case
however, the decisions of the uninformed player are made by gathering observations coming
from both markets. Since observations made on market B contain indirectly information on
A (and reciprocally), the second player is a priori more informed than if the markets were
completely separated. This increasing information effect can dramatically change the type of
price dynamics.
In this work, we introduce a general two-assets model, including as a particular case the
couple formed by an asset and some derivative on it, but allowing for more complicate, possibly
probabilistic, dependencies. All the results obtained extend directly to a model with a finite
number of assets. We define a repeated exchange game between two risk-neutral players in
which one of them is assumed to be informed about the liquidation value of the two risky
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assets. In this general setting, the different assets cannot be separated, and the results of [25]
do not apply due to the above mentioned effect of increasing information.
The organization is as follows: The next section is a reminder of notations and results of
[25]. From section 3 to 8, we study the structure of a particular two assets game which is an
extension of the game introduced in [31]. Section 3 presents the model as well as the strategies
and the payoff function in that game. In section 5, we relate the one-shot two-assets model
with two independent one-asset models. We characterize the price process at equilibrium in
the game of length n as a maximizer of an optimization problem for martingales in section 6.
We discuss the asymptotic behavior of this game as an approximation of a continuous time
optimization problem in section 8 in order to give some insight of the main results of chapter
2.
In section 1.2, we show how to deduce from the results of chapter 2 the asymptotic behavior
of the value of our games.
Using this result in section 9, we study the special case in which the second asset B is
a monotonic derivative on A. The main result (Theorem 9.2) in this section says that the
dynamic of A is not perturbed by the introduction of B in the model. It shows that the effect
of increasing information does not modifies the prices when we introduce in the one asset-model
derivatives with the same maturity date whose prices are monotonic functions of the underlying
asset’s price at that date, typically european options. This gives a positive answer to the above
mentioned question, and states an additional robustness result for the class CMMV.
The last section (10) treats the case of a general link between A and B including non
monotonic or probabilistic dependencies. The problem of characterizing the price dynamics is
formulated as a dual stochastic control problem in continuous time. We provide an explicit
solution of this problem for a particular case of non monotonic dependency between A and B
liquidation values, using a dual PDE formulation. In contrast to Theorem 9.2, this solution
provides an example where the answer is negative: the price dynamic of the underlying asset
is modified by the introduction of the derivative and is no more in the class CMMV due to
the effect of increasing information. We also give some examples of more general probabilistic
dependencies where there is non-uniqueness of the price dynamic.
2. The one asset model
This paper is concerned with a multi-assets model that generalizes the one asset case ana-
lyzed in [25]. It will be useful to remind both results and notations of that paper. The following
description is only formal and we refer to [25] for the precise statements.
The model consists in a zero-sum game denoted by Gn(µA), in which two agents (Player 1
and 2) are trading a risky asset A against a nume´raire N .
Information structure. At the beginning of the game, which will correspond for us to
the time t = 0, Player 1 receives some private message concerning the risky asset A. At some
fixed future date, for us t = 1, P1’s message will be publicly disclosed. The price LA of asset
A at time t = 1 is called the liquidation value of A. It will depend on P1’s message. Since
LA is the only useful content of P1’s information in this model, we may assume that nature
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initially chooses LA with a probability µA over R, informs P1 but not P2 who only knows µA.
The liquidation value of N will be for simplicity fixed to 1.
The repeated exchange game. Before the disclosure date t = 1, players exchange (trade)
repeatedly asset A and N during n consecutive rounds. Each round is described by the same
general exchange mechanism, which is defined as a zero-sum game (I, J, T ), where I, J are the
respective action sets of P1 and P2 and where T is a transfer function from I × J to R2 . If
players’ actions are (i, j), then T (i, j) = (R(i, j), N(i, j)) where R(i, j) and N(i, j) represent
respectively the number of A and N shares received by P1.
At round k (k = 1, ..., n), the players have to select a pair of actions (ik, jk) independently
of each others, based on their past observations and private information. Next the resulting
transaction takes place and the actions are announced publicly. This transaction is summarized
by the following relations. Let yk = (yAk , yNk ) and zk = (zAk , zNk ) denote P1’s and P2’s portfolios
after round k, then
yk = yk−1 + T (ik, jk) ; zk = zk−1 − T (ik, jk)
The payoff function. Both players are assumed to have sufficiently large initial endow-
ments, and therefore the constraints yk ≥ 0 and zk ≥ 0 are ignored in this model. The players
are supposed to be risk neutral so that the utility they aim to maximize is the expected value
of their final portfolio. P1’s utility is then : E[yAnLA + yNn ]. Since y0 is initially fixed, its
liquidation value is independent of players’ moves. It can thus be subtracted from P1’s utility
without affecting his behavior in the game. The same argument can be applied to P2 and this
amounts to assume y0 = z0 = (0, 0).
Players are assumed to use behavioral strategies: at each round, they can use a lottery
depending on their past observations and private information to select their actions (see chapter
1 for a formal definition).
The price process. In this abstract model, the price LAk of asset A at stage k is defined
as the expected liquidation value given P2’s information: LAk := E[LA | i1, .., ik, j1, ..jk] (it is
the price at which P2 would agree to trade with another risk-neutral player having the same
information).
Asymptotic results. The main result in [25] concerns the asymptotic of the price process
at equilibrium (LA,nk )k=0,...,n, as the number of rounds goes to ∞. Since the players use a
lottery to select their actions, at equilibrium in Gn(µA), the sequence of prices (LA,nk )k=1,..,n is a
stochastic process. The n transaction rounds occur between the date t = 0 when P1 receives the
message and the date of public disclosure t = 1. Assuming that round k occurs at time t = k
n
we
can then extend this price process in a continuous time process Πnt , piecewise constant on the
intervals [ k
n
, k+1
n
). Precisely, with bac the greater integer less or equal to a, and LA,n0 = E(LA),
we define:
∀t ∈ [0, 1] Πnt = LA,nbntc
When n becomes large, the time between two transactions goes to zero, and the price process
appears naturally as an approximation of a continuous-time price process. The limit, if it exists,
of the processes Πnt , represents then a continuous-time “equilibrium” price process. The main
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result in [25] is that, under very weak and natural hypotheses on the exchange mechanism
described below, Πn converges in distribution 1 to the continuous martingale ΠµA of maximal
variation (CMMV). This martingale ΠµA is defined as : Πµ
A
t := E[fµA(B1) | Gt] where B is a
Brownian motion on its natural filtration G and fµA the unique right-continuous nondecreasing
function such that fµA(B1) is µA-distributed.
The class of processes ΠµA is therefore quite universal or robust, in the sense that it is
independent of the “natural” exchange mechanism used by the players. An exchange mechanism
is said to be natural if it satisfies the following five hypotheses for µA in some fixed subset of
probabilities :
H1) Existence of a value: For all n and µA the game Gn(µA) has a value vn(µA) and both
players have optimal strategies.
H2) Continuity : The value v1 is K-Lipschitz with respect to the Wasserstein distance of
order p for a p ∈ [1, 2). (see appendix for a precise definition of this distance)
H3) Invariance with respect to the nume´raire scale that can be expressed in terms of v1: For
all random variable X we denote [X] the law of X. With that notation, the hypothesis
becomes for all α ≥ 0, for all X : v1([αX]) = αv1([X])
H4) Invariance with respect to the risk-less part of the risky asset:
For all β ∈ R, for all X, v1([X + β]) = v1([X]).
H5) Positive value of information:
v1 is nonnegative and there exists µA such that v1(µA) > 0.
An example of Natural Mechanism. The following mechanism was introduced in [31]
where the associated game Gn(µA) was studied for distributions concentrated on {0, 1}. The
generalization for any distribution was made in [30]. The convergence result was first proved
using this mechanism, and it provides a concrete example that fulfills all the hypotheses needed
to apply the general result obtained in [25].
This example is a simplified zero-sum version of bid-ask competition between market makers.
More precisely, for each round of transaction, both players have to post a price for 1 unit of
the risky asset. Then, the maximal bid wins and one share is exchanged at this price (directly
between the players). If both bids are equal, no transaction happens. Let p denote the price
posted by P1 (respectively q for P2), and (I, J, T ) this mechanism, then we have:
I = J = R, and T (p, q) = (R(p, q), N(p, q)) with :
(2.1) R(p, q) = 1I(p>q) − 1I(q>p) N(p, q) = 1I(q>p)q − 1I(p>q)p
where 1I(p>q) is the function equal to 1 if p > q and to 0 otherwise. Other examples are discussed
in [25], and all our results in the multi-asset setting extend to any natural mechanism except
the existence of the value and of optimal strategies which is specific to the payoff function of
the game unless strong regularity assumptions are made on T, I, J .
1. Convergence in distribution has to be understood as convergence of probability measures on the space
D([0, 1],Rp) of rcll functions endowed with the Skorokhod topology. The result in [25] is stated using convergence
in finite-dimensional distributions. But using the result of Aldous [1], this convergence implies the stronger
convergence we mention here since the limit process has continuous trajectories.
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3. An exchange game model with two assets
The two-assets game Γn. Let us now describe the two-assets game using the particular
exchange mechanism described in the previous section. At the beginning of the game (date t =
0), the pair of liquidation values L = (LA, LB) is chosen at random according to a probability
distribution µ over R2, and P1 is informed of L. P2 knows only µ and that P1 has been
informed of L. Transactions take place during n consecutive rounds up to date 1, and the
same exchange mechanism is used on both markets. It means that both players, at each round
and for each asset, have to post a price. Let pk = (pAk , pBk ) denote the prices posted by P1 at
round k, (respectively qk = (qAk , qBk ) for P2). If yk = (yAk , yBk , yNk ) denotes player 1’s portfolio
after round k
yk = yk−1 + t(pk, qk) with :
t(p, q) =
(
R(pA, qA) , R(pB, qB) , N(pA, qA) +N(pB, qB)
)
where R and N are given by (2.1). Players are risk-neutral and aim to maximize the expected
value of their final portfolios.
We denote Γn(µ) the two assets game, with µ the distribution of the vector of liquidation
values L = (LA, LB). The one asset-game using the same mechanism will be denoted as in the
previous section Gn(µA) where µA is the distribution of the liquidation value LA. For a given
bivariate distribution µ, the pair of univariate marginal distributions of µ will be denoted by
(µA, µB). The study the possible effect of the introduction of a second asset in the model on the
prices reduces in this setting to the comparison of the equilibrium price processes for the asset
A in Gn(µA) and Γn(µ). Note that for the case in which B is a derivative on A, the information
structure is the same in Gn(µA) and Γn(µ). Indeed, since LB is a function of LA, knowing
(LA, LB) is equivalent to knowing LA. The comparison between these two games studies then
precisely the effect of allowing the players to trade derivatives in this model.
Strategies in Γn(µ). We assume that µ ∈ ∆1(R2) where ∆p(R2) denotes the set of Borelian
probabilities on R2 with finite moment of order p.
At round k, the choice made by P2 is based on his past information
(pi, qi)i≤k−1 ∈ (R2)2(k−1).
A behavioral strategy τ for P2 in Γn(µ) is then a sequence (τ1, ..., τn) of transition probabilities
τk : (R2)2(k−1) → ∆(R2).
Let Tn denote the set of these strategies. P1 can also use his private information to make his
choice, so the prices he post at round k are depending on
(L, (pi, qi)i≤k−1) ∈ R2 × (R2)2(k−1).
A behavioral strategy for P1 is then a sequence σ = (σ1, ..., σn) of transition probabilities
σk : R2 × (R2)2(k−1) → ∆(R2).
94 3. APPLICATIONS AUX JEUX D’E´CHANGE FINANCIERS ET AUX MODE`LES DE PRIX.
The triplet (µ, σ, τ) induces a unique probability Π(µ,σ,τ) on (R2)× (R2)2n. Formally, the payoff
function is then
gn(µ, σ, τ) = EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [L
A
n∑
k=1
(R(pAk , qAk )) +
n∑
k=1
(N(pAk , qAk ))
+LB
n∑
k=1
(R(pBk , qBk )) +
n∑
k=1
(N(pBk , qBk ))]
The quantity above is not always well defined for integrability reasons, so we have to restrict
the sets of strategies. As µ ∈ ∆1(R2) the quantities:
Li(R(pik, qik)) = Li(1Ipik>qik − 1Iqik>pik) for i ∈ {A,B}
are always integrable, so we will concentrate on the remaining part of the payoff . A strategy
σ for P1 is admissible if:
∀τ ∈ Tn,∀k = 1, .., n, ∀i ∈ {A,B}, EΠ(µ,σ,τ)
[(
N(pik, qik)
)−]
<∞
where for a real number x, x− denotes the negative part of x. Σn(µ) will be the set of admissible
strategies for P1 in Γn(µ). Restricting the set of P1’s strategies to admissible ones, the payoff
is always well defined in R ∪ {+∞}.
Equilibrium. Let us recall the following notions of zero-sum games theory. We say that
the strategy σ of P1 can guarantee C in Γn(µ) if
inf
τ∈Tn
gn(µ, σ, τ) ≥ C
Similarly, a strategy τ can guarantee C is
sup
σ∈Σn(µ)
gn(µ, σ, τ) ≤ C
The maximal amount P1 can guarantee is therefore
V n(µ) = sup
σ∈Σn(µ)
inf
τ∈Tn
gn(µ, σ, τ)
A strategy σ is said to be optimal optimal if it guarantees V n(µ). The minimal amount P2 can
guarantee is:
V n(µ) = inf
τ∈Tn
sup
σ∈Σn(µ)
gn(µ, σ, τ)
A strategy τ is said to be optimal if it guarantees V n(µ). We always have V n(µ) ≤ V n(µ) and
when equality holds, the game is said to have a value
Vn(µ) , V n(µ) = V n(µ).
An equilibrium of the game is a pair of optimal strategies (σ, τ).
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Reduced strategies in Γn(µ). We introduce the notion of reduced strategies, which are
simply strategies that do not depend on P2’s past actions.
A reduced strategy τ for P2 is a sequence (τ1, ..., τn) of transition probabilities
τk : (R)k−1 → ∆(R).
A reduced strategy for P1 is a sequence σ = (σ1, ..., σn) of transition probabilities
σk : R× (R)k−1 → ∆(R).
Given a reduced strategy σ of P1, the pair (µ, σ) induces a probability on R2×(R2)n. Therefore,
if
E(µ,σ)[
n∑
k=1
| pAk | + | pBk |] <∞
then σ is admissible. Indeed, this follows from the following obvious inequality
N(pik, qik) = 1I(qik>pik)q
i
k − 1I(pik>qik)p
i
k ≥ −|pik|
Remark 3.1: Since our results rely on the recursive structure of this repeated game, we need
the following admissibility criterion. If there exists M > 0 such that with probability 1
∀k = 1, .., n, ∀i = A,B, E(µ,σ)[|pik||p1, .., pk−1] ≤ME(µ,σ)[|Li||p1, .., pk−1]
then σ is admissible.
The main property of the game in reduced strategies is that the action of P2 at step k does
not influence the payoff of next stages. Therefore, to play a best reply against some reduced
strategy σ of P1, P2 has just to maximize his stage payoff given past actions of P1. In other
words, P2 can be seen as a succession of players facing P1, being informed only of the past
actions of P1. The next proposition shows that an optimal strategy in the game restricted to
reduced strategies is still optimal in the initial game.
Proposition 3.1: If a strategy guarantees the quantity C in the game Γn(µ) where the strategy
sets of the players are restricted to reduced (admissible) strategies, then it guarantees C in the
initial game.
Proof. see proposition 1.4 in chapter 1. 
4. The one asset game Gn
The set of admissible strategies in Gn are defined in the same way as above (with an obvious
truncation). The following result was proved in [30]:
Theorem 4.1: For µA ∈ ∆1(R), the game Gn(µA) has a value vn(µA) and both players have
an optimal strategy. Moreover, the function v1 is given by:
(4.1) v1(µA) =
∫ 1
0
F−1µA (u)(2u− 1)du
where for any probability ν over R, Fν denotes the distribution function and F−1ν its generalized
right-continuous inverse.
We introduce now some notations and properties for set of joint probabilities with constraint
on the marginals.
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Notation 10: Let X,Y be two polish spaces and Q,R two subsets of the set of Borelian prob-
abilities ∆(X) and ∆(Y ). Then P(Q,R) denotes the set of probabilities over X × Y whose
marginal distributions over X and Y belongs respectively to Q and R. If Q = {µ}, we will
simply write P(µ,R). Unless otherwise stated, topological properties of such sets refer to the
usual weak topology.
Lemma 4.1: Let X,Y be two polish spaces and Q,R two tight (resp. closed, convex) subsets of
∆(X) and ∆(Y ). Then the set P(Q,R) is itself tight (resp. closed, convex).
Let us now recall the following well-known result concerning maximal covariance functions
on the line, which is a particular case of the Monge-Kantorovitch optimal transportation prob-
lem.
Lemma 4.2: If µ ∈ ∆p(R) with p ≥ 1 and ν ∈ ∆q(R) with 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1, then:
max{E[XY ] | X ∼ µ, Y ∼ ν} =
∫ 1
0
F−1µ (u)F−1ν (u)du
If Fν is bijective, the law of (F−1µ (Fν(Y )), Y ) induced by some random variable Y ∼ ν is an
optimal solution, and the function f = F−1µ ◦ Fν is the unique nondecreasing function (up to
equality ν a.e.) such that f(Y ) ∼ µ. Moreover if X ∼ µ is a r.v. defined on the same space as
Y ∼ ν and such that (X, Y ) is an optimal solution, then X = (F−1µ (Fν(Y )) a.s..
Proof. see theorem 6.0.2 in [2]. 
Remark 4.1: Any pair of random variable optimal in the preceding lemma is called comono-
tonic. Although the same problem does not have explicit solutions in higher dimensions, this
notion of comonotonicity allows to solve it in some particular cases. The symmetric notion of
an antimonotonic pair is a pair (X, Y ) such that there exists some variable U and X = f(U),
Y = g(U), with f nondecreasing and g nonincreasing.
We deduce directly from this lemma the following representation formula for v1
v1(µA) = max{E[LAUA] | LA ∼ µA , UA ∼ U[−1,1]}(4.2)
= max
pi∈P(µ,U[−1,1])
∫
xydpi(x, y)(4.3)
where U[−1,1] denotes the uniform distribution on [−1, 1] and where the second line is just an
integral reformulation of the first one. Let us now mention some useful properties of v1.
Lemma 4.3: v1 fulfills the properties H2 to H5 with p = K = 1 on the set ∆1(R), together
with the following symmetry hypothesis
∀α ∈ R, v1[αY ] =| α | v1[Y ]
Proof. Let ν1, ν2 ∈ ∆1(R) and X1, X2 random variables such that Xi ∼ νi and E[|X1 −
X2|] = dW1(ν1, ν2). Then for any uniform random variable U on [−1, 1] defined on the same
probability space, we have
|E[X1U ]− E[X2U ]| ≤ dW1(ν1, ν2)
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and property H2 follows easily. properties H3 to H5 and the symmetry hypothesis are obvious
consequences of the linearity of the expectation and of the fact that the uniform law is centered
and symmetric. 
We recall finally two technical lemmas proved in [31] 2, that we will use to construct optimal
strategies in the one asset game G1, and that we will use to construct optimal strategies in Γn.
Lemma 4.4: For µA ∈ ∆1(R), define f(u) = 1
u2
∫ u
0 2sF−1µA (s)ds. Then:
min
q∈R
∫ 1
0
(
F−1µA (u)(1If(u)>q − 1Iq>f(u)) + 1Iq>f(u)q − 1If(u)>qf(u)
)
du
=
∫ 1
0
(2s− 1)F−1µA (s)ds
and the minimum is reached for any q ∈ f(]0, 1[). Moreover, f ≤ F−1µA and∫ 1
0
F−1µA (u)− f(u)du =
∫ 1
0
(2u− 1)F−1µA (u)du ≤
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣F−1µA (u)−m(µA)∣∣∣ du
with m(µA) =
∫ 1
0 F
−1
µA (u)du.
Lemma 4.5: Let h be a continuous convex function defined on [−1, 1]. Define:
g(u) = 1
u2
∫ u
0
2sh′(2s− 1)ds where h′ is the right-hand derivative of h
We have:
max
p∈R
[
h
(∫ 1
0
(1Ip>g(u) − 1Ig(u)>p)du
)
+
∫ 1
0
(1Ig(u)>pg(u)− 1Ip>g(u)p)du
]
=
∫ 1
0
h(2s− 1)ds
5. The one shot game Γ1(µ)
In Γ1(µ), since there is only one transaction round, P1 has not to care about the information
his action will reveal. Therefore, playing that game is equivalent to playing independently the
two games G1(µA) and G1(µB). Therefore, both players can play optimally in both markets
using any coupling of optimal strategies inG1(µA) andG1(µB). We deduce from this observation
the following result
Proposition 5.1: For all µ ∈ ∆1(R2),Γ1(µ) has a value
V1(µ) = v1(µA) + v1(µB)
and both players have optimal strategies.
Proof. We will only explain briefly how to formalize the above argument in order to obtain
a rigorous proof. The payoff function has been defined in order to ensure that the payoff is
2. resp. lemma 5.1 p.15 and 7.1 p.22. See also the construction of optimal strategies in [31], the proof being
the same.
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always the sum of two expectations, resulting respectively from the exchanges on market A and
B. The “A” expected payoff is :
EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [L
AR(pA, qA)) +N(pA, qA)]
and the relevant part of players strategies to compute it reduces to a pair of one-asset game’s
strategies, precisely : the conditional distribution of pA given LA and the marginal distribution
of qA, which define respectively a strategy in Gn(µA) for P1 and P2. Applying the same
decomposition for the second part of the payoff, the relevant part of any strategy in Γ1(µ) can
be represented by a pair of strategies in Gn(µA),Gn(µB). The reverse way, coupling two Gn
strategies into a Γn strategy, can be done for example this way : given (σA, σB) strategies in
the games (G1(µA), G1(µB)) define a strategy ̂(σA, σB) in Γ1(µ) by:
̂(σA, σB)(LA, LB) = σA(LA)⊗ σB(LB)
and similarly ̂(τA, τB) = τA⊗τB. Since admissibility as well as measurability is clearly preserved
in these operations, the equivalence mentioned above is straightforward to prove. 
We need for the sequel to prove a slightly more precise result.
Definition 5.1: An optimal admissible selection for P1 is a transition probability, that is a
measurable application :
σ : ∆1(R2)× R2 → ∆(R2)
such that ∀µ ∈ ∆1(R2), σ(µ, ·) ∈ Σ1(µ) and:
∀µ, ∀τ ∈ T 1, g1(µ, σ(µ, ·), τ) ≥ V1(µ)
Moreover, we require for admissibility that there exists M > 0 such that
∀i = A,B, E(µ,σ(µ,·))[|pi1|] ≤MEµ[|Li|]
Proposition 5.2: P1 has an optimal admissible selection in Γ1(µ) and:
V1(µ) = max
{∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
pi ∈ P(µ,H1)
}
where P(µ,H1) refers to bivariate marginals and H1 = P(U[−1;1],U[−1;1]) refers to univariate
marginals.
We will need the following classical lemma for the proof, whose general form is known as
the regression representation lemma.
Lemma 5.1: Let X be a random variable of distribution ν and V another random variable of
distribution U[0,1] independent of X. Define:
F˜ν(x) = P(X < x) , pν(x) = P(X = x)
and θ(ν, x, λ) = F˜ν(x) + λpν(x)
Then:
θ(ν,X, V ) ∼ U[0,1] and F−1ν (θ(ν,X, V )) = X a.s.
Proof. See theorem 2.1 in [52]. 
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Proof of proposition 5.2. Given two independent random variables (V A, V B) with dis-
tribution U[0;1] and independent of L, define for i = A;B:
U i = θ(µi, Li, V i) ⇒ Li = F−1µi (U i) and U i ∼ U[0;1]
If P1 plays pi = hi(U i), with : hi(α) = 1
α2
∫ α
0 2sF−1µi (s)ds, it defines a strategy σ, and using
lemma 4.4, P1 guarantees with σ :
v1(µA) + v1(µB) = E[F−1µA (U
A)(2UA − 1)] + E[F−1µB (UB)(2UB − 1)]
= E[LA(2UA − 1) + LB(2UB − 1)]
Using the above construction, the variables appearing in the last equality are defined on the
same probability space and fulfill the requested marginal constraints. Therefore :
v1(µA) + v1(µB) ≤ max
{∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
pi ∈ P(µ,H1)
}
The reverse inequality is clear from the definition of v1. The optimal strategy of P1 we have
constructed is a coupling (as defined in the proof of proposition 5.1) of some one-asset game
strategies (σA, σB). Each one of these strategies can be summarized by its inverse distribution
function which depends on (Li, µi) for i = A,B
F−1σi(Li,µi)(u) = h
i ◦ θ(µi, Li, u)
These functions being jointly measurable, it defines jointly measurable transitions and since
coupling preserve measurability, this strategy is an optimal selection. Admissibility follows
directly from lemma 4.4. Indeed, we have
E[|pi − Li|] =
∫ 1
0
|hi(u)− F−1µi (u)|du ≤ E[|Li − E[Li]|]
and this implies E[|pi|] =≤ 3E[|Li|]. 
6. The game Γn(µ)
In our game, since player’s actions are posted prices, a natural notion for the price process
is the sequence of prices posted by P1. The main results in section 9 are expressed using
the abstract notion of price introduced in section 2, which does not depend on the exchange
mechanism. This choice has two advantages, at first this allows to extend these results to
games using abstract exchange mechanisms, and secondly, the obtained price process being by
construction a martingale possesses good mathematical properties. Moreover, it will be shown
at the end of section 8 that this choice is not restricting for the particular game we are studying
since the sequence of prices posted by P1 has the same asymptotic behavior as the martingale
price process.
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The martingale price process. Given (µ, σ, τ), the following process describe the evolu-
tion of the expected price of L for P2 when updating his beliefs after each round
Lk , EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [L | iq, jq, q ≤ k].
Define F0 = {∅,R2 × (I2 × J2)n}, Fk = σ(iq, jq, q ≤ k) for k = 1, .., n and Fn+1 = σ(Fn, L). If
we add to this process a final value Ln+1 = L, then (Lk,Fk)k=0,..,n+1 is a R2-valued martingale
with terminal law µ or equivalently the law of Ln is Blackwell dominated by µ (see section 12
in chapter 2). This process is very important in the analysis of the game: it indicates how
much information has been revealed by player 1. If P1’s move at stage k depends strongly on
L, then Lk will be in some sense close to the true value L.
Definition 6.1: Mn(µ) is the collection of martingales (Xk,Fk)k=1,..,n defined of some filtered
probability space (Ω,A, (Fk)k=1,..,n,P), of length n and whose final distribution is Blackwell dom-
inated by µ ([Ln]  µ). By convention, we set F0 = {Ω, ∅}.
By choosing a strategy, P1 is in fact choosing a rate of revelation, that is a price martingale
in Mn(µ) and as argued in [25] the optimal price martingale will have to solve a maximization
problem. In order to state formally this result, we need the following definition
Definition 6.2: We call V1-variation of a martingale (X,F) ∈Mn(µ) the following functional
Vn(X,F) = E[
n∑
k=1
V1([Xk −Xk−1 | Fk−1])]
The maximal V1-variation is then the function defined for all µ ∈ ∆1(R) by
(6.1) VV1n (µ) = sup
(X,F)∈Mn(µ)
VV1n (X,F)
Theorem 6.1: For all µ ∈ ∆1(R2),
V n(µ) = VV1n (µ).
For all (X,F) ∈Mn(µ), P1 has a reduced strategy that guarantees VV1n (X,F). If the game Γn(µ)
has a value and if both players play an optimal strategy, the induced a posteriori martingale
solves the problem (6.1).
Proof. At first, from property H4, the definition of maximal variation given gere coincide
cith the definition of chapter 1. Then, despite the fact the the payoff function can be unbounded,
the proof follows words for words from the proofs of proposition 1.2 and 1.3. Just replace the
optimal strategies of P1 by the admissible measurable selection constructed in proposition 5.2
and note that the payoff is always well-defined. 
Existence of an optimal strategy for player 1 could be easily deduced from this result if we
can show that there is a martingale maximizing the V1-variation. We will derive this result
from an alternative representation of Vn, which will be moreover useful to construct optimal
strategies for P2 and to illustrate the asymptotic results in section 8.
Let us now introduce some notations.
Definition 6.3:
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– The vector (Uk)k=1,...,n ∈ (R2)n is multi-uniform (on [-1,1]) if:
(6.2) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, [Uk | Fk−1] ∈ H1
with Fk−1 = σ(Ui)i=1,...,k−1 and H1 = P
(
U[−1,1], U[−1,1]
)
.
– If the property (6.2) holds for a larger filtration F˜k, we say that the vector is F˜k multi-
uniform. Note that it defines a sequence of F˜k martingale increments.
– Wn denotes the set of probabilities on (R2)n induced by multi-uniform vectors, and Hn
the set of probabilities on (R2) induced by the vectors (∑nk=1 Uk) ∈ R2, as the joint law
[(Uk)k=1,...,n] ranges through Wn.
Lemma 6.1: Define
Φn(µ) ,max
{
E[LA
n∑
k=1
UAk + LB
n∑
k=1
UBk ]
 L ∼ µ, [(UAk , UBk )k=1,...,n] ∈ Wn
}
= max
{ ∫
〈x, y〉dpi
pi ∈ P(µ,Hn)}(P)
Then Vn(µ) = Φn(µ).
Proof. From the previous definitions, the second line is just an integral reformulation of
the first. We prove first the inequality ≤. For a given (X,F) ∈ Mn(µ), let Gk denote the
natural filtration of X. Define µk as the conditional law of Xk given Gk−1. µk is then an Gk−1-
measurable r.v. with values in ∆1(R2). Up to enlarging the probability space, we can assume
the existence of a family (V ik )k=1,...,n i=A,B of independent r.v. of distribution U[0,1], independent
of Fn+1. We define then a larger filtration G˜k = σ(Gk, (V Aq , V Bq )q≤k) for k = 1, .., n + 1 and
G˜0 = G0. Since X is still a martingale with respect to G˜ and the conditional distributions µk
are not affected, we have
VV1n (X,F) ≤ VV1n (X,G) = VV1n (X, G˜)
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality (see lemma 5.1 in chapter 1). We
define next, using notations of lemma 5.1:
(Y Ak , Y Bk ) = (θ(µAk , XAk , V Ak ), θ(µBk , XBk , V Bk )) k = 1, . . . , n
It follows that XAk = F−1µA
k
(Y Ak ) and [Y Ak | G˜k−1] = U[0,1]. By proposition 5.2
(6.3) V1([Xk | G˜k−1]) = E[XAk (2Y Ak − 1) +XBk (2Y Bk − 1) | G˜k−1]
The vector ((2Y Ak −1), (2Y Bk −1))k=1,..,n is then G˜k multi-uniform by construction, so we deduce
the first inequality by summation of (6.3) over k.
For the reverse inequality, let us start with a random variable L of distribution µ and a
multi-uniform vector (UAk , UBk )k=1,...,n defined on the same probability space Ω. We define the
associated martingale as follows. Let F0 = {∅,Ω}, Fk = σ((UAi , UBi )i=1,...,k) for k = 1, . . . , n
and Fn+1 = σ(Fn, L). Then the martingale (Lk,Fk)k=1,...,n defined by Lik = E[Li | Fk] for
i = A,B and k = 1, .., n belongs to Mn(µ). Proposition 5.2 implies
E[LAk UAk + LBk UBk | Fk−1] ≤ V1([Lk | Fk−1])
and we conclude by summation over k.
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It remains to show that the maximum is reached in the definition of Φn(µ). The definition
of Wn can be reformulated as the set of distributions of vectors (UAk , UBk )k=1,...,n verifying :
– All one dimensional marginals distributions are U[−1,1]
– ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀i ∈ {A,B}, U ik is independent of (UAm, UBm)m=1,...,k−1
These constraints are weakly continuous and affine and therefore define a convex compact set.
Define
u : R2n → R2 : u(x) = (
n∑
k=1
xAk ,
n∑
k=1
xBk ).
Hn is the image of Wn by the continuous affine map µ → u]µ, hence convex compact. Using
lemma 4.1, the set P(µ,Hn) is convex compact. The map pi → ∫ 〈x, y〉dpi is continuous on
P(µ,Hn) by lemma 1.4 in the appendix and the existence of a maximum follows. 
Remark 6.1: This proof also implies that for any optimal martingale (X,F) in the problem
(6.1), we can construct a multi-uniform vector U such that the pair (Xn+1, U) is optimal in the
problem (P). Conversely, given an optimal pair (L,U) for the problem (P), then the associated
martingale is optimal in (6.1).
Using the preceding remark and the construction described in the beginning of this section,
we obtain:
Proposition 6.1: P1 has a strategy that guarantees Φn(µ) = Vn(µ) in Γn(µ).
Proof. Being informed of L, P1 can generate a vector (UAk , UBk )k=1,...,n such that the distri-
bution of (L, (UAk , UBk )k=1,...,n) is optimal in the maximization problem defining Φn(µ). Define
the associated martingale (Lk)k=0,...,n+1 as in the previous lemma. Then, at round k, he plays
an optimal strategy in the game Γ1([Lk | Fk−1]) (such a selection exists according to proposition
5.2). As prices posted by the two players at round k are independent of L given Fk, the payoff
for round k given Fk−1 is
E[
∑
i=A,B
LikR(pik, qik) +N(pik, qik) | Fk−1]
P1 guarantees then V1([Lk | Fk−1]) at round k, and the results follows by summation. The strat-
egy induced by this construction is admissible using remark 3.1 and proposition 5.2. Indeed,
by construction, the optimal selection of P1 is such that for all k
E[|pik|] ≤ 3E[|Lik|] ≤ 3E[Lin+1]
and this last bound is independent of k. 
7. The dual game Γ∗n
The results of this section are obtained using the same construction as for the dual game
introduced in [23]. The main difficulty will be that we do not have anymore explicit expressions
for the dual variables and for the optimal strategies of P2 in the dual game.
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Duality results. At first, as a consequence of duality results from optimal transportation
theory, we obtain a dual formulation of Φn(µ). Recall for this the expression of Φn as a
covariance maximization problem over probabilities with fixed marginals.
Φn(µ) = max
{ ∫
〈x, y〉dpi
pi ∈ P(µ,Hn)}
= max
ν∈Hn
max
pi∈P(µ,ν)
∫
〈x, y〉dpi
This problem being a special case of the Monge-Kantorovitch optimal transportation problem,
we will use the following classical duality theorem (see for instance theorem 1.3 in [57]).
Theorem 7.1: (Monge-Kantorovitch) Let (X,µ), (Y, ν) be two polish spaces equipped with some
probability and c : X × Y → R a continuous function verifying:
∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, c(x, y) 6 a(x) + b(y)
for some real-valued u.s.c. functions a,b such that a ∈ L1(µ) and b ∈ L1(ν).
Then the following equality holds:
max
pi∈P(µ,ν)
∫
X×Y
c(x, y)dpi(x, y) = inf
(φ−a,ψ−b)∈Cb(X)×Cb(Y );φ+ψ>c
(
∫
X
φdµ+
∫
Y
ψdν)
where φ + ψ > c means φ(x) + ψ(y) > c(x, y) for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and Cb(X) denotes the set
of real-valued bounded continuous functions on X.
Since (x, y) ∈ R2 × [−n, n]2 , |〈x, y〉| ≤ n(|xA| + |xB|), we can apply theorem 7.1 with
c(x, y) = 〈x, y〉, an(x) = n(|xA|+ |xB|) and b(x) = 0
Φn(µ) = max
ν∈Hn
inf
(φ−an,ψ)∈Cb(R2)×Cb([−n,n]2);φ+ψ>c
(
∫
φdµ+
∫
ψdν)
The map ((φ, ψ), ν)→ ∫ φdµ+ ∫ ψdν is linear with respect to (φ, ψ), and affine with respect to
ν. The set Hn is convex compact, and the set (an+Cb(R2))×Cb([−n, n]2) is convex. Therefore,
the minmax theorem of Sion ([53])
Φn(µ) = inf
(φ−an,ψ)∈Cb(R2)×Cb([−n,n]2);φ+ψ>c
(
∫
φdµ+ max
ν∈Hn
∫
ψdν)
Since all the measures in Hn are concentrated [−n, n]2, we will identify a function ψ ∈
Cb([−n, n]2) with the function defined on R2 which is equal to ψ on [−n, n]2 and to +∞
otherwise. Given a pair (φ − an, ψ) ∈ Cb(R2) × Cb([−n, n]2), we define as usual the convex
conjugates:
∀y ∈ R2, φ∗(y) = sup
x∈R2
〈x, y〉 − φ(x)
∀x ∈ R2, φ∗∗(x) = sup
y∈R2
〈x, y〉 − φ∗(y)
The following claims are straightforward to prove using classical properties of convex conjuga-
tion when φ ∈ an + Cb(R2) (see for instance [51]):
i) φ∗ ≤ ψ, φ∗∗ ≤ φ
ii) φ∗∗ ∈ an + Cb(R2)
iii) For all x, y ∈ R2, φ∗∗(x) + φ∗(y) ≥ 〈x, y〉
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iv) For all α ∈ R, (φ+ α)∗ = φ∗ − α
v) φ∗ is continuous on [−n, n]2
The pair (φ∗∗, φ∗) is therefore an admissible pair in the above minimization problem. The three
first properties allow us to consider only the pairs (φ, φ∗) for convex functions φ in an +Cb(R2).
Moreover, using iv), we can also assume that φ(0) = 0.
Notation 11: D denotes the set of l.s.c. convex functions φ from R2 to R ∪ {+∞} such that
φ(0) = 0.
Given φ ∈ D, since φ(0) = 0, φ∗ is nonnegative, and ∫ φdµ + sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗dν is well defined in
R ∪ {+∞}. We deduce from the preceding discussion:
Φn(µ) = inf
φ∈D∩(an+Cb(R2))
(
∫
φdµ+ sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗dν)
= inf
φ∈D
(
∫
φdµ+ sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗dν)(D)
Definition 7.1: For φ ∈ D, we define:
Θn(φ) = sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗dν.
∂Φn(µ) = {φ ∈ D : Φn(µ) =
∫
φdµ+ Θn(φ)}.
Note that the relation φ ∈ ∂Φn(µ) implies ∫ φdµ < +∞ and Θn(φ) < +∞.
In order to apply this result, we have to prove the existence of minimizers for the dual
problem (D). This is the aim of the next lemma.
Proposition 7.1: For all µ ∈ ∆1(R2), there exists a solution φµ ∈ D to the problem (D), i.e.
such that φµ ∈ ∂Φn(µ). Moreover, if µ has compact support, the solution φµ can be chosen such
that φ∗µ is Lipschitz on R2.
Proof. If φ ∈ D ∩ (an + Cb(R2)), since φ(0) = an(0) = 0 and ‖φ − an‖∞ < ∞, convexity
of φ implies | φ |≤ an. Therefore φ is
√
2n-Lipschitz. Ascoli’s theorem implies then that
D ∩ (an + Cb(R2)) is relatively compact in C(R2) for the topology of uniform convergence on
compact sets. Define H(φ) =
∫
φdµ+ sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗dν for φ ∈ D. Let φk be a minimizing sequence
in D ∩ (an + Cb(R2)), we can extract a subsequence also denoted φk which converges in C(R2)
to a limit φ. D being closed in C(R2), φ ∈ D. Since | φk |≤ an, dominated convergence implies:
lim
k→∞
∫
φkdµ =
∫
φdµ
Let Kl be a nondecreasing sequence of convex compact sets such that
⋃
l∈NKl = R2, and ξKl the
function equal to 0 on Kl and +∞ otherwise. For any function f , we define f ∗l = (f + ξKl)∗,
so that the sequence f ∗l is nondecreasing and converges pointwise to f ∗. Using that Fenchel
transform is an isometry for the uniform norm, l being fixed, φ∗lk converges uniformly to φ∗l
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when k goes to +∞. We obtain that for ν ∈ Hn:∫
φ∗ldν = lim
k→∞
∫
φ∗lk dν ≤ liminf
k→∞
∫
φ∗kdν
≤ liminf
k→∞
sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗kdν
Monotone convergence implies lim
l→∞
∫
φ∗ldν =
∫
φ∗dν, then:
sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗dν ≤ liminf
k→∞
sup
ν∈Hn
∫
φ∗kdν
Finally H(φ) ≤ liminfkH(φk) = limkH(φk) and limkΘn(φ∗k) = Θn(φ∗).
Note that if φ ∈ D is optimal, and µ is supported by a convex compact set K, then φ + ξK
belongs to D and is itself optimal. Moreover (φ+ ξK)∗ is Lipschitz on R2. 
The dual game Γ∗n(φ). This auxiliary game depends on some function φ ∈ D. At the
beginning of the game, Player 1 chooses privately the liquidation value L of the assets and then
the game follows as Gn. After the n rounds of transaction, P1 has to pay a penalty of φ(L) to
P2. The function φ is known by the players.
A behavioral strategy for player 1 is then a pair (µ, σ) with µ ∈ ∆1(R2) and σ ∈ Σn(µ).
For player 2 strategies are the same as in Γn. The payoff function of P1 is
g∗n(φ, (µ, σ), τ) = gn(µ, σ, τ)− Eµ[φ(L)]
Since the payoff is not always well defined, we set
g∗n(φ, (µ, σ), τ) = −∞ if Eµ[φ(L)] = +∞.
Next proposition shows how the dual game is related to optimal behavior of P2 in the game
Γn.
Proposition 7.2: If φ ∈ ∂Φn(µ0) and if P2 has a strategy τ ∗ which guarantees Θn(φ) in the
game Γ∗n(φ), then τ ∗ guarantees Φn(µ0) in the game Γn(µ0).
Proof. τ ∗ guarantees Θn(φ) means:
∀µ ∈ ∆1(R2), σ ∈ Σn(µ), g∗n(φ, (µ, σ), τ ∗) ≤ Θn(φ)
Then
∀σ ∈ Σn(µ0), gn(µ0, σ, τ ∗)− 〈φ, µ0〉 ≤ Θn(φ)
and finally gn(µ0, σ, τ ∗) ≤ 〈φ, µ0〉+ Θn(φ)
= Φn(µ0)

Using the preceding results, in order to obtain an optimal strategy for P2 in the initial game
Γn(µ), we have to show that there exists some strategy for P2 in Γ∗n(φ) which guarantees Θn(φ)
for some φ ∈ ∂Φn(µ). We have the following result under an additional assumption on φ.
Proposition 7.3: If φ ∈ D is such that φ∗ is Lipschitz continuous on [−n, n]2, then P2 has a
strategy which guarantees Θn(φ) in Γ∗n(φ).
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We deduce then
Theorem 7.2: For all µ ∈ ∆1(R2), the game Γn(µ) has a value
Vn(µ) = Φn(µ).
and if µ has compact support, then P2 has an optimal strategy.
Proof. Using proposition 7.1, if µ has compact support, there exists φ ∈ ∂Φn(µ) such that
φ∗ is Lipschitz on R2 and the existence of a strategy for P2 guaranteeing Φn(µ) in Γn(µ) follows
from propositions 7.2 and 7.3. In the general case (µ ∈ ∆1(R2)), we obtain only ε-optimal
strategies using the same method. Precisely, given an ε-optimal function φ ∈ an + Cb(R2) in
the minimization problem (D) for µ, there exists a strategy that guarantees Θn(φ) in the dual
game Γ∗n(φ), and the same proof as in lemma 7.2 shows that this strategy guarantees Φn(µ) + ε
in Γn(µ). 
The proof of proposition 7.3 is based on the recursive structure of the dual game which is
expressed by the following recurrence formula.
Proposition 7.4: For all φ ∈ D
Θn(φ) = Θn−1(Λ(φ∗)∗) = Λn(φ∗)
where the operator Λ is defined from the set of l.s.c. convex functions from R2 to R∪{+∞} to
itself by
Λ(ψ)(z) = sup
ν∈H1
∫
ψ(z + w)dν(w).
Proof. The proof follows the standard method to prove dynamic programming equations.
We only prove the first equality since the second follows by induction. Note at first that for any
multi-uniform vector (Uk)k=1,..,n, the marginal law of (U1, .., Un−1) is in Hn−1 and the conditional
law of Un given (U1, .., Un−1) is a random variable with values in H1. Therefore
E[φ∗(
n∑
k=1
Uk)] ≤ E[Λ(φ∗)(
n−1∑
k=1
Uk)] ≤ Θn−1(Λ(φ∗)∗)
This implies the first inequality by taking the supremum over Hn−1 on the left-hand side. For
the reverse inequality, the mapping
(ν, x) ∈ H1 × R2 →
∫
φ∗(x+ w)dν(w) ∈ R ∪ {+∞}
being lower semi-continuous, there exists (see theorem 2.2 in the appendix) a ε-optimal mea-
surable selection νε from R2 to H1 such that∫
φ∗(x+ w)dνε(x)(w) ≥
{
Λ(φ∗)(x)− ε if Λ(φ∗)(x) < +∞
1
ε
if Λ(φ∗)(x) = +∞
Given any multi-uniform vector, (Uk)k=1,..,n−1, one can define a random variable Un ∈ R2 such
that the conditional law of Un given (Uk)k=1,..,n−1 is νε(
∑n−1
k=1 Uk). This construction induces
Λ(φ∗)(
n−1∑
k=1
Uk) ≤ E[φ∗(
n∑
k=1
Uk) | U1, .., Un−1] + ε
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on the set on which Λ(φ∗)(∑n−1k=1 Uk) < +∞. The inequality is preserved by expectation if
this set has always probability zero, the results follows then by sending ε to zero. If not, the
left-hand side is equal to +∞ and the right-hand side converges to +∞ as ε goes to zero, which
concludes the proof. 
In order to use the strategies of P2 constructed in the one-asset model, we need the following
selection lemma, which allows to reduce our problem to two separate one-dimensional problems.
Lemma 7.1: Let ψ be a Lipschitz convex function defined on R2, there exists a pair (r, t) of
measurable functions from R2 × [−1, 1] to R such that:
– u→ r(x, y, u) and v → t(x, y, v) are convex and continuous on [−1, 1].
– r(x, y, u) + t(x, y, v) ≥ ψ(x+ u, y + v) ∀(x, y) ∈ R2, (u, v) ∈ [−1, 1]2.
– Λ(ψ)(x, y) =
∫ 1
−1 r(x, y, u)du2 +
∫ 1
−1 t(x, y, v)dv2 .
Moreover Λ(ψ) is Lipschitz continuous.
Proof. Theorem 7.1 with c(u, v) = ψ(x+ u, y + v) implies:
Λ(ψ)(x, y) = inf
r,t∈Cb([−1,1]), r(u)+t(v)≥ψ(x+u,y+v)
{∫ 1
−1
r(u)du2 +
∫ 1
−1
t(v)dv2
}
The pair (x, y) being fixed, define rψ1x,y(v) = sup
u∈[−1,1]
ψ(x + u, y + v) − r(u). Then (the proof
being similar to the one for Fenchel transform)
i) rψ1x,y is convex and continuous.
ii) rψ1x,y ≤ t
iii) ∀u, v r(u) + rψ1x,y(v) ≥ ψ(x+ u, y + v)
iv) For r1, r2 ∈ Cb([−1, 1]), ‖rψ
1
x,y
1 − rψ
1
x,y
2 ‖∞ ≤ ‖r1 − r2‖∞
Similar properties hold for tψ2x,y(u) = sup
v∈[−1,1]
ψ(x+ u, y + v)− t(v). Let Cψ denote the lipschit-
coefficient of ψ. For v1, v2 ∈ [−1, 1] and r ∈ Cb([−1, 1]), there exists u1, u2 ∈ [−1, 1] such that
for i = 1, 2
rψ
1
x,y(vi) = sup
u∈[−1,1]
ψ(x+ u, y + vi)− r(u) = ψ(x+ ui, y + vi)− r(ui)
Therefore
| rψ1x,y(v1)− rψ1x,y(v2) |≤ max
i=1,2
| ψ(x+ ui, y + v2)− ψ(x+ ui, y + v1) |≤ Cψ | v2 − v1 |
The set {rψ1x,y | r ∈ Cb([−1, 1])} is thus uniformly equi-continuous. Due to properties i), ii), iii)
above, any pair (r, t) can be replaced by ((rψ1x,y)ψ2x,y , rψ1x,y). Using that (r + α)ψ1x,y = rψ1x,y − α ,
we can moreover assume that inf[−1,1] r = 0. Finally
Λ(ψ)(x, y) = inf
r∈B
{∫ 1
−1
r(u)du2 +
∫ 1
−1
rψ
1
x,y(v)dv2
}
where B is the set of Cψ-Lipschitz convex functions r defined on [−1, 1] , such that inf[−1,1] r = 0.
B is closed in C([−1, 1], [0, 2Cψ]) endowed with the topology of uniform convergence, and using
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Ascoli’s theorem, relatively compact. On the other hand, if follows from uniform continuity of
ψ and property iv) that the map:
(x, y, r)→
∫ 1
−1
r(u)du2 +
∫ 1
−1
rψ
1
x,y(v)dv2
is continuous. Therefore there exists (see theorem 2.1 in the appendix) a measurable selection
f of the multivalued mapping:
F (x, y) = argmin
r∈B
{∫ 1
−1
r(u)du2 +
∫ 1
−1
rψ
1
x,y(v)dv2
}
An optimal pair is then (r, rψ) with:
r(x, y, u) = f(x, y)(u) rψ(x, y, v) = f(x, y)ψ1x,y(v)
The last point is obvious. 
Proof of proposition 7.3. We proceed by induction. Suppose that that for all Lipschitz
convex function φ∗, P2 has a strategy τ ∗(z) depending (in a measurable way) on z ∈ R2 which
guarantees Λn−1(φ∗(z + .)) in Γ∗n−1(φ(.)− 〈z, .〉).
For a parameter z0 = (x0, y0) ∈ R2 consider the game Γ∗n(φ(.) − 〈z0, .〉). Let τ(z0) be
a strategy of P2 such that τ1(z0) is given by q1(z0) = (gA(z0, U), gB(z0, V )) where U and V
are independent uniform random variables on [0, 1] and for i = A,B, gi(z0, .) are real-valued
nondecreasing right-continuous functions defined on (0, 1), jointly measurable on R2 × (0, 1).
Let z1 = (x1, y1) be given by
x1 =
∫ 1
0
(1IpA1 >gA(z0,u) − 1IgA(z0,u)>pA1 )du, y1 =
∫ 1
0
(1IpB1 >gB(z0,u) − 1IgB(z0,u)>pB1 )du
z1 ∈ [−1, 1]2 is a measurable function of (p1, z0). If P2 plays after τ1(z0) the strategy τ ∗(z0 +z1)
for the remaining rounds we deduce that
g∗n(φ(.)− 〈z0, .〉, µ, σ, τ) ≤ sup
p1
Λn−1(φ∗(z0 + z1 + .))
+
∑
i=A,B
∫ 1
0
(1Igi(z0,u)>pi1g
i(z0, u)− 1Ipi1>gi(z0,u)pi1)du

To prove this inequality, just write the conditional expected payoff given p1 and note that it is
exactly the sum of a payoff in the game Γ∗n−1(φ(.)−〈z0 + z1, .〉) where P2 is playing τ ∗(z0 + z1)
and the second term written above. The expectation with respect to p1 is then bounded by the
supremum over p1. Consider next the Lipschitz convex function
z → χ(z) = Λn−1(φ∗(z + .))
Using lemma 7.1, there exists a pair of functions (rn, tn) such that:
χ(x+ u, y + v) ≤ rn(x, y, u) + tn(x, y, v) ∀(x, y) ∈ R2, (u, v) ∈ [−1, 1]2
(7.1) Λ(χ)(x, y) =
∫ 1
−1
rn(x, y, u)
du
2 +
∫ 1
−1
tn(x, y, v)
dv
2
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Applying this inequality with our previous result, we find
g∗n(φ(.)− 〈z0, .〉, µ, σ, τ) ≤ sup
p1
rn(x0, y0, x1) + tn(x0, y0, y1)
+
∑
i=A,B
∫ 1
0
(1Igi(z0,u)>pi1g
i(z0, u)− 1Ipi1>gi(z0,u)pi1)du

Define :
gA(x, y, u) = 1
u2
∫ u
0
2sr′n(x, y, 2s− 1)ds , gB(x, y, v) =
1
v2
∫ v
0
2st′n(x, y, 2s− 1)ds
Proposition 4.5 and (7.1) imply
g∗n(φ(.)− 〈z0, .〉, µ, σ, τ) ≤ Λn(φ∗(z0 + .)
which was exactly the desired result. 
8. From discrete to continuous time
As mentioned in section 2, the notion of price dynamics in continuous-time arising from the
general class of exchange games defined in [25] is the result of a limit operation. To obtain
such results in our context, the idea is to consider a sequence of games Γn(µ) as a discrete-time
sequence approximating an heuristic continuous-time exchange game, assuming that round k
occurs at time t = k
n
with t = 0 the date when P1 receives the message and t = 1 the date of
public information disclosure. Since any equilibrium price martingale in Γn(µ) is a maximizer
in the formulation of Vn as an optimization problem over martingales in Mn(µ), our strategy
in order to obtain a limit for a sequence of equilibrium price martingales is to study first
the asymptotic behavior of Vn. We present here without proofs the main ideas leading to an
asymptotic expansion for Vn. Precisely, the sequence of value functions Vn divided by
√
n
converge to a limit V∞ that can be expressed as the value of an optimization problem over
continuous-time martingales. This result will allow us to prove some result on the convergence
of sequences of maximizers for Vn (discrete-time martingales) to maximizers for V∞.
This result being quite technical, the following presentation with our particular case of
exchange mechanism is given in order to illustrate heuristically the general ideas of the general
proof given in chapter 2.
Let us start with the probabilistic representation of vn, which is the value function of the
one-asset game Gn, obtained using the same proof as for proposition 5.2.
vn(µA) = max
LA∼µA, (UA
k
)k=0,..,n iid sequence of U[−1,1]
E[LA
n∑
k=1
UAk ]
The asymptotic behavior of vn is not difficult to guess since it involves a sum of independent,
identically distributed uniform random variables. The variance of these variables being ρ2 =
var(U[−1,1]) = 13 , and dividing vn(µA) by ρ
√
n, we obtain
1
ρ
√
n
vn(µA) = max
LA∼µA, (UA
k
)k=0,..,n iid sequence of U[−1,1]
E[LA
∑n
k=1 U
A
k
ρ
√
n
]
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Hence, using the central limit theorem
1
ρ
√
n
vn(µA) −→
n→∞ α(µ
A) = max
LA∼µA,N∼N (0,1)
E[LAN ]
with N (0, 1) the standard gaussian distribution. However, since we are interested in the as-
ymptotic behavior of maximizers of (6.1), we need to have a more precise result. Let (Xn,Fn)
be a sequence of maximizers for (6.1). We can assume that (see remark 6.1) these maximizers
in our case are given by
– An optimal solution (LA,n,∑nk=1 UA,nk ) for the problem vn(µA)
– Xnk = E[LA,n | Fnk ] with Fnk = σ(UA,n1 , .., UA,nk ) for k = 1, .., n
and Fnn+1 = σ(Fnn , LA)
The price martingale Xn is obtained by projection (conditional expectation) of LA,n on the
filtration generated by (UA,nk ). In order to obtain a continuous-time limit for this operation, we
introduce the continuous-time processes
SA,nt =
1
ρ
√
n
bntc∑
k=1
UA,nk for t ∈ [0, 1].
Using a central limit theorem for martingales, the pair (LA,n, (SA,nt )t∈[0,1]) converges in distri-
bution to (fµA(B1), (Bt)t∈[0,1]) where B is a Brownian motion. However, this is not sufficient
to prove that the projection property is conserved, in the sense that the continuous versions of
the equilibrium price martingales Xn converge in distribution to the martingale obtained by
projection in the limit
LAt = E[fµA(B1) | (Bs, s ≤ t)]
To prove this, the technique used in [25] is a functional central limit theorem obtained by
embedding of the process SA,nt in a Brownian filtration. The main difference there from classical
limit theorems (see e.g. Kallenberg [38] chapter 12) is that both processes SA,n and Xn are
embedded and this allows to deduce the asymptotic behavior of Xn from that of SA,n.
Let us try now to adapt this procedure in the two-assets game Γn. Dividing the probabilistic
representation of Vn given in proposition 6.1 by ρ
√
n, we obtain :
1
ρ
√
n
Vn(µ) = maxE[〈L,
∑n
k=1 Uk
ρ
√
n
〉]
= maxE[LA
∑n
k=1 U
A
k
ρ
√
n
+ LB
∑n
k=1 U
B
k
ρ
√
n
]
Since the distribution of Uk given the preceding variables is not fixed but only assumed to
belong to the set H1, a characterization of the limit distribution of the sequence
1
ρ
√
n
(
n∑
k=1
UA,nk ,
n∑
k=1
UB,nk )
using some central limit result will depend on the (random) sequence of covariance matrices :(
1 cnk
cnk 1
)
with cnk =
1
ρ
E[UA,nk U
B,n
k | Un1 , .., Unk−1] ∈ [−1, 1]
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Without any additional properties of the sequence cnk in this formulation, we have to consider a
family of possible limit distributions rather than a precise one, allowing for any continuous-time
instantaneous covariance process ct in the limit. Precisely, define the bivariate continuous-time
process as above :
Snt =
1
ρ
√
n
(
bntc∑
k=1
UAk ,
bntc∑
k=1
UBk )
Each sequence of coordinate processes converges in distribution to a Brownian motion. Any
limiting distribution for the sequence of bivariate processes is a bi-Brownian process in the
following sense: a bivariate continuous-time martingale with natural filtration F such that
both univariate coordinate processes are Brownian motions relative to F . Precisely
Definition 8.1: For ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ C([0, 1],R2), let (Xt(ω), Yt(ω)) = (ω1(t), ω2(t)) and Ft =
σ(Xs, Ys, s ≤ t).
Q is the set of probabilities ν on C([0, 1],R2) such that:
1) Xt is an (ν,Ft) Brownian motion.
2) Yt is an (ν,Ft) Brownian motion.
Q is the set of processes’ distributions such that the two coordinate processes are Brownian
motions with respect to the filtration Ft.
The preceding discussion is made rigorous in chapter 2 and we deduce
Theorem 8.1:
∀µ ∈ ∆2(R2), 1
ρ
√
n
Vn(µ) −→
n→∞ V∞(µ)
with
V∞(µ) = sup
{
E[LAX1 + LBY1]
 L ∼ µ, [X, Y ] ∈ Q} .
Proof. See theorem 11.2 and corollary 3 and remark 11.2 in chapter 2. 
The second part of the results concerning the asymptotic behavior of the price processes
will be derived in the monotonic case in the next section from this probabilistic representation
and in some non-monotonic cases from the dual representation of the above problem exposed
in the next sections.
Before proving these convergence results, let us prove that if we define the price processes
as the sequences of prices posted by P1, then the asymptotic behavior of these processes when
n goes to infinity will be the same as for the abstract notion of price we have defined.
Proposition 8.1: Suppose that both players play an optimal strategy in Γn(µ), that P1’s strat-
egy is constructed using proposition 5.2 and that the sequence of continuous versions of the a
posteriori martingales (L(n)k ,F (n)k )k=0,..n+1 converge in distribution to some process with contin-
uous trajectories Π. Then the sequence continuous versions of posted price process defined by
p˜n0 = E(L) and for t ∈ [0, 1]
p˜nt = (p
A,n
bntc, p
B,n
bntc)
converge in finite-dimensional distributions to the same limit Π.
Proof. Convergence in distribution has to be understood as weak convergence in the space
of probability on D([0, 1],R2), the space of rcll (right-continuous with left-hand limits) functions
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endowed with the Skorokhod topology. Since the sequence Πn converge in distribution to a limit
Π having continuous trajectory, we can assume using Skorokhod’s representation theorem that
the processes Πn and Π are defined on the same probability space and that the trajectories
converge almost surely in uniform norm:
sup
t∈[0,1]
‖Πnt − Πt‖ −→n→∞0 a.s.
The variables (Πnt ,Πt, n ∈ N, t ∈ [0, 1]) being uniformly integrable, we deduce for all t > 0 the
following L1 convergences :
E[‖Πnt − Πt‖]−→n→∞0 , E[
∥∥∥Πnt − Πnt− 1
n
∥∥∥]−→
n→∞0
From the construction of P1 optimal strategies and the last assertion in lemma 4.4, we have
for all n,k = 1, .., n and i = A,B 3
E[|Li,nk − pi,nk |] ≤ E[|Li,nk − Li,nk−1|]
Therefore, for all t
E[‖p˜nt − Πt‖] ≤ E[‖Πnt − Πt‖] + E[‖Πnt − p˜nt ‖]
≤ E[‖Πnt − Πt‖] + E[
∥∥∥Πnt − Πnt− 1
n
∥∥∥]−→
n→∞0
and this implies the convergence in finite-dimensional distributions of p˜n to Π. 
9. A Monotonic derivative
We focus in this section on the first question addressed in the introduction concerning
the robustness of the one asset model against the introduction of a derivative, namely how
the introduction of the asset B affects the price dynamics of A. To answer, we compare the
dynamics obtained in the one-asset model for A to the dynamics obtained for A,B in our
model, when in the two models, A has the same marginal distribution. As mentioned in the
introduction, if the two assets we consider are linked, actions taken by the informed agent
Player 1 on market B are relevant for the uninformed agent to trade on market A. Therefore,
in general, the value of the two-assets game is less than the sum of the two corresponding one-
asset games, Player 2 having more information in the two-assets game. The price dynamic will
be said to be robust against the introduction of a derivative B if the asymptotic behavior of the
price processes for the asset A is the same in the two models. If we assume that this derivative
is monotonic, which in our context means that µ is such that LB is a monotonic function of LA
with probability 1, then we will prove that the price dynamic is robust. A typical example is
when B is an european put or call option on A.
Actually, we can solve explicitly the optimization problems Vn and V∞ in this case. The
proof relies on the notion of comonotonicity and its relation with the one-dimensional Monge-
Kantorovitch problem already discussed in lemma 4.2.
3. Using the construction of the optimal selection in proposition 5.2, we can assume that the variable pi,nk
are defined on the same probability space up to an enlargement.
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At first, note that for any probability µ, the following inequality holds
Vn(µ) ≤ vn(µA) + vn(µB)
since relaxing the constraint L ∼ µ (in the formulation defining Φn) into the pair of constraints
LA ∼ µA and LB ∼ µB transforms the left-hand side into the right-hand side.
In order to obtain an equality one must construct a vector (L, S) ∈ R2 × R2 such that
each pair (Li, Si) is comonotonic for i = A,B and fulfilling the marginal constraints L ∼ µ
and [S] ∈ Hn. This is in general not possible, but if µ is such that LB = g(LA) for some
nondecreasing function g, then the pair LA, LB is itself comonotonic. This notion is transitive,
we can construct a comonotonic pair (LA, SA) with the prescribed distribution and define LB =
g(LA) so that L ∼ µ. By composition of nondecreasing functions, (LB, SA) is comonotonic, and
[SA, SA] ∈ Hn. The above inequality is therefore an equality and the optimal solution depends
only on one variable SA
(9.1) Vn(µ) = vn(µA) + vn(µB)
The main result in this section is then theorem 9.2, which implies that the asymptotic
distribution of the equilibrium price process of the asset A in not affected by the introduction
of a monotonic derivative in the game.
We assume that µ ∈ ∆2(R2) is such that LB = g(LA) µ-a.s. for some nondecreasing function
g. First recall the results obtained in [25]:
Theorem 9.1:
∀µA ∈ ∆2(R), 1
ρ
√
n
vn(µA)−→
n→∞ρα(µ
A)
with α(µA) = sup
pi∈P(µA,N (0,1))
∫
xydpi(x, y) = E[fµA(N)N ] for some r.v. N ∼ N (0, 1).
Proof. See [25]. 
With the notations of the previous section, we have:
V∞(µ) = sup
{
E[LAX1 + LBY1]
 L ∼ µ, [X, Y ] ∈ Q}
Since X1 and Y1 are standard gaussian r.v. and L ∼ µ, we deduce from the definition of α that:
V∞(µ) ≤ α(µA) + α(µB)
Given a Brownian motion X, we define LA = fµA(X1) so that LB = g(fµA(X1)) is a non-
decreasing function of X1. This implies g ◦ fµA = fµB and the process (X,X) is an optimal
bi-Brownian process since
E[LAX1 + LBX1] = E[fµA(X1)X1 + fµB(X1)X1] = α(µA) + α(µB)
and we recover finally the following inequality, which could be deduced from (9.1), and theorems
9.1 and 8.1 by sending n to infinity.
(9.2) V∞(µ) = α(µA) + α(µB).
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Suppose that both players play an optimal strategy in Γn(µ). Then the price martingale
(Lnk ,Fnk )k=0,..n+1 must solve the problem (6.1):
E[
n∑
k=1
V1([Lnk | Fnk−1])] = Vn(µ)
Let B be a standard Brownian motion defined on (Ω,A,P) and let (Gt)t≥0 denotes its natural
filtration. Consider next the bivariate process Πµ = (ΠµA ,ΠµB) defined as in the introduction
by:
Πµ
A
t = E[fµA(B1) | Gt] , Πµ
B
t = E[fµB(B1) | Gt]
This process is actually the unique comonotonic martingale coupling of the CMMV martingales
of final distribution µA and µB.
Theorem 9.2: If both players play an optimal strategy in Γn(µ), then the continuous versions
of the price martingales (L(n)k ,F (n)k )k=0,..n+1 converge in distribution to the process Πµ.
Proof. Using theorem 1.2 in chapter 2, we know that the sequence of laws of the continuous-
time versions of the martingales (L(n)k ,F (n)k )k=0,..n+1 is relatively compact for the Meyer-Zheng
topology. Moreover, any limit belongs to the set P∞(µ) that we define now. At first, we have
V∞(µ) = max
[(Lt,Zt)t∈[0,1]]∈M(µ,Q)
E[〈L1, Z1〉]
where M( µ,Q) is the set of martingales distributions of processes (Lt, Zt)t∈[0,1] in
∆(D([0, 1],R4)) (with D the set of ca´dla´g functions ) such that [L1]  µ and [(Zt)t∈[0,1]] ∈ Q
(using the identification of the continuous functions as a subset of D). The set of image prob-
abilities by the projection on the first coordinate (Lt)t∈[0,1] of the set of maximizers will be
denoted P∞(µ). This set is simply the generalization of the law of the martingale LAt obtained
by projection on the Brownian filtration in the unidimensional case. Using the previous discus-
sion, if a martingale (Lt, Zt)t∈[0,1] is optimal in the previous problem, then necessarily, we have
LA1 = fµA(ZA1 ) and LB1 = fµB(ZA1 ). By definition, the process (Lt, Zt)t∈[0,1] is a martingale with
respect to the filtration it generates Ft = σ(Ls, Zs, s ≤ t). But ZA is a Brownian motion and
a Ft-martingale and therefore an Ft-Brownian motion (see 3.3.16 in [39]). It follows that
LAt = E[LA1 | Ft] = E[fµA(ZA1 ) | Ft] = E[fµA(ZA1 ) | (Zs, s ≤ t)]
As the same computation holds for LB, this shows that (Lt)t∈[0,1] has a continuous version
which follows the law of the martingale Πµ. Since (Lt)t∈[0,1] is a ca´dla´g martingale, its law
is therefore equal to the law of Πµ. In order to conclude the proof, the convergence in law
of a sequence of uniformly integrable martingales to a martingale with continuous trajectories
for the Meyer-Zheng topology implies the convergence for the Skorokhod topology as shown
in [48] (the exact uniform integrability required to apply this result is a direct consequence
of Doob’s inequality and the fact that our martingales have uniformly bounded second order
moments). 
Remark 9.1: All this discussion can be easily adapted to the anti-monotonic case by replacing
(X,X) by (X,−X) in the proof of (9.2). Theorem 9.2 holds with (fµA(B1), fµB(−B1)) instead
of (fµA(B1), fµB(B1)).
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10. The dual problem and a non-monotonic example.
A general dual formulation of V∞ as a stochastic control problem is given in chapter 2.
We will solve this problem in a very particular case, corresponding the case of non-monotonic
derivative, providing an explicit example of price dynamics which differs from the class CMMV.
The dual Problem. Recall the asymptotic problem obtained in section 1.2 written in
integral form
V∞(µ) = max
ν∈Q1
max
pi∈P(µ,ν)
∫
〈u, v〉dpi(u, v)
Applying theorem 7.1 c(x, y) = 〈x, y〉 and the minmax theorem, the following result is
proposition 7.1 in chapter 2
Proposition 10.1:
(10.1) V∞(µ) = min
φ
(Eµ[φ(L)] + max
ν∈Q(1)
Eν [φ∗(X1, Y1)])
where the minimum is taken and exists in the set of proper l.s.c. convex functions from R2 to
R ∪ {+∞}.
The dual problem is then defined by
V ∗∞(φ) = max
ν∈Q(1)
Eν [φ∗(X1, Y1)]
V ∗∞(φ) is associated to a stochastic control problem and the value function of this problem
starting from a point (x, y) at time t is by definition:
u(x, y, t) = sup
P∈Q
EP[φ∗(x+X1−t, y + Y1−t)]
This function is the unique (continuous) viscosity solution of the HJB equation (proposition
8.1 in chapter 2)
(10.2)
−ut =
1
2∆u+ | uxy | for (x, y, t) ∈ R2 × [0, 1)
u(x, y, 1) = ψ∗(x, y) for (x, y) ∈ R2
for all function φ∗ in the class of functions C with the following restriction on growth:
u ∈ C⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ (0, 1), ∃M,ρ > 0, ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, 1]× R2, |u(s, x)| ≤Meρ|x|2
The next result summarizes the relation between the solutions of the primal and dual
problems.
Lemma 10.1: In the following, µ denotes the law of the variable L in ∆2(R2) and Z = (X, Y )
is a process whose law is in Q, both defined on the same probability space. The two following
assertions are equivalent
i)L ∈ ∂φ∗(Z1) almost surely, and E[φ∗(Z1)] = sup
ν∈Q(1)
〈ν, φ∗〉
ii) The joint distribution of (L,Z) is optimal for V∞(µ)
and φ is optimal in the dual formulation (10.1).
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The HJB equation associated to this problem is degenerate, and general existence theorems
for a classic C2,1-solution to HJB equations do not apply since they rely on a strict ellipticity
condition. However, in the following example we can provide a C2,1 solution to the equation
(10.2).
A basic non-monotonic derivative : The three points case. We apply now the
preceding results to the family of distributions C concentrated on the three points
I = (−1, 1); J = (0, 0);K = (1, 1)
Note that if L ∼ µ ∈ C, we have LB =| LA |, and B is then a non monotonic derivative on A.
According to lemma 10.1, in order to obtain a solution to V (µ) for µ ∈ C, we focus on
the family of convex function φ such that ∇φ∗ is valued in {I, J,K} (at least almost surely for
the optimal distribution of the problem V ∗(φ)). We consider the family γ∗(x + ., y + .) , for
(x, y) ∈ R2 with γ∗(u, v) = (v + |u|)+. Up to a translation, the value function associated to
these functions is always :
u(x, y, t) = max
P∈Q
E[γ∗(x+X1−t, y + Y1−t)]
Using the scaling property of Brownian motion (processes (Xt) and (1cXc2t) have same law)
and the positive homogeneity of γ∗, we deduce
u(x, y, t) =
√
1− t u( x√1−t , y√1−t , 0)
With z = (x, y) and G(z) = u(z, 0), this leads to the equation:
(10.3) G(z) = 〈∇G(z), z〉+ ∆G(z) + 2 | Gxy(z) |
An explicit solution. Using an heuristic argument, we construct now an explicit solution
to the above problem.
The function γ∗ is convex and linear outside the set
Z = {y = − | x |} ∪ {y ≥ 0, x = 0}.
Intuitively, in order to maximize the above expectation, the process we control has to pass
through Z a “maximal number of times”. Using the heuristic approach explained in section 8,
at time t, we have to choose ct, that is to choose on which of the two diagonals in the plan we
want to direct (X, Y ) starting from (Xt, Yt). A reasonable choice is the diagonal that minimizes
the distance to Z, and this leads to ct = sgn(Xt).
The process defined by: {
dXt = dBt, X0 = x
dYt = sgn(Xt)dBt, Y0 = y
where B is a standard Brownian motion seems to be a good candidate.
The law of the process we just defined is well-known and related to the local time of Brownian
motion. We can therefore check by a direct computation (reproduced in section 12) that the
function
G(x, y) = E[γ∗(X1, Y1)]
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is a C2 solution of the equation (10.3). If we define
u(x, y, t) =
√
1− t G( x√1−t , y√1−t)
then u is the unique solution of (10.2) and c(x, y) = sgn(x) is an optimal markovian control in
the sense that
ut(x, y, t) = 12∆u(x, y, t)− c(x, y)uxy(x, y, t) = 12∆u− | uxy |
We deduce from theorem 1.3 that (X, Y ) is the unique maximizer (in law) of the problem
max
P∈Q
E[γ∗(x+X1, y + Y1)]
Indeed, any maximizer (X˜, Y˜ ) should be such that
d
dt
(〈X˜, Y˜ 〉t) = sgn(X˜t) dt⊗ dP a.s.
since E[
∫ 1
0 1IX˜s=0ds] = 0. Since
〈
∫ .
0
sgn(X˜s)dX˜s, Y˜ 〉t = t
we deduce that
Y˜t =
∫ t
0
sgn(X˜s)dX˜s
which determines the law of law (X˜, Y˜ ).
For (x, y), the distribution of (X1, Y1) = (x + B1, y +
∫ 1
0 sgn(x + Bs)dBs) gives probability
zero to the set Z where γ∗ is not linear. Then the random variable L = ∇γ∗(X1, Y1) is well
defined and its distribution µ belongs to C. Moreover, we have by a direct computation
Eµ[L] = E[∇γ∗(X1, Y1)] = (∂u
∂x
(x, y, 0), ∂u
∂y
(x, y, 0))
We can check that (∂u
∂x
(x, y, 0), ∂u
∂y
(x, y, 0)) is bijective from R2 to the interior of the triangle
IJK. Denoting int(C) the relative interior of C, we conclude
Proposition 10.2: ∀µ ∈ int(C), ∃(x, y) ∈ R2 such that :
L := ∇γ∗(x+B1, y +
∫ 1
0
sgn(x+Bs)dBs) ∼ µ
V (µ) = E[LAB1 + LB
∫ 1
0
sgn(x+Bs)dBs]
where (x, y) is the unique solution of
(∂u
∂x
(x, y, 0), ∂u
∂y
(x, y, 0)) = Eµ[L]
Existence of a smooth solution implies actually a much stronger result.
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Theorem 10.1: For all µ ∈ int(C), any sequence of continuous-time versions of martingales in
Mn(µ), asymptotically optimal for the problem (6.1) converges in distribution to the continuous
bivariate martingale
LAt = E[∇xγ∗(X1, Y1) | Gt] =
∂u
∂x
(Xt, Yt, t)
LBt = E[∇yγ∗(X1, Y1) | Gt] =
∂u
∂y
(Xt, Yt, t)
This applies in particular for any sequence of optimal price processes in Γn(µ).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the set P∞(µ) is reduced to a single point, which is
the law of the martingale (Lt)t∈[0,1] defined in the theorem. This follows from the preceding
discussion and theorem 10.1 in chapter 2 which implies that any optimal martingale L̂ must
verify the following equalities for i = A,B and t ∈ [0, 1]
Lit =
∂u
∂x
(Xt, Yt, t)

We deduce from this result that V (µ) < α(µA)+α(µB) for µ ∈ int(C), otherwise we should
have the same equalities as in section between LA1 and X1. This means that the asymptotic
behavior of the value of the game has been modified by the introduction of this particular non
monotonic derivative.
Non-uniqueness. We end this section with a simple negative result. Consider the gaussian
bivariate distribution µ = N (0, Id). If L ∼ µ, then the two assets are independent and our
game is separable, in the sense that it can be reduced to a pair of one-asset games played
in parallel. However, the problem V (µ) has an infinity of maximizers. The most intuitive
is to consider a bi-dimensional Brownian process (X, Y ) and L = (X1, Y1). But, we can
construct a bi-Brownian process (X, Y ) having the same terminal distribution. Consider a
Brownian motion X and define Yt =
∫ t
0 csdBs with cs the deterministic function equal to
1 on [0, 1/2] and to −1 on (1/2, 1]. We have Y1 = X 1
2
− (X1 − X 1
2
) and this implies clearly
(X1, Y1) ∼ µ using the characterization of X as gaussian process. Using the stability of gaussian
random variables, any deterministic measurable function cs with values in {−1, 1} and such
that
∫ 1
0 csds = 0 leads to the same result. We have therefore an infinity of possible price
dynamics. The same construction holds for any bivariate gaussian distribution with some
correlation coefficient r ∈ (−1, 1) replacing the condition on cs by ∫ 10 csds = r. This example
shows that the uniqueness of maximizers for the problem V fails in general.
11. Some Extensions
All the asymptotic results can be generalized in a large class of games as in [25] using the
results obtained in chapter 1.
Games in this class will still be denoted by Γn(µ) since they differ only from the game we
have studied in the earlier sections by the exchange mechanism T . It is no more possible to
prove existence of the value or of optimal strategies without specifying T . We will therefore
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make similar hypotheses on the trading mechanism as in [25]. In order to avoid technical
difficulties, let us assume that T is bounded. (see [25] for possible extensions). We assume
H1,H4 and H5 on ∆2(R) as in section 2, and the following two hypotheses
H1’) Existence of a value: For all n, for all µ ∈ ∆2(R2), Γn(µ) has a value Vn(µ) and both
players have optimal strategies.
H3’) Symmetry and Invariance with respect to the nume´raire scale
∀α ∈ R, ∀X ∈ L2, v1([αX]) =| α | v1([X])
Proposition 1.2 in chapter 1 and theorem 11.2 in chapter 2 show that the asymptotic analysis
of any game in this class will be equivalent to the analysis made for our particular game. Since
the asymptotic behavior of Vn and of the optimal price processes is the same within all this
class, this results strengthens the result obtained in [25] in the sense that the class CMMV is
robust against the introduction of monotonic derivatives in a large class of models.
Remark 11.1: We did not assume H2 since it always hold for bounded mappings T . In case
T is unbounded, one has to define a notion of admissible strategies as we did in section 3. H2
allows in this case to weaken the Lipschitz assumption on the value.
12. Complements.
Computation of E[γ∗(X1, Y1)]. The law of the process X, Y is well-known and related
to the local time of Brownian motion. Define βt =
∫ t
0 sgn(Xs)dBs and St = inf
s≤t
βs, and let Lt
denote the local time of X in 0. Tanaka’s formula (see [50] chapter VI) gives
| Xt |=| x | +βt + Lt
This implies
St = inf
s≤t
βs = inf
s≤t
| Xs | − | x | −Ls
Using properties classical of the local time of X, we deduce that{| Xt |=| x | +βt if St > − | x |
| Xt |= βt − St if St ≤ − | x |
and finally:
γ∗(X1, Y1) = (Y1+ | X1 |)+ =
{
(y + 2β1+ | x |)+ if S1 > − | x |
(y + 2β1 − S1)+ if S1 ≤ − | x |
The distribution of (β1, S1) is known (see proposition 2.8.1 in [39]) and given by the following
density on R2:
f(s, b) = 2(b−2s)√2pi exp(
−(b−2s)2
2 )1 (s≤0,b≥s)
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We compute:
G(x, y) = E[γ∗(X1, Y1)]
=
∫ 0
−|x|
ds
∫ +∞
−y−|x|
2
(y + 2b+ | x |)f(s, b)db
+
∫ −|x|
−∞
ds
∫ +∞
s−y
2
(y + 2b− s)f(s, b)db
The function G is C2 an its derivatives are given by:
Gx(x, y) = +sgn(x)
∫ 0
−|x|
ds
∫ +∞
−y−|x|
2
f(s, b)db
Gy(x, y) =
∫ 0
−|x|
ds
∫ +∞
−y−|x|
2
f(s, b)db+
∫ −|x|
−∞
ds
∫ +∞
s−y
2
f(s, b)db
Gxx = F1 + F2, Gyy = F2 + F3, Gxy = +sgn(x)F2
with:
F1(x, y) = 2√2pi
[
exp(−12x2)1I(y≥|x|) + exp(−12(+3|x|−y2 )2)1I(y<|x|)
]
F2(x, y) = 12√2pi
[
exp(−12(y+|x|2 )2)− exp(−12(3|x|−y2 )2)
]
1I(y≤|x|)
F3(x, y) = 23√2pi
[
exp(−12y2)1I(y≥|x|) + exp(−12(3|x|−y2 )2)1I(y<|x|)
]
and we check that G is solution of the equation (10.3).
CHAPITRE 4
Etude asymptotique d’un jeu d’e´change a` somme non-nulle.
On analyse dans ce chapitre un jeu d’e´change a` somme non-nulle avec information in-
comple`te d’un coˆte´. Dans les sections 2 a` 5, on de´finit un jeu dual et on prouve l’existence d’une
classe particulie`re d’e´quilibres dans le jeu dual appele´s e´quilibres re´duits et auto-e´galisateurs.
Dans la section 6, on e´tudie le comportement asymptotique de ces e´quilibres, on fait ap-
paraˆıtre en particulier un processus de prix limite en temps continu.
On prouve enfin dans la section 7 un re´sultat d’existence d’e´quilibre dans le jeu initial pour
une classe de lois re´gulie`res.
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1. Introduction
Brownian motion and related continuous martingales are used in many financial models to
describe the stock prices. The appearance of these processes is often explained exogenously:
prices depends on a long list of external random parameters whose effects aggregate in a Brow-
nian motion due to an implicit central limit theorem. In “On the strategic origin of Brownian
Motion in finance” [31], an endogenous explanation is provided : the Brownian Motion is
partially introduced by the agents to maximize their profit. The main idea is to consider infor-
mational asymmetries. Suppose that an informed agent is trading with an uninformed one, who
just knows that his opponent is informed. Each move of the insider on the market is analyzed
by the other to infer its informational content. A naive use of information would disclose it and
induce a loss of this strategic advantage for the next periods. At each transaction the informed
agent has thus to care about how much information his action will reveal. In order to take
benefit of his information, he has to find how to control the rate of revelation. As proved in
[31], his optimal behavior is to introduce some random noises in his actions, and these noises in
the day after day transactions aggregate in a Brownian motion. To illustrate this idea, the au-
thors consider a n times repeated exchange game between asymmetrically informed risk-neutral
agents. They show that any sequence of equilibrium price processes converges in distribution,
as n goes to infinity, to a particular Brownian martingale. This model as well as the following
generalizations ([25]) were dealing with zero-sum games. In order to extend these results to a
risk-aversion setting or to m-player games, we have to work with non-zero-sum games. We aim
to prove in this work that Brownian dynamics also appear in a particular non-zero-sum market
game.
The organization of the paper is as follows: At first, we describe the model and state the
main result in section 1. In section 3, we introduce an auxiliary game, which is a generalization
of the dual game introduced in [23] for repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information.
In particular, we show how the equilibria in this dual game are related to the equilibria in our
initial game, extending this way in the nonzero-sum case some results of [23]. Sections 4 and
5 are devoted to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the dual game, which is the unique
one in a particular class of equilibria defined in section 5, called reduced and self-equalizing
equilibria. In section 6, we prove that the sequence of price processes associated to these
equilibria converges to some Brownian martingale as n goes to infinity, and we deduce from
this result an asymptotic result on the price processes in the initial game.
2. The Model
The game Gn(µ). In this game Gn(µ), two market makers (Player 1 and 2) are trading
a risky asset R against a nume´raire N. At the beginning of the game, Player 1 receives some
private message concerning asset R. At a future date (t = 1), say at the next shareholder
meeting, P1’s message will be publicly disclosed. At that date, the price L of asset R is called
the liquidation value of R. It will depend on P1’s message. Since L is the only useful content
of P1’s information, we may assume that nature initially chooses L with a lottery µ ∈ ∆(R)
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(where ∆(R) denotes the set of Borelian probabilities on R), informs P1 but not P2 who only
knows µ.
Before the disclosure date t = 1, there are n consecutive trading rounds. As market makers,
players 1 and 2 are committed to post, at round k, prices pk, qk for the risky asset R. A price
p posted by player 1 is a commitment to buy or sell one share of the risky asset R against p
units of N . Prices are posted independently and simultaneously, and publicly observed after
each round. Clearly, if pk 6= qk, a trader will see an arbitrage possibility, and he will buy at the
lowest price one share of R to sell it immediately at the highest price. The external trader we
introduce in this model is not a strategic player. At round k (k = 1, ..., n), the players have to
select a pair of actions (pk, qk) independently of each others, based on their past observations
and private information. Next, the trader realizes the arbitrage if there is any and the actions
are announced publicly.
If ynk = (yRk , yNk ) and zk = (zRk , zNk ) denote P1’s and P2’s portfolio after round k, then:
yk+1 = yk + sg(pk − qk)(1,−pk)
zk+1 = zk + sg(pk − qk)(−1, qk)
where sg(x) =

1 if x > 0
0 if x = 0
−1 if x < 0
Both players are assumed to have sufficiently large initial endowments, and therefore the con-
straints yk ≥ 0 and zk ≥ 0 can be ignored in this model. The players are supposed to be risk
neutral so that the utility they aim to maximize is the expected value of their final portfolio.
P1’utility is: E[yRnL + yNn ]. Since y0 is initially fixed, its liquidation value is independent of
players’ moves. It can thus be subtracted from P1’s utility without affecting his behavior in the
game. The same argument can be applied to P2 and this amounts to assume y0 = z0 = (0, 0).
Players are assumed to use behavioral strategies: at each round, they can use a lottery
to select their actions (see next section for a precise description). Therefore, at equilibrium in
Gn(µ), the sequence of prices posted by P1, (pnk)k=1,..,n is a stochastic process. The n transaction
rounds occur at time t = k
n
, and we can then extend this price process in a continuous time
process Πnt , piecewise constant on the intervals [ kn ,
k+1
n
). Precisely, with bac the greater integer
less or equal to a, and pn0 = E[L], we have :
For t ∈ [0, 1], Πnt = pnbntc
When n becomes large, then the time between two transactions tends to zero, and the price
process appears naturally as an approximation of a continuous-time price process. The limit,
if it exists, of the processes Πnt , can be interpreted as a continuous-time “equilibrium” price
process.
Previous results in [31] and [25] show that in the zero-sum case, for any sequence of equilib-
ria, this limit exists and is independent of the chosen sequence and of the exchange mechanism
of the game. It is a Brownian martingale called continuous martingale of maximal variation
that depends only of the distribution µ of the liquidation value of the risky asset.
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Main result. The aim of this work is to obtain a asymptotic result in the same spirit as
in the zero-sum case. However, since many equilibria with different payoffs could exist in the
nonzero-sum setting, we will focus on a particular class of equilibria called reduced and self-
equalizing. For this class, we establish the existence of the continuous-time limit process, and
we give its representation as a Brownian diffusion. In section 5, we show that the equilibrium
strategies of P1 in this class are based on a time-homogeneous Markov chain. Therefore, it is
natural to conjecture that the associated equilibrium price processes converge to some time-
homogeneous Brownian diffusion when n goes to infinity. More precisely :
Conjecture 1: If µ is the law of Π1 where Π is a time homogeneous Brownian martingale
defined by :
Π0 =
∫
xdµ, Πt =
∫ t
0
a(Πs)dBs
then for all n there exists an equilibrium in Gn(µ) such that the process Πnt of posted prices at
equilibrium converges in law as n→∞ to Π.
As mentioned in the introduction, all the results in this work are obtained through an
auxiliary game, the dual game. The main difficulty is the regularity of the correspondance
between equilibria in the dual game and in the initial game. Due to this technical problem, we
will only prove in this work the following weaker version of this conjecture under some regularity
and ellipticity assumptions on a denoted (A)(see proposition 6.1 for a precise definition). Our
result is divided in two parts, the first one is an approximate version of the conjecture and the
second is an existence result of equilibrium for fixed n.
Theorem 2.1: If µ is the law of Π1 where Π is a time homogeneous Brownian martingale
defined by
Π0 =
∫
xdµ, Πt =
∫ t
0
a(Πs)dBs
where the function a fulfills assumptions (A), then for all n there exists a probability µn and an
equilibrium in Gn(µn) such that the process Πnt = pnbntc of posted prices at equilibrium converges
in law as n→∞ to Π and µn → µ.
Theorem 2.2: For all non-atomic µ ∈ ∆(R) with compact convex support [a, b] there exists an
equilibrium in Gn(µ) in the class or reduced and self-equalizing equilibria.
In view of these results, the missing argument to prove the conjecture would be a some
local regularity with respect to n and µ of the map (or of a selection of the correspondance)
associating to µ the law of the induced process of equilibrium prices.
Note that when µ is a normal or a log-normal distribution, which corresponds to a(x) = 1
or a(x) = x, we recover the classical dynamics of Bachelier and Black and Scholes.
The conjecture as well as the theorem suppose that the distribution µ is the law at time t = 1
of a time-homogeneous Brownian diffusion. This assumption excludes for example to consider
dicrete distributions. The behavior of the price process for discrete distributions is still an open
question. However, it is not difficult to show, for some examples of discrete distributions µ, that
there is no equilibrium in the class of reduced and self-equalizing equilibria that we consider in
this work.
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Behavioral Strategies in Gn(µ). We will assume that µ has compact support, the set of
such probabilities will be denoted hereafter ∆c(R). All the results of the next sections can be
extended to a probability with finite first order moment. This extension is only technical and
not necessary for the proof of the main theorem. Since the compact support case contains all the
relevant ideas of the general proof, we think that this assumption will clarify the presentation.
A note on the extension is given in section 8.
At round k, the choice made by P2 is based on his past observations (pi, qi)i≤k−1 ∈ (R2)k−1. A
behavioral strategy τ for P2 in Γn(µ) is then a sequence (τ1, ..., τn) of transition probabilities
τk : (R2)k−1 → ∆(R).
P1 can also use his private information to make his choice, so the price he posts at round k
depends on : (L, (pi, qi)i≤k−1) ∈ R × (R2)k−1. A behavioral strategy for P1 is then a sequence
σ = (σ1, ..., σn) of transition probabilities
σk : R× (R2)k−1 → ∆(R).
The triplet (µ, σ, τ) induces a unique probability Π(µ,σ,τ) on R×(R2)n. The payoff functions are :
gn1 (µ, σ, τ) = EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [Ly
R
n + yNn ] = EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [
n∑
k=1
(L− pk)sg(pk − qk)]
gn2 (µ, σ, τ) = EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [Lz
R
n + zNn ] = EΠ(µ,σ,τ) [
n∑
k=1
(qk − L)sg(pk − qk)]
Since these expectations are not always well-defined for integrability reasons, we introduce the
notion of admissible strategies. An strategy for P1 is admissible if there exists M > 0 such
that 1:
∀k,∀(L, (pi, qi)i=1,..,k−1) ∈ R× (R2)k−1, σk(L, (pi, qi)i=1,..,k−1) ∈ ∆([−M,M ])
We denote Σn the set of admissible strategies in Gn(µ). The set Tn of admissible strategies of
P2 is defined similarly. With admissible strategies, the payoff functions are always well-defined
in R. A (Nash) equilibrium in Gn(µ) is then a pair of admissible strategies (σ, τ) such that:
∀σ˜ ∈ Σn, gn1 (µ, σ, τ) ≥ gn1 (µ, σ˜, τ)
∀τ˜ ∈ Tn, gn2 (µ, σ, τ) ≥ gn2 (µ, σ, τ˜)
Reduced strategies in Gn(µ). As in zero-sum games, we introduce the notion of reduced
strategies : reduced strategies are strategies that do not depend on P2’s past actions.
A reduced strategy τ for P2 is a sequence (τ1, ..., τn) of transition probabilities
τk : (R)k−1 → ∆(R).
A reduced strategy for P1 is a sequence σ = (σ1, ..., σn) of transition probabilities
σk : R× (R)k−1 → ∆(R).
1. In this expression, ∆([−M,M ]) is as usual identified with the subset of probabilities on R supported by
[−M,M ]. Let us also mention that restricting the strategies to be concentrated on a fixed convex compact set
containing the support of the law µ would not modify our results.
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The main property of the game in reduced strategies is that the action of P2 at step k does
not influence the payoff of next stages. Therefore, to play a best reply against some reduced
strategy σ of P1, P2 has just to maximize his stage payoff given past actions of P1. In other
words, P2 can be seen as a succession of players facing P1, being informed only of the past
actions of P1. We will focus in this work on equilibria in reduced strategies. We exclude
therefore equilibria where P2 has to follow an equilibrium path and is punished if a deviation
is observed. The next proposition shows that an equilibrium in the game restricted to reduced
strategies is still an equilibrium in the initial game.
Proposition 2.1: An equilibrium in the game where the strategy sets of the players are re-
stricted to reduced strategies is an equilibrium in the initial game.
Proof. This proof is a direct adaptation of the one appearing in [23]. Suppose that
(σ∗, τ ∗) is an equilibrium in the game Gn(µ) where players are constrained to use only reduced
strategies. For any τ ∈ Tn, there exists a reduced strategy τˆ giving the same payoff as τ
against any reduced strategy of P1. The strategy τˆ proceeds as follows : at step k, P2 does
not remind his past actions (q1, .., qk−1), but using past actions of P1, he generates a virtual
history (pi, qˆi)i=1,..,k−1 by choosing qˆi with the probability τ(p1, qˆ1, .., pi−1, qˆi−1). He selects then
at stage k a price qk with the probability τ((pi, qˆi)i=1,..,k−1). Since the action of P1 does not
depend on past actions of P2, the conditional distribution of (pk, qk) given (L, p1, .., pk−1) is the
same as if P2 was using τ , and so is the conditional expected payoff at stage k. The situation
is not symmetric for P1, because to generate a virtual history of the past actions of P2, he has
to know which strategy P2 is using. However, the same argument shows that for all σ ∈ Σn,
there exists a reduced strategy σˆ giving the same payoff as σ against the fixed strategy τ ∗, and
we have :
∀σ ∈ Σn, g1n(σ, τ ∗) = g1n(σˆ, τ ∗) ≤ g1n(σ∗, τ ∗)
∀τ ∈ Tn, g2n(σ∗, τ) = g2n(σ∗, τˆ) ≤ g2n(σ∗, τ ∗)

3. The dual game G∗n(ψ)
The game we introduce now is a generalization of the dual game introduced in [23] to
analyze the behavior of the uninformed player in zero-sum games with one-sided information.
Representation of P1’s reduced strategies. Given a reduced strategy σ of Player 1 in
Gn(µ), the pair (µ, σ) induces a distribution pi on (L, p1, ..., pn) such that the marginal distri-
bution of L, denoted piL, is equal to µ. Conversely, any such distribution can be disintegrated
in a pair (µ, σ) where σ is the sequence of conditional distributions of pk given (L, p1, .., pk−1).
Since the payoff function in Gn(µ) depends on σ only through pi, we can identify the set of
reduced strategies of P1 to the set of distributions pi such that piL = µ.
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Best reply of P1. Given a reduced strategy τ of P2, the problem P1 is facing when
computing a best reply to τ is then (with obvious notations):
sup
pi:piL=µ
gn(pi, τ)
It is then natural to relax the constraint introducing Lagrange multipliers. To do this, we
can use the linear functionals acting on piL given by piL → 〈ψ, piL〉 = ∫ ψdpiL with ψ in some
(sufficiently large) function space. The above supremum becomes
sup
pi
inf
ψ
gn(pi, τ)− 〈ψ, piL − µ〉
Assuming that the sup and inf commute in this formula, this leads to the maximization problem
sup
pi
gn(pi, τ)− 〈ψ, piL〉
that can be interpreted as the best reply of P1 in a auxiliary game of complete information
called the dual game G∗n(ψ).
Description of the dual game G∗n(ψ). At the beginning of this game, P1 selects privately
the liquidation value L of the risky asset, and then the game follows as Gn. At the end, a penalty
ψ(L) is subtracted from P1’s payoff.
More precisely, for a given penalty function ψ, a strategy pi for P1 in G∗n(ψ) is a distribution
pi on (L, p1, .., pn) with compact support or equivalently a pair (µ, σ) where µ = piL ∈ ∆c(R)
and σ is a strategy in Σn. P2 chooses a strategy τ ∈ Tn. Payoff functions are:
gn∗1 (ψ, (µ, σ), τ) = gn1 (µ, σ, τ)− 〈ψ, µ〉
gn∗2 (ψ, (µ, σ), τ) = gn2 (µ, σ, τ)
We assume that ψ : R→ R∪{+∞} is such that 〈ψ, µ〉 = Eµ[ψ(L)] is well defined in R∪{+∞}
for all µ ∈ ∆c(R) and is not identically equal to +∞. Further assumptions will be made in
the next sections. Next lemma shows how the equilibria in the dual game G∗n are linked with
equilibria in the primal game Gn.
Lemma 3.1: If ((µ, σ), τ) is an equilibrium in the dual game G∗n(ψ), then (σ, τ) is an equilibrium
in the game Gn(µ).
Proof. Since (µ, σ, τ) is an equilibrium.
∀(µ˜, σ˜) ∈ ∆1(R)× Σn, gn1 (µ, σ, τ)− Eµ[ψ(L)] ≥ gn1 (µ˜, σ˜, τ)− Eµ˜[ψ(L)]
At first, it implies Eµ[ψ(L)] <∞, otherwise P1 could deviate by choosing a distribution µ˜ such
that Eµ˜[ψ(L)] <∞, getting this way a better payoff. Then, since Eµ[ψ(L)] does not depend on
σ, we have
∀σ˜ ∈ Σn, gn1 (µ, σ, τ) ≥ gn1 (µ, σ˜, τ)
The conclusion follows since the equilibrium condition for τ :
∀τ˜ ∈ Tn, gn2 (µ, σ, τ) ≥ gn2 (µ, σ, τ˜)
is the same in Gn(µ) and in G∗n(ψ). 
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4. Equilibrium Strategy for P2 in the dual game
Representation of P2’s reduced strategies. For any vector (p1, .., pn) ∈ Rn, we define
p<k = (p1, .., pk−1) and p≤k = (p1, .., pk). A reduced strategy τ is a sequence (τ1, ..., τn), where
τk(p<k) is the lottery used by P2 to select his price at step k given the sequence p<k of past
actions of P1. Since any random variable can be represented as a nondecreasing function of
an uniform random variable, there exists a measurable function fk : Rk−1× [−1, 1]→ R, right-
continuous and nondecreasing with respect to the last variable, such that fk(p<k, Uk) follows
the distribution τk(p<k) and Uk is a random variable uniformly distributed on [−1, 1]. Applying
this process inductively, playing τ is equivalent to play qk = fk(p<k, Uk) where (U1, .., Un) is a
sequence of independent random variable uniformly distributed on [−1, 1].
Best reply of P1 in the dual game. Using this representation, if P2 is using the strategy
τ ∼= (f1, .., fn), then the payoff of P1 if he plays the pure reduced strategy (L, p1, .., pn) is :
E[
n∑
k=1
(L− pk)sg (pk − fk(p<k, Uk))]− ψ(L)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the variables (U1, .., Un). To compute a best
reply P1 has to solve the problem :
sup
L,p1,..,pn
E[
n∑
k=1
(L− pk)sg (pk − fk(p<k, Uk))]− ψ(L)
We define
(4.1)
{
αk(p≤k) = E[sg (pk − fk(p<k, Uk))]
Sk(p≤k) =
∑k
i=1 αi(p≤i)
Note that these two functions depend on the strategy of P2. The above quantity becomes
LSn(p≤n)− ψ(L)−
n∑
k=1
pkαk(p≤k)
If we take the supremum over L, we obtain :
H(p≤n) , ψ∗(Sn(p≤n))−
n∑
k=1
pkαk(p≤k)
where ψ∗ is the Fenchel transform of ψ defined by :
∀x ∈ R, ψ∗(x) = sup
L∈R
xL− ψ(L).
Using Fenchel’s lemma, the supremum is reached for L ∈ ∂ψ∗(Sn(p≤n)) if this subdifferential
is nonempty. In particular, if ψ∗ admits a derivative in Sn(p≤n), then this relation becomes
L = ψ∗ ′(Sn(p≤n)).
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Self-equalizing strategies. At equilibrium in G∗n(ψ), P1 will play only optimal values of
p≤n (i.e. maximizing H), and therefore the equilibrium strategies of P2 must be equalizing
H on the support of p≤n. Since at round k, P2 posts a price qk = fk(p<k, Uk) where Uk is
uniformly distributed on [−1, 1], fk(p<k, [−1, 1]) is the support of the mixed strategy of P2 at
round k. Intuitively, P1 has no incentive to play outside this support. Indeed, if he posts a
price pk which is greater than fk(p<k, 1), then pk > qk and P1 will always buy one unit of the
risky asset at price pk. He gets clearly a better payoff by posting a price closer to fk(p<k, 1).
This argument shows that a best reply of P1, if it exists, must be concentrated on the support 2
of the mixed strategy of P2 at round k, and this leads us to introduce a particular class of
equalizing strategies. A strategy of P2 is self equalizing if it makes P1 indifferent between any
sequence of prices in the support of the mixed action of P2 at every round k. Precisely :
Definition 4.1: A reduced strategy (f1, .., fn) of P2 is self equalizing if there exists some real
constant C such that :
H(p≤n) = C for all p≤n such that ∀k ≤ n, pk ∈ fk(p<k, [−1, 1]).
The self-equalizing strategies of P2 depend on the function ψ only through its Fenchel
transform ψ∗, and we will therefore limit the study of the dual game to proper l.s.c. convex
functions ψ. To simplify the notations, we take the convention ϕ = ψ∗ and we will index
equilibrium strategies in G∗n(ψ) by ϕ.
Definition 4.2: Let Dn denote the set of convex functions f , C1 on [−n, n] and such that f ′
is strictly increasing.
Proposition 4.1: Assume that ϕ ∈ Dn, then there exists a self-equalizing strategy τ(ϕ) of P2
in G∗n(ψ).
This strategy is defined by ∀k ≤ n, fk(p<k, u) = h(Sk−1, u), with
h(Sn−1, u) ,
{ 1
u
(ϕ(Sn−1 + u)− ϕ(Sn−1)) if u 6= 0
ϕ′(Sn−1) if u = 0
Moreover, any best reply for P1 to this strategy is a distribution pi on (L, p1, .., pn) such that
with probability 1 :
∀k ≤ n, pk ∈ h(Sk−1, [−1, 1]) and L = ϕ′(Sn).
Proof. We construct the strategy τ(ϕ) for P2 in G∗n(ψ) by backward induction. (We omit
the dependence of αk and Sk on p to shorten notations.)
Let pn = fn(p<n, vn) for some vn ∈ [−1, 1] , then
H(p≤n) = ϕ(Sn−1 + αn)− αnfn(p<n, vn)−
n−1∑
k=1
pkαk
Suppose that fn(p<n, •) is strictly increasing, then
(4.2) αn(p≤n) = E[sg (fn(p<n, vn)− fn(p<n, Un))] = E[sg(vn − Un)] = vn
2. To be rigorous, the support of qk is the closure of fk(p<k, [−1, 1]) and our argument implies that any best
reply of P1 must be concentrated on the convex hull of this support at step k.
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The equalizing condition becomes
∀vn ∈ [−1, 1], ϕ(Sn−1 + vn)− vnfn(p<n, vn)−
n−1∑
k=1
pkαk = C
Taking vn = 0 implies C = ϕ(Sn−1)−∑n−1k=1 pkαk and we deduce
fn(p<n, vn) = h(Sn−1, vn) =
{ 1
vn
(ϕ(Sn−1 + vn)− ϕ(Sn−1)) if vn 6= 0
ϕ′(Sn−1) if vn = 0
The same argument leads by backward induction to:
fk(p<k, vk) = h(Sk−1, vk)
and since h is strictly increasing in its last variable, it shows that the strategy is self-equalizing
and that C = ϕ(0).
Note that if at step n, P1 plays pn > h(Sn−1, 1) then he gets strictly less than playing
h(Sn−1, 1). Indeed αn = 1 and we have:
H(p≤n) =ϕ(Sn−1 + 1)− pn −
n−1∑
k=1
pkαk
< ϕ(Sn−1 + 1)− h(Sn−1, 1)−
n−1∑
k=1
pkαk = ϕ(Sn−1)−
n−1∑
k=1
pkαk
If pn < h(Sn−1,−1), then αn = −1 and we have the same inequality. It implies by induction
that H(p≤n) < ϕ(0) if P1 plays at some round k outside of [h(Sk−1,−1), h(Sk−1, 1)].
A best reply for P1 to this strategy is then any distribution pi on (L, p1, .., pn) such that
with probability 1 : ∀k ≤ n, pk ∈ h(Sk−1, [−1, 1]) and L = ϕ′(Sn) .

The strategy τ(ϕ) constructed in the above lemma can be summarized as follows:
- At step 1, P2 plays q1 = h(0, U1)
- At step k, he computes
Sk−1 =

−1 if pk < h(Sk−2,−1)
solution of pk = h(Sk−2, Sk−1 − Sk−2) if pk ∈ h(Sk−2, [−1, 1])
1 if pk > h(Sk−2, 1)
and plays qk = h(Sk−1, Uk) where (U1, .., Un) is a sequence of independent random variables
uniformly distributed on [−1, 1].
5. Equilibrium strategy for P1
This section is devoted to prove the following result:
Proposition 5.1: For all ϕ ∈ Dn, there exists a unique reduced strategy pi(ϕ) of P1 in G∗n(ψ)
such that (pi(ϕ), τ(ϕ)) is an equilibrium.
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Since we consider reduced strategies of P1, actions of P2 at round k do not influence P1’s
behavior during the following rounds. To play a best reply to a reduced strategy, P2 has
therefore to maximize at each step his stage payoff conditionally to the past actions of P1. This
conditional payoff at step k if P2 plays some strategy τ against the reduced strategy pi is:
E[(qk − L)sg(pk − qk) | p<k]
= E[E[(qk − L)sg(pk − qk) | p≤k] | p<k]
Since pk is a function of p≤k and by construction L and qk are conditionally independent given
p≤k, we have
E[Lsg(pk − qk) | p≤k] = E[Lksg(pk − qk) | p≤k]
where Lk = E[L | p≤k].
Let φ ∈ Dn, and define the functions h, Sk, and αk associated to the strategy τ(ϕ) as in the
previous section. Suppose that pi(ϕ) is a best reply to τ(ϕ), hence a distribution on (L, p1, .., pn)
such that with probability 1:
∀k ≤ n, pk ∈ h(Sk−1, [−1, 1]) and L = ϕ′(Sn)
Conditions on ϕ implies that the function h(s, •) is strictly increasing. Therefore such a strategy
of P1 is completely determined by the law of the process (Sk)k=1,..,n. Indeed, using (4.1),(4.2)
and the definition of τ(ϕ), we find :
pk = h(Sk−1, αk) where αk = Sk − Sk−1.
The random variables p≤k and S≤k generate the same σ-field, and we can replace the conditional
expectations with respect to “p” by conditional expectations with respect to “S”. In particular,
Lk = E[L | S≤k]. Suppose now that (pi(ϕ), τ(ϕ)) is an equilibrium. The strategy τ(ϕ) is then a
best reply to pi(ϕ), and we will show that this condition determines uniquely the distribution
of the process (Sk)k=1,..,n induced by pi(ϕ). The self-equalizing strategy of P2 τ(ϕ) being a best
reply to pi(ϕ), it implies that for all k, P2’s mixed action is concentrated on the optimal values
of qk. Since qk = h(Sk−1, U), where U is uniformly distributed on [−1, 1], the strategy of P1
must be equalizing on the support of qk, or equivalently there exists a constant Ck independent
of t such that for Lebesgue-almost every t in [−1, 1] :
(5.1) Epi(ϕ)[(h(Sk−1, t)− Lk)sg(pk − h(Sk−1, t)) | S<k] = Ck
Moreover, since these values of qk must be optimal, we also have for all q ∈ R,
(5.2) Epi(ϕ)[(q − Lk)sg(pk − q)) | S<k] ≤ Ck
The conditional expectation Lk can be expressed as a function of S≤k. By abuse of notations,
we will denote this function by Lk(S≤k). In the same way, Ck is a function of S<k that will be
denoted Ck(S<k). Using that h is strictly increasing in its last variable and that pk = h(Sk−1, αk)
for αk ∈ [−1, 1], the equalizing condition (5.1) becomes
Epi(ϕ)[(h(Sk−1, t)− Lk(S<k, Sk−1 + αk))sg(αk − t) | S<k] = Ck
If Gks<k(t) denotes the distribution function of αk conditionally on S<k = s<k, then this equation
becomes a Stieltjes integral equation for Gks<k(t) :
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(5.3) h(sk−1, t)(1− 2Gks<k(t) + ∆Gks<k(t))
−
∫
[−1,1]
Lk(s<k, sk−1 + u)sg(u− t)dGks<k(u) = Ck(s<k)
where ∆Gks<k(t) is the jump of the distribution function at time t.
The equalizing condition (5.1) as well as (5.2) need only to hold almost surely with respect
to the distribution of S<k. We will show that the equation (5.3) for any fixed value s<k has only
one solution Gks<k . Therefore, (5.1) implies that G
k
S<k
is a version of the conditional distribution
of αk given S<k, and thus the law of the the process (Sk)k=1,..,n is completely described by the
functions (Gks<k)k=1,..,n. The proof is based on three technical lemma proved in section 8.
Lemma 5.1: Assuming (5.2) and that equation (5.3) holds for Lebesgue almost-every t in [−1, 1]
then (5.3) holds for all t in [1, 1], any solution Gks<k(t) is continuous in t = −1 and 1 and
Ck(s<k) =
1
2(h(sk−1,−1)− h(sk−1, 1)) , C(sk−1)
Lk−1(s<k) =
1
2(ϕ(sk−1 + 1)− ϕ(sk−1 − 1)) , g(sk−1)
The last assertions in the previous lemma imply that equation (5.3) for k < n depends
only on s<k through sk−1. Lemma 5.3 will show that this equation has only one solution, and
thus the process (Sk)k=1,..,n−1 associated to these solutions will be a time-homogeneous Markov
chain. Let us first study the case k = n in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.2: Using the boundary condition Gns<n(−1) = 0 and Gns<n(1) = 1, the unique solution
of (5.3) for k = n is Gns<n(t) =
1
2(1 + t).
Equalizing condition for P1 implies therefore that pn = h(Sn−1, U) where U is uniformly
distributed on [−1, 1] and independent of Sn−1. Taking the derivative with respect to t in (5.3)
for k < n, we obtain
(5.4) ∂h
∂t
(sk−1, t)(1− 2Gks<k(t)) + 2Gks<k ′(t)(g(sk−1 + t)− h(sk−1, t)) = 0
Lemma 5.3: For k < n, equation (5.3) admits a unique solution depending only on sk−1 and
denoted Gsk−1. This solution is piecewise C1 and solution of (5.4) except in finitely many points
in (−1, 1). Moreover, if we assume that ϕ is C2 and that ϕ′′ > 0, then Gsk−1 is continuous.
The equalizing strategy of P1 is then completely described by :
∀k ≤ n, pk = h(Sk−1, Sk − Sk−1), L = ϕ′(Sn)
where S1, ..., Sn−1 is a time-homogeneous markov chain such that:
P[Sk − Sk−1 ≤ t | Sk−1 = s] = Gs(t)
with Gs(t) the solution given by lemma 5.3 (see section 8 or 7 for a precise formula) and
Sn = Sn−1 + U with U uniformly distributed on [−1, 1] and independent of Sn−1. To conclude
that (pi(ϕ), τ(ψ)) is an equilibrium, since P1’s strategy is reduced, we only need to check
condition (5.2), which says that P2 cannot obtain a better payoff at step k by playing outside
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of h(Sk−1, [−1, 1]). Indeed, if at round k P2 plays qk > h(Sk−1, 1), then his conditional stage
payoff given S<k is:
Epi(ϕ)[(qk − g(Sk−1 + αk))(−1) | S<k] = −qk + g(Sk−1) < −h(Sk−1, 1) + g(Sk−1) = C(Sk−1)
and the same argument gives the corresponding inequality in the symmetric case, which con-
cludes the proof.
6. Asymptotic behavior of equilibria in the dual game
We now analyze the behavior of the equilibria constructed in the previous section when n
goes to infinity. In the zero-sum setting, the main result used to obtain the limit price process
is the asymptotic expansion of the value of zero-sum games. In the game studied in [31] or
more generally in the class of games introduced in [25], using a central limit result, the first
term of this expansion is shown to be or order
√
n. Since the game we consider here is close to
the zero-sum market game introduced in [23], it is then natural to consider the games where
the payoffs functions are divided by
√
n and to study the asymptotic behavior of the equilibria
obtained in the previous section in these game. Consider the games Gn(µ) where the payoff
functions are divided by
√
n. In particular, the payoff function of P1 is then:
1√
n
gn1 (µ, σ, τ)
Introducing the dual games associated to this game in the same way as for Gn, the payoff
function of P1 is then :
1√
n
gn1 (µ, σ, τ)− 〈ψ, µ〉
In order to analyze the asymptotic behavior of these games for a fixed function ψ, it is then
equivalent to study the sequence of dual games G∗n(ψn) with ψn =
√
nψ. In this case ϕn(y) =
ψ∗n(y) =
√
nϕ( y√
n
). With these notations, we are now able to state the main convergence result
on the reduced and self-equalizing equilibria in the dual game.
Proposition 6.1: Let ϕ be a convex function, C4 on R such that φ′ is bounded, ϕ′′ > 0 and
(6.1)
∣∣∣ϕ(3)(z)∣∣∣
6ϕ ′′(z) ≤ C(1 + |z|)
for some constant C. Let (pnk)k=1,..,n denote the process of prices posted by P1 when he’s playing
the equilibrium strategy constructed in proposition 5.1 in Gn(ψn), and define the continuous-
time process:
Πnt = pnbntc for t ∈ [0, 1]
With these assumptions, the sequence of processes Πn converge in distribution, in the space of
ca´dla´g functions defined on [0, 1] endowed with the Skorokhod topology, to a continuous diffusion
process defined as the unique solution (in law) of the stochastic differential equation :
Πt = ϕ′(0) +
∫ t
0
1√
3ψ′′(Πs)
dBs
where B is a standard Brownian motion.
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Proof. In the dual game G∗n(ψn), the equalizing strategy of P1 is described by the process
Sn. Let Zn = Sn√
n
. Then for all i < n − 1, the conditional distribution function of Sni+1 − Sni
given Zni is G 1√
n
,Zni
where G,z is solution of
(6.2) 2G′,z(t)(
ϕ(z + (t+ 1))− ϕ(z + (t− 1))
2 −
ϕ(z + t)− ϕ(z)
t
)
= (2G,z(t)− 1)1
t
(ϕ′(z + t)− ϕ(z + t)− ϕ(z)
t
)
with the conditions G,z(−1) = 0 and G,z(1) = 1. The last increment Snn − Snn−1 is uniformly
distributed on [−1, 1] and independent of the past of the process. To study the asymptotic of Zn,
we define the continuous-time process Z˜nt = Znbntc. In order to apply a general approximation
result of diffusion by discrete-time Markov chain, we need to have estimates on the conditional
moments per unit of time of the process Z˜n. Namely :
bn(z) = nE[Zni+1 − Zni | Zni = z]
cn(z) = nE[(Zni+1 − Zni )2 | Zni = z]
dn(z) = nE[(Zni+1 − Zni )3 | Zni = z]
First note that dn(z) ≤ 1√
n
and thus converges to 0 uniformly in z.
Let Ik(, z) =
∫ 1
−1(2G,z(t)− 1)tkdt.
Integrating by parts (6.2) over [−1, 1] gives 3
(6.3)
∫ 1
−1
(2G,z(t)− 1)ϕ
′(z + (t+ 1))− ϕ′(z + (t− 1))
2 dt
= 12(ϕ(z + 2)− ϕ(z − 2))−
1

(ϕ(z + )− ϕ(z − ))
Expanding in power of , we find
I0(, z)ϕ′′(z) + ϕ(3)(z)(I1(, z)− 1) = 2R1(z, )
where R1(z, ) is the rest appearing in the Taylor expansion, that can be expressed as follows
R1(z, ) =
1
24[8φ
(4)(z + 2θ1)− 8φ(4)(z − 2θ2) + φ(4)(z + θ3)− φ(4)(z − θ4)
− 2
∫ 1
−1
(2G,z(t)− 1)
(
(1 + t)3φ(4)(z + (1 + t)θ5(t))− (−1 + t)3φ(4)(z + (t− 1)θ6(t))
)
dt]
where θi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, .., 6. Therefore, we obtain easily the following bound :
|R1(z, )| ≤ 4112 supx∈[−2,2]
∣∣∣ϕ(4)(z + x)∣∣∣ .
The same process applied to (6.2) multiplied by t leads to:
ϕ′′(z)(I1(, z)− 23) = R2(z, )
3. Integration by parts formula holds here, since with our assumptions on ϕ, the solution of (6.2) is continuous
and piecewise C1, hence absolutely continuous (see the proof in section 8 for the details).
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with |R2(z, )| ≤ 529 sup
x∈[−2,2]
∣∣∣ϕ(3)(z + x)∣∣∣.
We deduce then, using integration by parts
cn(z) = (1− I1( 1√
n
, z)) = 13 −
1√
n
R2(z, 1√n)
ϕ′′(z)
bn(z) = −
√
n
2 I0(
1√
n
, z) = −ϕ
(3)(z)
6ϕ′′(z) +
1
2
√
nϕ′′(z)
ϕ(3)(z)R2(z, 1√n)
ϕ′′(z) −R1(z,
1√
n
)

With our assumptions on ϕ, the functions cn and bn converge uniformly on compact sets to
c(z) = 13 and b(z) = −ϕ
(3)(z)
6ϕ′′(z) . By Corollary 7.4.2 in [34],
4 the sequence of processes Z˜n converge
in distribution, in the space of ca´dla´g functions defined on [0, 1] endowed with the Skorokhod
topology, to the law of the process Z defined as the solution 5 of :
(6.4)
Zt =
∫ t
0
1√
3dBs −
∫ t
0
ϕ(3)(Zs)
6ϕ′′(Zs)ds
Z0 = 0
where B is a standard Brownian motion defined on some filtered probability space.
We can now deduce the asymptotic behavior of P2’s expected beliefs martingale Ln and of
the price process pn at equilibrium in G∗n(ψn). According to the previous section we have :
Lnk =
∫ 1
−1
ϕ′(Znk +
t√
n
)dt2
pnk =
ϕ(Znk )− ϕ(Znk−1)
Znk − Znk−1
= 1
Znk − Znk−1
∫ Znk−Znk−1
0
ϕ′(Znk−1 + t)dt
We define the continuous time processes L˜nt = Lnbntc and Πnt = pnbntc for t ∈ [0, 1]. The limit
process Z having continuous trajectories, using Skorokhod representation theorem, there exists
some probability space Ω where are defined a sequence (Z˜n)n≥0 of processes and a process
Z having the same distribution as above and such that the sequence of trajectories converge
almost surely, uniformly in t :
(6.5) sup
t∈[0,1]
∣∣∣Z˜nt − Zt∣∣∣ −→n→∞ 0 a.s.
To conclude that the two processes L˜n and Πn converge in distribution to ϕ′(Z), we only have
to check that their trajectories converges almost surely uniformly in t in Ω. Using (6.5), the
trajectories of ϕ′(Z˜n) converge uniformly in t to that of ϕ′(Z) with probability 1.
4. Our process is not a homogeneous Markov chain because of the last increment. But this process and
the Markov chain obtained by replacing this last increment using the same transition probability have the
same asymptotic behavior. Indeed, assume that the Z˜n and the modified versions Zˆn are defined on the same
probability space, then the difference converges uniformly to 0 with probability 1.
5. The conditions on ϕ ensures that the solution Z of the above stochastic differential equation exists, is
unique in law and, by (6.1), does not explode in a finite time.
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The result follows then from the two following inequalities.
∣∣∣L˜nt − ϕ′(Z˜nt )∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ 1−1
∣∣∣∣∣ϕ′(Znbntc + u√n)− ϕ′(Znbntc)
∣∣∣∣∣ du2
≤ 1√
n
sup
|u|≤ 1√
n
∣∣∣ϕ′′(Znbntc + u)∣∣∣
∣∣∣Πnt − ϕ′(Z˜nt )∣∣∣ ≤ 1√n sup|u|≤ 1√
n
∣∣∣ϕ′′(Znbntc + u)∣∣∣
Using Ito’s formula :
ϕ′(Zt) = ϕ′(0) +
∫ t
0
1√
3
ϕ′′(Zs)dBs
Let Πt = ϕ′(Zt), then by Fenchel lemma Zt = ψ′(Πt) and
ϕ′′(Zs) = ϕ′′(ψ′(Πs)) =
1
ψ′′(Πs)
We can now conclude that
Πt = ϕ′(0) +
∫ t
0
1√
3ψ′′(Πs)
dBs
Since φ′ is bounded Π is a well-defined martingale and uniqueness in law for the above equation
follows from uniqueness in (6.4). 
The set of assumptions on the function a announced in the introduction is just the refor-
mulation of the assumptions made on φ in the preceding proposition.
Definition 6.1: The function a fulfills assumptions (A) if there exists a function φ fulfilling
the assumptions of proposition 6.1 such that a(x) = 1√3ψ′′(x) for x in the range of φ
′ and zero
elsewhere.
Now the main theorem is just a corollary of the preceding proposition.
Proof of theorem 2.1. Define the function a(x) = 1√3ψ′′(x) with ψ, ϕ as in the previous
proposition 6.1. The probability µ is then the law of Π1. Using the notations of the previous
proof, the sequence of equilibria in G∗n(ψn) induces a sequence of equilibria in Gn(µn) where µn
is the law of ϕ′n(Sn) = Lnn. Since L˜nt converges in distribution to the continuous process Πt, we
deduce that L˜n1 converges in distribution to Π1, hence µn → µ. The equilibrium price process
in Gn(µn) being the same as in G∗n(ψn), the result follows directly from proposition 6.1. 
7. Existence of equilibria in the primal game
The aim of this section is to prove the existence theorem 2.2, which added to the result of
the previous section is a first step toward the conjecture as announced in the introduction.
In section 5, P1’s equilibrium strategy in G∗n(ψ) is constructed using a time-homogeneous
Markov transition depending on ψ∗. For f ∈ Dn, this Markov transition P f from
7. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA IN THE PRIMAL GAME 137
[−(n− 2), (n− 2)] to [−1, 1] is defined by its distribution function:
(7.1) Gf (s, t) = P f (s, [−1, t]) =

1
2(1− exp(
∫ t
−1
1
x
(f ′(s+x)−hf (s,x))
gf (s+x)−hf (s,x) dx)) t ∈ [−1, δf (s))
1
2 t ∈ [δf (s), γf (s))
1
2(1 + exp(−
∫ 1
t
1
x
(f ′(s+x)−hf (s,x))
gf (s+x)−hf (s,x) dx)) t ∈ (γf (s), 1]
where:
hf (s, x) = 1
x
(f(s+ x)− f(x))
gf (x) = 12(f(x+ 1)− f(x− 1))
δf (s) = inf{x ∈ [−1, 1] | gf (s+ x)− hf (s, x) = 0}
γf (s) = sup{x ∈ [−1, 1] | gf (s+ x)− hf (s, x) = 0}
As shown in lemma 5.3, P f (s, dt) is the unique solution Q ∈ ∆([−1, 1]) of:
(7.2) ∀t ∈ [−1, 1], hf (s, t)(1−2Q([−1, t])+Q({t}))−
∫
[−1,1]
gf (s+u)sg(u−t)Q(du) = Cf (s)
with Cf (s) = 12(h
f (s,−1)− hf (s, 1)).
Definition 7.1: Let Dn be the set of convex functions, C1 on [−n, n], endowed with the fol-
lowing topology. A sequence fk converges to f in Dn ( fk → f hereafter) if :
fk and f ′k converge uniformly to f and f ′ in [−n, n].
Let us extend the former definition to Dn
Definition 7.2: P f (s, .) denotes the set of solutions Q ∈ ∆([−1, 1]) of (7.2).
Proposition 7.1: The set-valued mapping
(s, f) ∈ [−(n− 2), (n− 2)]×Dn → P f (s, .) ⊂ ∆([−1, 1])
has nonempty closed-convex values and its graph is closed. Moreover, any distribution Q ∈
P f (s, .) is uniquely determined on the intervals [−1, δf (s)) and (γf (s), 1], where its distribution
function is given by formula (7.1).
Proof. Convexity of P f (s, .) follows directly from the linearity of (7.2) with respect to Q.
Non-emptiness will follow from the next result, using that Dn is dense in Dn for the considered
topology. Let sk → s ∈ [−(n − 2), (n − 2)] and fk → f ∈ Dn. Let also Qk be a sequence
from P fk(sk, dt) converging to some probability Q. We will show that (7.2) is satisfied by Q.
Therefore, Q will be in the set of solutions P f (s, dt) of (7.2), and the closedness of the graph
will be proved.
At first, fk → f implies that gfk(sk + x) and hfk(sk, x) converge to gf (s + x) and hf (s, x)
uniformly in x, and also the convergence of Cfk(sk) to Cf (s). Suppose that t ∈ [−1, 1] is such
that Q({t}) = 0. Then by the classical Portemanteau theorem:
Qk([−1, t])→ Q([−1, t]), Qk({t})→ 0
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The sequence of function gfk(sk + u)sg(u − t) converges to gf (s + u)sg(u − t) uniformly in u
and the only discontinuity point of these functions is t. Therefore, by lemma 8.1∫
[−1,1]
gfk(sk + u)sg(u− t)Qk(du)→
∫
[−1,1]
gf (s+ u)sg(u− t)Q(du)
As a consequence, Q satisfies (7.2) for all t in the set J = {t ∈ [−1, 1], Q({t}) = 0}. But this
set is dense in [−1, 1] and therefore the right and left-hand limits in of this equation must be
equal for all t ∈ (−1, 1). This implies
Q({t})(gf (s+ t)− h(s, t)) = 0
Since this condition is equivalent to the continuity in t of the left-hand side of (7.2), Q satisfies
(7.2) for all t in (−1, 1). To conclude, we only show that the equation still holds for t = −1,
the case t = 1 being symmetric. Using the proof of lemma 5.3, we know that if δf (s) > −1,
then the probability Q ∈ P f (s, .) is uniquely determined on [−1, δf (s)) (the same proof works
in Dn). On the other hand, if δf (s) = −1, then hf (s,−1) = gf (s− 1). In both cases, equation
(7.2) for t = −1 is
hf (s,−1)(1)−
∫
[−1,1]
gf (s+ u)Q(du) = Cf (s)
This equation holds by assumption when replacing f by fk and s by sk. The result with f and
s follows therefore from the above mentioned uniform convergences.

Notation 12: Given f ∈ Dn, the class of (laws of) processes S(f) is defined as follows:
The law of a process (Sfi )i=1,..,n belongs to S(f) if (Sfi )i=1,..,n−1 is a Markov chain whose tran-
sition is given by
P(Sfk − Sfk−1 ∈ B | Sfk−1) = Qf (k, Sfk−1)(B)
for all Borel set B where Qf (k, s) is a measurable selection of s→ P f (s, .). The last increment
is defined by Sfn = S
f
n−1 +U where U is a random variable uniformly distributed on [−1, 1] and
independent of Sfn−1.
The set of laws of f ′(Sfn) when the law of the process Sf is varying in S(f) is denoted L(f).
Note that both these sets are reduced to a point when f ∈ Dn.
As shown in the previous sections, the transition P f for f ∈ Dn induces an equilibrium
in G∗n(f ∗) and thus an equilibrium in Gn(L(f)). This result is no more true when f is only
assumed to be in Dn, even for measurable selections of the associated set-valued mappings.
Lemma 7.1: The set-valued mappings associating to f ∈ Dn the set of laws S(f) and the set
of possible laws L(f) have closed graphs.
Proof. Given a sequence fq converging to f and a sequence of processes (Sfqk )k=1,..,n in
S(fq) that converges in distribution to (Sk)k=1,..,n, we will show that the law of the limit process
S belong to S(f). Let ρ be a bounded continuous function on [−n, n]. Using the previous
lemma, since Sfq1 converges in distribution to S1, the law of S1 belongs to P f (0, dt). We can
assume that all the random variables are defined on the same probability space and that Sfqk
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converges almost surely to Sk for all k = 1, .., n. Let us denote the support function of P f (s, .)
by σf (s, ρ) defined for ρ ∈ C([−1, 1]) by
σf (s, ρ) = sup
ν∈P f (s,.)
∫
ρdν
In order to prove that the conditional law of S2 − S1 given S1 is almost surely in the closed
convex set P f (S1, .), it is sufficient to show that for all ρ, η ∈ C([−1, 1]) with η ≥ 0
(7.3) E[ρ(S2 − S1)η(S1)] ≤ E[σf (S1, ρ)η(S1)]
Indeed, a monotone class argument allows to replace η by any indicator function, implying that
the inequality holds for conditional expectations. Then, this inequality holds with probability
one for all ρ in a dense subset of C([−1, 1]), which shows that the conditional distribution
belongs almost surely to P f (S1, .). It remains to show (7.3). Note that for all q, by assumption
(7.4) E[ρ(Sfq2 − Sfq1 )η(Sfq1 )] ≤ E[σfq(Sfq1 , ρ)η(Sfq1 )]
The left-hand side converges to the left-hand side of (7.3) by dominated convergence. For the
right-hand side, it is sufficient to show that the map (s, f)→ σf (s, ρ) is upper-semi-continuous.
But this follows directly from the continuity of the application ν → ∫ ρdν on ∆([−1, 1]) and the
closed graph property given in the previous lemma. The same argument shows by induction
that the law of S belongs to S(f), using independence for the last increment. For the second
assertion, recall that L(fq) is the set of laws of f ′q(Sfqn ) for some processes Sfq as described above.
Suppose that the sequence f ′q(Sfqn ) converges in law to µ and that fq converges to f . Note that
the sequence of laws of Sfqn is relatively compact in the weak topology. Since f ′q converges
uniformly to f ′, using lemma 8.1, convergence in law of some subsequence of Sfqn to Sn implies
the convergence in law along the same subsequence of f ′q(Sfqn ) to f ′(Sn). Identifying the limit
and using the previous result, we deduce that the limiting law µ = law(f ′(Sn)) ∈ L(f). 
We show next that the set of distributions L(f ∗) for f ∈ Dn is dense in ∆(R). More
precisely,
Lemma 7.2: Given an integer K and a sequence a0 < .. < aK of real numbers, then for all
λ ∈ int(∆K) where ∆K is the K-dimensional simplex, there exists a function f ∈ Dn such that
L(f) is a non-atomic measure and
∀i = 1, .., n, L(f)([ai−1, ai]) = λi
identifying L(f) to its single element.
Proof. For  > 0 such that 2n− K > 0 , we define
∆K = {λ ∈ ∆K | mini λi ≥ }
For each λ ∈ ∆K we define a function gλ : [−n, n]→ [a0, aK ] as the piecewise linear function
such that gλ(ti) = ai for i = 0, .., K where
t0 = −n, tK = n, and for all i = 1, .., K ti − ti−1 = + (2n− K)λi
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We define then fλ(t) =
∫ t
−n gλ(u)du and the application λ → fλ is clearly continuous from
∆K to Dn. Using results and notations of the previous section, the application λ → L(fλ) is
continuous and if λi = 0, we have
L(fλ)([ai−1, ai]) = P(gλ(Sfλn ) ∈ [ai−1, ai]) = P(Sfλn ∈ [ti−1, ti])
= E(P(Sfλn ∈ [ti−1, ti] | Sfλn−1))
≤ ti − ti−12 =
+ λi(2n− K)
2 ≤

2
We now define the application:
T : ∆K → ∆K : λ→ (L(fλ)([ai−1, ai]))i=1,..,K
Since the measures L(f) for f ∈ Dn are non-atomic, T is continuous and by the above inequality
(7.5) λi = 0⇒ T (λ)i ≤ 2
We show next that ∆/2K ⊂ T (∆K) and the conclusion follows by letting  go to 0.
Fix some y ∈ ∆/2K and define Ci = {λ ∈ ∆K | T (λ)i ≤ yi}. Then by (7.5) we have
{λ ∈ ∆K | λi = 0} ⊂ Ci and ∪ni=1Ci = ∆K . The KKM lemma implies that ∩ni=1Ci 6= ∅ and this
completes the proof.

Finally, we are able to state an existence result.
Proposition 7.2: For all non-atomic µ ∈ ∆(R) with compact convex support [a, b] there exists
f ∈ Dn such that L(f) = µ.
Proof. Let µk = L(fk), with fk a sequence of functions in Dn given by the previous lemma
such that µk → µ. The sequence fk can be chosen such that fk(−n) = 0 and f ′k([−n, n]) = [a, b].
Identifying the sequence of derivatives f ′k with distributions functions, the sequence is relatively
compact for the convergence in distribution, and we can extract a subsequence also denoted
f ′k converging to some limit f ′ which is a right-continuous nondecreasing function such that
f ′(−n) ≥ a and f ′(n) = b. By compactness, we can assume that along the same subsequence,
the sequence of laws of Sfkn−1 converges in law to some variable Y , implying that Sfkn converges
in law to Y + U where U is uniformly distributed on [−1, 1] and independent of Y . Since
Y + U is non-atomic, lemma 8.1 implies that µk converges to f ′(Y + U) ∼ µ. Since [a, b]
is by assumption the support of µ and using the previously mentioned conditions on µ, f ′
is necessarily continuous on [−n, n]. Using that f(t) = ∫ t−n f ′(u)du is in Dn, the previous
reasoning implies that fk converges to f in Dn and therefore µ is the law of f ′(Sfn) for some
process Sf as defined in the previous lemma. It remains to show that f is increasing in order
to prove f ∈ Dn. Define now
Dr = {s ∈ [−(n− 2), n− 2] , f is linear on [s, s+ 1]}
Dl = {s ∈ [−(n− 2), n− 2] , f is linear on [s− 1, s]}
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Using the characterization of the solutions Q ∈ P f (s, .) on the intervals [−1, δf (s)) and
(γf (s), 1], if s /∈ Dr, then these two intervals are not trivial and
(7.6) ∀Q ∈ P f (s, .), ∀ε > 0, Q([1− ε, 1)) > 0
A similar result holds for Dl. Suppose that Dr does not contain any neighborhood of integers
of type [k− ε, k] for k = 0, .., n− 2 and the symmetric property for Dl. Under this assumption,
using property (7.6), and since the last step of the process Sf is an uniform random variable,
we deduce easily that Sfn has no atom and that its support is the whole interval [−n, n].
Therefore, f ′ is necessarily increasing otherwise the law µ ∼ f ′(Sfn) would have atoms, which
would contradicts our assumption. If Dr (or Dl) contains some neighborhood as described
above, the argument is slightly different. We will prove that Sfn gives positive probability to
the set Z = (Dr+[0, 1])∪(Dl+[−1, 0]). The main idea is that if the process Sf is not in Dl, then
the next increment is with positive probability in (−1,−1+ε] for any small ε > 0. Assume that
there is a step k at which the process will reach the set [k−ε, k] ⊂ Dr with positive probability.
We claim that the process cannot “exit” from Z with probability 1. If Sfk ∈ Dr ∩ Dl, then
Sfk + [−1, 1] ⊂ Z and this implies P(Sfk+1 ∈ Z) > 0. If P(Sfk /∈ Dl, Sfk ∈ [k − ε, k]) > 0, then by
integration P(Sfk+1 ∈ (k − 1 − ε, k − 1 + ε)) > 0. In this last case, if Sk+1 /∈ Z, then the next
increment will jump with positive probability in an interval (k − ε, k + ε) ⊂ Z. Note that the
last argument works even if k + 1 = n− 1 since in this case the last increment is uniform. We
deduce by induction that in all cases P(Sfn ∈ Z) > 0. But, this implies that Sfn gives positive
probability to some interval on which f is linear, which in turn implies that µ has some atom,
and contradicts our assumption. 
8. Technical results.
Proofs of the lemmas in section 5.
Proof of lemma 5.1. If we denote
(8.1) Φk(s<k, t) := h(s, t)(1−2Gks<k(t)+∆Gks<k(t))−
∫
[−1,1]
Lk(s<k, sk−1 +u)sg(u− t)dGks<k(u)
the left-hand side of (5.3), then the equation becomes
(8.2) Φk(s<k, t) = Ck(s<k)
Since this equation holds for all t in a dense subset of [−1, 1], then for t in (−1, 1),the right
and left-hand limits of Φk(s<k, t) must be equal and this implies
(8.3) ∆Gks<k(t)(Lk(s<k, sk−1 + t)− h(sk−1, t)) = 0
A direct computation shows that this equation is equivalent to continuity in t of Φk, and
thus (8.2) holds for all t in (−1, 1). We also know by (5.2) that Φk(s<k,−1) ≤ Ck(s<k) =
Φk(s<k,−1+) i.e.
(8.4) (Lk(s<k, sk−1 − 1)− h(sk−1,−1))∆Gks<k(−1) ≥ 0
142 4. ETUDE ASYMPTOTIQUE D’UN JEU D’E´CHANGE A` SOMME NON-NULLE.
Similarly in t = 1, we obtain
(8.5) (Lk(s<k, sk−1 + 1)− h(sk−1, 1))∆Gks<k(1) ≤ 0
Consider at first the case k = n for which Ln(s≤n) = ϕ′(sn). For all sn−1 ∈ [−(n− 1), (n− 1)]
and t ∈ [−1, 1], ϕ′(sn−1 + t) is bounded. Since ϕ′ is strictly increasing we have that ϕ′(sn−1 +
t) − h(sn−1, t) < 0 for t ∈ [−1, 0) and > 0 for t ∈ (0, 1]. By (8.3),(8.4) and (8.5) , Gns<n is
continuous on these two intervals. Finally, the equalizing condition (8.2) is valid for t = −1
and t = 1 and we find :
h(sn−1,−1)−
∫
[−1,1]
ϕ′(sn−1 + u)dGns<n(u) = −h(sn−1, 1) +
∫
[−1,1]
ϕ′(sn−1 + u)dGns<n(u)
Since Ln−1(s<n) =
∫
[−1,1] ϕ
′(sn−1 + u)dGns<n(u), we conclude that:
Cn(s<n) =
1
2(h(sn−1,−1)− h(sn−1, 1)) , C(sn−1)
Ln−1(s<n) =
∫ 1
−1
ϕ′(sn−1 + u)
du
2 =
1
2(ϕ(sn−1 + 1)− ϕ(sn−1 − 1)) , g(sn−1)
Consider next k = n− 1, then since ϕ is strictly convex
g(sn−2 − 1)− h(sn−2,−1) = 12(ϕ(sn−2)− ϕ(sn−2 − 2))− (ϕ(sn−2)− ϕ(sn−2 − 1))
= ϕ(sn−2 − 1)− 12(ϕ(sn−2 − 2) + ϕ(sn−2)) < 0
By continuity we have :
g(sn−2 + t)− h(sn−2, t) < 0 for t ∈ [−1, δ(sn−2))
with δ(sn−2) = inf{x ∈ [−1, 1] | g(sn−2 + x)− h(sn−2, x) = 0}.
By a symmetric argument
g(sn−2 + t)− h(sn−2, t) > 0 for t ∈ (γ(sn−2), 1]
with γ(sn−2) = sup{x ∈ [−1, 1] | g(sn−2 + x)− h(sn−2, x) = 0}.
Therefore, replacing Ln−1 by g in (8.3),(8.4), and (8.5), we deduce that Gn−1s<n−1 is continuous
on [−1, δ(sn−2)) and on [γ(sn−2), 1].
The equalizing condition (8.2) is then valid for t = −1 and t = 1. This implies
h(sn−2,−1)−
∫
[−1,1]
g(sn−2 + u)dGn−1s<n−1(u) = −h(sn−2, 1) +
∫
[−1,1]
g(sn−2 + u)dGn−1s<n−1(u)
Since Ln−2(s<n−2) =
∫
[−1,1] g(sn−2 + u)dGn−1s<n−1(u), we conclude that:
Ln−2(s<n−2) =
1
2(h(sn−2, 1) + h(sn−2,−1)) = g(sn−2)
and
Cn−1(s<n−2) =
1
2(h(sn−2,−1)− h(sn−2, 1)) = C(sn−2)
All the preceding results for k = n−1 apply for k = n−2 and by induction for any k ≤ n−1.

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Proof of lemma 5.2. Using (5.3) together integration by parts formula leads to
(8.6) (2Gns<n(t)− 1)(ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− h(sn−1, t)) = C(sn−1) + g(sn−1)− ϕ′(sn−1 − 1)
+ 2
∫
[−1,t]
(2Gns<n(u)− 1)dϕ′(sn−1 + u)
Taking formally the derivative with respect to t in (5.3) gives us:
∂h
∂t
(sn−1, t)(1− 2Gns<n(t)) + 2Gns<n ′(t)(ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− h(sn−1, t))
= (ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− h(sn−1, t))(1
t
(1− 2Gns<n(t)) + 2Gns<n ′(t)) = 0
Using the boundary condition Gns<n(−1) = 0 and Gns<n(1) = 1, the only solution of this differ-
ential equation is Gns<n(t) =
1
2(1 + t) and a direct computation shows that it is also a solution
of (5.3).
To prove uniqueness, let D(t) be the difference of two solutions. For t ∈ [−1, 0), it follows
from (8.6) that :
D(t)(ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− h(sn−1, t)) =
∫
[−1,t]
D(u)dϕ′(sn−1 + u)
with λ(t) = sup
x∈[−1,t]
1
|ϕ′(sn−1+t)−h(sn−1,t)| and Z(t) = sup
x∈[−1,t]
| D(x) |, we deduce
| D(t) |≤ λ(t)Z(t)(ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− ϕ′(sn−1 − 1))
Reporting in the first equation and with integration by parts formula:
| D(t) | ≤ λ(t)2Z(t)
∫
[−1,t]
(ϕ′(sn−1 + u)− ϕ′(sn−1 − 1))dϕ′(sn−1 + u)
≤ Z(t)λ(t)
2(ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− ϕ′(sn−1 − 1))2
2
Applying this process inductively:
| D(t) |≤ Z(t)λ(t)
n(ϕ′(sn−1 + t)− ϕ′(sn−1 − 1))n
n!
which proves that D(t) = 0 on [−1, 0) and by symmetry on (0, 1]. the result follows since the
solution must be nondecreasing.

Proof of lemma 5.3. Applying integration by parts formula in (8.2) gives us for t ∈
[−1, δ(sk−1)) ∪ (γ(sk−1), 1]
144 4. ETUDE ASYMPTOTIQUE D’UN JEU D’E´CHANGE A` SOMME NON-NULLE.
(8.7)
(2Gks<k(t)− 1)(g(sk−1 + t)− h(sk−1, t)) = C(sk−1) +
∫
[−1,1]
g(sk−1 + u)dGks<k(u)− g(sk−1 − 1)
+ 2
∫
[−1,t]
(2Gks<k(u)− 1)g′(sk−1 + u)du
(8.7) implies that Gks<k admits a derivative for
t ∈ [−1, δ(sk−1)) ∪ (γ(sk−1, 1]r {0}.
We recover then by differentiation equation (5.4) for these values of t :
∂h
∂t
(sk−1, t)(1− 2Gks<k(t)) + 2Gks<k ′(t)(g(sk−1 + t)− h(sk−1, t)) = 0
h(sk−1, •) admits a derivative except maybe in 0 and is continuous, and thus is an absolutely
continuous function. Therefore, the function
∂h
∂x
(sk−1, x)
g(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x) =
1
x
(ϕ′(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x))
g(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x)
is locally integrable on [−1, δ(sk−1)). Using the condition Gks<k(−1) = 0, a solution of this
differential equation on [−1, δ(sk−1)) is:
(8.8) Gks<k(t) =
1
2(1− exp(
∫ t
−1
1
x
(ϕ′(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x))
g(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x) dx))
If δ(sk−1) 6= 0, 1x(ϕ′(sk−1 + x) − h(sk−1, x)) being positive and since g(sk−1 + x) − h(sk−1, x)
admits a derivative in δ(sk−1):∫ t
−1
1
x
(ϕ′(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x))
g(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x) dx −→t→δ(sk−1)− −∞ =⇒ G
k
s<k
(t) −→
t→δ(sk−1)−
1
2
If ϕ is C2 with ϕ′′ > 0, then this result is true even if δ(sk−1) = 0 since in this case ∂h∂x(sk−1, x)
is continuous and positive on [−1, 1].
A symmetric argument shows that:
(8.9) Gks<k(t) =
1
2(1 + exp(−
∫ 1
t
1
x
(ϕ′(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x))
g(sk−1 + x)− h(sk−1, x) dx)) for t ∈ (γ(sk−1), 1]
If γ(sk−1) 6= 0 or ϕ is C2 with ϕ′′ > 0, Gks<k(t) −→t→γ(sk−1)+
1
2 .
We can check from (8.2) that a solution is then
(8.10) Gks<k(t) =

1
2(1− exp(
∫ t
−1
1
x
(ϕ′(sk−1+x)−h(sk−1,x))
g(sk−1+x)−h(sk−1,x) dx)) t ∈ [−1, δ(sk−1))
1
2 t ∈ [δ(sk−1), γ(sk−1))
1
2(1 + exp(−
∫ 1
t
1
x
(ϕ′(sk−1+x)−h(sk−1,x))
g(sk−1+x)−h(sk−1,x) dx)) t ∈ [γ(sk−1), 1]
and that Gks<k is solution of the differential equation (5.4) a.e. t ∈ [−1, 1]. Since this solu-
tion depends only on sk−1, it will be denoted Gsk−1 . This particular form of the conditional
distributions implies that (Sk)k=1,..,n−1 is a time-homogeneous Markov chain.
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To prove uniqueness, let D(t) be the difference of two solutions. For t ∈ [−1, δ(sk−1)), it
follows from (8.7) that :
D(t)(g(sk−1 + t)− h(sk−1, t)) =
∫
[−1,t]
D(u)dg(sk−1 + u)
with λ(t) = sup
x∈[−1,t]
1
|g(sk−1+t)−h(sk−1,t)| and Z(t) = sup
x∈[−1,t]
| D(x) |, we deduce
| D(t) |≤ λ(t)Z(t)(g(sk−1 + t)− g(sk−1 − 1))
Reporting in the first equation and with integration by parts formula:
| D(t) | ≤ λ(t)2Z(t)
∫
[−1,t]
(g(sk−1 + u)− g(sk−1 − 1))dg(sk−1 + u)
≤ Z(t)λ(t)
2(g(sk−1 + t)− g(sk−1 − 1))2
2
Applying this process inductively:
| D(t) |≤ Z(t)λ(t)
n(g(sk−1 + t)− g(sk−1 − 1))n
n!
which proves that D(t) = 0 on [−1, δ(sk−1)) and by symmetry on (γ(sk−1), 1]. Right-continuity
of the solutions implies also the equality in t = γ(sk−1).
The only cases where (8.8) and (8.9) do not define uniquely a distribution function is when
δ(sk−1) = 0, γ(sk−1) > 0, Gks<k(t) −→t→0− d <
1
2
and the symmetric case. Suppose in this case that we have two different solutions A,B, where
A is given by (8.10), these solutions must coincide on [−1, 0) and [γ(sk−1), 1] and we have:
h(sk−1, t)(1− 2A(t) + ∆A(t))−
∫
[−1,1]
g(sk−1 + u)sg(u− t)dA(u) = C(sk−1)
h(sk−1, t)(1− 2B(t) + ∆B(t))−
∫
[−1,1]
g(sk−1 + u)sg(u− t)dB(u) = C(sk−1)
Subtracting these two equation for some t ∈ [−1, 0), we find∫
[0,γ(sk−1)]
g(sk−1 + u)dB(u) =
∫
[0,γ(sk−1)]
g(sk−1 + u)dA(u) = g(sk−1)∆A(0)
But since g(sk−1 + •) is strictly increasing and measures dA and dB give the same mass to
[0, γ(sk−1)], this implies B = A on [0, γ(sk−1)].

We end this section with an useful lemma
Lemma 8.1: Let S and S ′ be polish spaces and hn and h Borel-measurable functions from S to
S ′. Let Pn be a sequence of probabilities over S weakly converging to P . Define E as the subset
of x ∈ S such that there exists a sequence xn → x such that hn(xn) does not converge to h(x)
and let P ◦ h−1 denote the image probability of P induced by the mapping h.
Using the former notations, if P (E) = 0, then Pn ◦ h−1n converges to P ◦ h−1.
Proof. See [10] theorem 5.5 p.33 
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Extension to integrable distributions. In order to extend the results of existence of
equilibria in the case of integrable distributions over R (denoted ∆1(R) hereafter), we have to
modify the definition of admissible strategies and the set of possible dual functions ψ accord-
ingly. The set of admissible strategies of P1 in this case is the set of strategies σ such that the
distribution pi induced by the pair (µ, σ) on (L, p1, .., pn) is in ∆1(Rn+1). The set of admissible
strategies of P1 in the dual game is then ∆1(Rn+1). For P2, an admissible strategy τ is such
that for any k and any p<k ∈ Rk−1 , τk(p<k) ∈ ∆1(R). With these definitions, for any pair of
admissible strategies, the payoff function of P1 is well defined in R and the payoff function of
P2 well-defined in R ∪ {−∞}.
The definition of the reduced strategy τ(ϕ) in section 4 is still meaningful for any convex
function ϕ with real values on (−n, n) and defines an admissible strategy. The only problem is
to specify the class of function Dn for which the associated strategy of P1 is admissible. The
definition of the process S in section 5 requires only that the function ϕ is C1 on (−n, n) and
such that ϕ′ is strictly increasing on this interval. The associated strategy of P1 is admissible if
and only if L = ϕ′(Sn) ∈ L1 and these conditions define the set Dn. It seems difficult however
to obtain a simple expression for this set except for n = 1 where this condition becomes
ϕ′(U) ∈ L1, where U is uniformly distributed on [−1, 1].
However, this extension is still expressed in terms of the dual game and the main difficulty
to prove the conjecture we addressed in the introduction is to invert this link. We know that
for a fixed probability µ with compact support as in the conjecture, we can find a sequence of
functions (ψn), such that the sequence of equilibria in G∗n(ψn) induce a sequence of equilibria
in Gn(µ). But the question of existence only is not sufficient, in order to use the result we have
proved here, we still need to show that the sequence ψn is not far, in a sense that has to be
made precise, from the sequence used in the proposition 6.1.
ANNEXE A
1. Probabilite´s, me´triques, lois conditionelles.
Soit E un espace topologique et B(E) la tribu bore´lienne sur E. On note ∆(E) l’espace
des probabilite´s sur B(E). Dans le corps du manuscrit, les espaces E conside´re´s sont toujours
me´triques se´parables et la plupart du temps polonais, c’est a` dire dont la topologie est me´trisable
par une me´trique d qui rend (E, d) complet et se´parable.
On munira implicitement tout espace topologique de la tribu bore´lienne associe´e, et tout
produit d’espaces topologiques de la topologie produit.
Notation 13: Si E,F sont deux espaces me´triques se´parables, et Q,R deux sous-ensembles de
∆(E) et ∆(F ). Alors on note P(Q,R) l’ensemble des probabilite´s sur E × F dont les distrib-
tions marginales sur X et Y appartiennent respectivement a` Q et R. Si Q = {µ}, on e´crira
simplement P(µ,R).
Lemme 1.1: Si E,F sont deux espaces me´triques se´parables et si Q,R sont des sous-ensembles
tendus (resp. ferme´s, convexes) de ∆(E) et ∆(F ). Alors l’ensemble P(Q,R) est lui meˆme tendu
(resp. ferme´, convexe).
De´finition 1.1: On de´finit la topologie faible w sur ∆(E) comme la topologie la moins fine
rendant continue toutes les applications de la forme
µ ∈ ∆(E) 7−→
∫
fdµ ∈ R
pour toute fonction f ∈ Cb(E) (continue borne´e).
Lemme 1.2: (∆(X), w) est un espace polonais.
De´finition 1.2: Dans la cas particulier ou` X = Rd, pour p ∈ [1,∞), on definit sur le sous-
ensemble
∆p(Rd) = {µ ∈ ∆(Rd) :
∫
Rd
|x|pdµ <∞}
La topologie Wp associe´e a` la distance de Wasserstein d’ordre p par
dWp(µ, ν) = min
pi∈P(µ,ν)
(
∫
|y − x|ppdpi(x, y))
1
p = min{‖X − Y ‖Lp | X ∼ µ , Y ∼ ν}
Lemme 1.3: (voir proposition 7.1.5 dans [2] et remarque 7.1.11)
L’espace me´trique (∆p(Rd), dWp) est complet et se´parable (donc polonais) . La topologie Wp
coincide avec la topologie engendre´e par l’ensemble Cp(Rd) des fonctions continues a` croissance
au plus polynomiale d’ordre p, i.e. la topologie la moins fine rendant continues les applications
µ ∈ ∆(X) 7−→
∫
fdµ ∈ R
147
148 A
pour f ∈ Cp(Rd). En particulier, une suite µn Wp-converge vers µ si et seulement si µn converge
faiblement vers µ et les moments d’ordre p convergent, c’est a` dire∫
Rd
|x|pdµn −→
∫
Rd
|x|pdµ
Un sous-ensemble S de ∆p(Rd) est relativement compact si et seulement si il admet des moments
d’ordre p uniforme´ment inte´grables, i.e.
lim
M→∞
sup
µ∈S
∫
Rd
|x|p1I|x|≥Mdµ(x) = 0
Ce dernier crite`re s’applique en particulier si S a des moments d’ordre q > p uniforme´ment
borne´s. Sur un tel ensemble, les topologies w et Wp coincident.
On utilisera en particulier le lemme suivant (lemme 5.2.4 dans [2]).
Lemme 1.4: Soient X = Y = Rd et pin ∈ P(X × Y ) est une suite faiblement convergente de
limite pi telle que
sup
n
∫
|x|p + |y|qdpin(x, y) <∞ pour p, q ∈ (1,∞) tels que 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1.
Si la suite de lois marginales µn sur X a des moments d’ordre p uniforme´ment inte´grables (resp.
νn sur Y a des moments d’ordre q uniforme´ment inte´grables) alors∫
〈x, y〉dpin(x, y)−→
n→∞
∫
〈x, y〉dpi(x, y)
De´finition 1.3: Etant donne´ Y polonais, on de´finit sur
∆1(Rd × Y ) = {µ :
∫
Rd×Y
|x|dµ(x, y) <∞}
une topologie mixte W1, w comme la topologie la moins fine rendant continue les applications
µ −→
∫
Rd×Y
g(x, y)dµ(x, y)
pour g : Rd × Y → R continue et telle qu’il existe une constante C ve´rifiant
∀y ∈ Y, g(x, y) ≤ C(1 + |x|)
remarque 1.1: Toutes les topologies conside´re´es engendrent les meˆmes tribus bore´liennes que
la tribu induite par la tribu bore´lienne associe´e a` la topologie faible w. On peut munir par
exemple ∆p(Rd) des topologies w et Wq pour 1 ≤ q ≤ p. Ces topologies e´tant de plus en plus
fines, on a une inclusion directe. Pour l’autre inclusion, on utilise la semi-continuite´ infe´rieure
de dWp sur (∆p(Rd), w) ( proposition 7.1.3 dans [2]). Ce re´sultat vaut aussi pour la topologie
mixte avec la meˆme preuve car cette topologie est en fait une distance de Wasserstein d’ordre 1
associe´e a` une me´trique produit ||+ d sur Rd× Y ou` d est une distance borne´e compatible avec
la topologie de Y .
On rappelle la de´finition classique des transitions
De´finition 1.4: Soient (E, E) un espace mesurable et F un espace polonais. Une probabilite´ de
transition de (E, E) dans F est une famille de probabilite´s sur F indexe´e par x ∈ E, q((. | x))x∈E
telle que pour tout B ∈ B(Y ), l’application x→ q(B | x) est E-mesurable.
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et la caracte´risation que nous utilisons tout au long du manuscrit.
Lemme 1.5: Si E et F sont polonais, alors q((.|x))x∈E est une probabilite´ de transition de E
dans F si et seulement si l’application x → q(.|x) est mesurable de E dans ∆(F ).(proposition
7.26 dans [9]).
Passons maintenant a` la de´finition des lois conditionnelles
De´finition 1.5: Soient X une variable ale´atoire a` valeurs dans un espace topologique E de´finie
sur un espace de probabilite´ (Ω,A,P) et F une sous-tribu de A. On appelle loi conditionnelle
(ou version re´gulie`re de la loi conditionnelle) de X sachant F une probabilite´ de transition
q(.|ω) de (Ω,F) dans E telle que pour toute fonction f mesurable borne´e∫
Ω
f(X(ω))dP(ω) =
∫
ω
(∫
E
f(x)q(dx | ω)
)
dP(ω)
The´oreme 1.1: (De´sinte´gration, voir 1.2 p.65 dans [36]) Dans la de´finition pre´ce´dente, si E
est polonais, alors il existe une loi conditionnelle de X sachant F .
Citons maintenant une version parame´tre´e du the´ore`me de de´sinte´gration.
The´oreme 1.2: (proposition 7.27 dans [9])
Soient E,F,G trois espaces polonais, et r(.|x) une probabilite´ de transition de E dans F ×G.
Alors il existe des probabilite´s de transition q(.|x, y) de E × F dans G et p(.|x) de E dans F
telles que
∀(A,B) ∈ B(F ),B(G), r(A×B|x, y) =
∫
A
q(B|x, y)p(dy|x)
On rappelle enfin le the´ore`me classique suivant, qui permet de construire des variables
ale´atoires avec des lois conditionnelles prescrites.
The´oreme 1.3: (Blackwell-Dubins [13])
Soit E un espace polonais et ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ) l’intervalle unite´ muni de la mesure de Lebesgue.
Il existe une application mesurable
Φ : [0, 1]×∆(E) −→ E
telle que pour toute loi µ ∈ ∆(E), la loi de Φ(U, µ) est exactement µ en notant U l’e´le´ment
canonique [0, 1] (ou` encore si U est une variable de loi uniforme sur [0, 1]). On fait parfois appel
a` ce re´sultat sans mentionner l’espace E concerne´ et en gardant la notation Φ pour diffe´rents
espaces.
On utilise ce re´sultat combine´ avec un re´sultat de de´sinte´gration dans les lemmes 4.1 et 6.1
du chapitre 2. Pre´cise´ment
Lemme 1.6: Soient X, Y des variables ale´atoires a` valeurs dans E de´finies sur un meˆme espace
de probabilite´s, U une variable uniforme sur [0, 1], inde´pendante de (X, Y ) et f une applica-
tion mesurable de E dans ∆(E2). Soit f1(x) la loi marginale de f(x) induite sur la premie`re
coordonne´e. Si f1(X) est une version de la loi conditionnelle de Y sachant X, alors il existe
une variable ale´atoire Z = ϕ(X, Y, U) telle que f(X) est une version de la loi conditionnelle
de (Y, Z) sachant X.
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De´monstration. On peut de´sinte´grer par le the´ore`me 1 la loi jointe f(x) en une paire
f1(x), g(x, y) ou` f1 est la loi marginale donne´e dans l’e´nonce´ et g une application a` valeur dans
∆(E). La variable Z = Φ(g(X, Y ), U) posse`de alors les proprie´te´s requises. 
Le re´sultat pre´ce´dent veut simplement dire que l’on peut construire une variable ale´atoire
vectorielle (Y, Z) ayant une loi conditionelle sachant X fixe´e sur un espace de probabilite´s ou`
X et Y sont de´ja` construites si la loi du couple X, Y est compatible avec la loi conditionnelle
choisie.
2. The´ore`mes de selection.
On rappelle ici les trois e´nonce´s principaux de the´ore`mes de selection mesurables utilise´s au
cours de la the`se.
The´oreme 2.1: (proposition 7.33 dans [9])
Soient E me´trique F compact me´trique, D ferme´ dans E × F et f s.c.s. sur D a` valeurs dans
R. On pose pour x dans DE (projection de D sur E)
g(x) = sup
y : (x,y)∈D
f(x, y)
Alors DE est ferme´, g est s.c.s. sur DE et il existe une fonction bore´lienne φ de DE dans F
dont le graphe est inclus dans D et telle que
∀x ∈ DE, f(x, φ(x)) = g(x)
The´oreme 2.2: (proposition 7.34 dans [9])
Soient E me´trique, F me´trique se´parable, D ouvert dans E × F et f s.c.i. sur D on pose
g(x) = sup
y : (x,y)∈D
f(x, y)
Alors DE est ouvert, g est s.c.i. sur DE et pour tout ε > 0, il existe une fonction bore´lienne φε
de DE dans F dont le graphe est inclus dans D et telle que
∀x ∈ DE, f(x, φ(x))
{≥ g(x)− ε si g(x) < +∞
≥ 1
ε
si g(x) = +∞
De´finition 2.1: Soient E et F polonais. On rapelle que la tribu universellement mesurable
sur E, U(E) est de´finie par
U(E) = ⋂
µ∈∆(E)
B(E)µ
ou` B(E)µ est la comple´tion de B(E) par rapport a` µ ( la tribu engendre´e par B(E) et les sous-
ensembles µ-ne´gligeables de E). Une application de E dans F est universellement mesurable
si
∀B ∈ B(F ), f−1(B) ∈ U(E)
Lemme 2.1: (lemme 7.27 dans [9])
Soient E et F polonais. Soit µ ∈ ∆(E) et f universellement mesurable de E dans F , alors il
existe g bore´lienne de E dans F telle que {f 6= g} soit µ-ne´gligeable.
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The´oreme 2.3: (Von Neumann, proposition 7.49 dans [9])
Soient E et F polonais. Si D est Borel dans E×F alors il existe une application universellement
mesurable de DE dans F dont le graphe est inclus dans D.
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